291. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Meeting between Mr. Kubisch and Peruvian Foreign Ministry Secretary General Garcia Bedoya—October 23, 1973 (5:00 p.m.)

PARTICIPANTS

  • Peru

    • Peruvian Foreign Ministry
    • Secretary General Carlos Garcia Bedoya
    • Peruvian Minister-Counselor
    • Manuel A. Roca-Zela
  • U.S.

    • Mr. Jack B. Kubisch, ARA
    • Mr. Richard F. Weber, ARA-LA/EP
    • Mr. Myles R.R. Frechette, ARA-LA/EP/P

Garcia Bedoya had asked for an urgent meeting with Mr. Kubisch on October 23 because he was returning to Lima on the following day. In requesting the appointment he had said that he wanted to discuss U.S.-Peruvian bilateral relations and the Peruvian version of the inter-governmental agreement connected with the Greene Mission.

[Page 776]

The meeting lasted almost an hour and the atmosphere was cordial. The principal points covered in the conversation are as follows:

Garcia Bedoya began by saying that he wanted to give Mr. Kubisch his view of the work of the OAS Special Committee. With respect to the political subcommittee, he said there had been much discussion concerning definitions of democracy. Peru, he said, had participated fully in those discussions and was very interested in such concepts as pluralismo and plena participatión. Garcia Bedoya stated that he believed that through discussion, these problems could be overcome. With respect to the Rio Treaty, he said that Peru believed changes were required.

Concerning economic matters, Garcia Bedoya said that there was a great deal of hard work to be done and that progress had been very slow. He said that he believed the U.S. had the erroneous impression that the Latins were trying to commit the U.S. to new and increased levels of bilateral assistance. What the Latins were trying to achieve was a new, more realistic and effective cooperation with the U.S.

Garcia Bedoya said he had read Mr. Kubisch’s Boston speech to the Inter-American Press Association with great interest, and in connection with that speech asked whether Secretary of State Kissinger planned to go to Bogota. He said he believed that all Latin American foreign ministers were most interested in talking to Secretary Kissinger, and he thought that such talks with the Secretary of State would be beneficial. He asked Mr. Kubisch whether Peru could be informed as early as possible if the Secretary were to go to Bogota. Finally, referring to the next session in Lima of the OAS Special Committee, he asked whether Mr. Kubisch would be travelling to Lima.

Mr. Kubisch began by explaining the origin of the Bogota meeting. He then said that Secretary Kissinger had not been officially invited to Bogota, that he had no plans to go there and that he had many other commitments. However, Mr. Kubisch said that if all the Latins wanted the Secretary to go, he could not see how the Secretary could refuse. In sum, Mr. Kubisch said that while attendance by the Secretary was possible, it was not probable. With respect to a meeting in Bogota of Latin American foreign ministers, Mr. Kubisch noted that the U.S. did not think it a good idea for the Latin Americans to get together and attempt to present a prescription to the U.S. concerning hemispheric relations, to be either accepted or rejected à la Consensus of Viña del Mar. By the same token, he said that the U.S. was not seeking to develop a U.S. prescription for the Hemisphere, which the Latins could either accept or reject. Mr. Kubisch said that in his view, the objective should be a dialogue between all the countries in the Hemisphere. However, this dialogue should be private and frank, not aimed at international or domestic opinion. He believed that out of such a dialogue all of the [Page 777] countries in the Hemisphere working together could develop policies and approaches which would contribute to the common good of all. Garcia Bedoya agreed that it was important to avoid another Consensus of Viña del Mar, and the Bogota meeting should be very carefully planned to avoid such an outcome. He said his government would watch and approach it very carefully. Mr. Kubisch asked that Peru keep the U.S. advised of its attitude toward the Bogota meeting through Ambassador Belcher. In response to a question by Mr. Kubisch, Garcia Bedoya said that his Foreign Minister had left New York before the Bogota meeting had been suggested and he had not yet been formally invited.

Mr. Kubisch pointed out that in one or two days Ambassador Jova would present the U.S. position on possible changes to the Rio Treaty. With respect to economic questions, Mr. Kubisch said that it was unrealistic for the Latins to think that they could pressure the U.S. into making specific commitments with respect to assistance for the Hemisphere. He said that this was a misreading of the way the U.S. Government and the U.S. Congress operated. Pressure, he said, would not produce a commitment from the United States. Mr. Kubisch said he had just returned from a briefing on the Middle East by the Secretary. The Arabs, he said, had tried to pressure the U.S. with oil. Both they and the Russians had found out that pressure of this kind does not work with the U.S.

Mr. Kubisch remarked that he hoped to see Garcia Bedoya in Lima, and said that although he did not know for sure, he expected to be present at the forthcoming Lima session of the OAS Special Committee.

Garcia Bedoya said that one of the reasons for his early return to Lima was to be present during Mr. Greene’s next visit. Mr. Kubisch asked him how he saw the prospects for a prompt settlement. Garcia Bedoya said that he sincerely hoped there would be a prompt settlement. Peru, he said, was prepared to be reasonable. However, because of the disparity in size and power between the two countries, his government expected the U.S. to be more reasonable than Peru.

Concerning the Cerro Corporation, Mr. Kubisch said that in his view, the Peruvian Government had been very restrained in its reaction to the Cerro communiqué. Garcia Bedoya agreed, saying that the sort of thing Cerro said in its communiqué had hurt Peruvian feelings. He observed that, bearing in mind the nationalistic set of the military government, Peru’s reaction indicated that it seeks a negotiated settlement of the Cerro problem.

Mr. Kubisch asked whether there had been any progress in the fisheries dispute talks, and Garcia Bedoya replied that it was up to the U.S. to do whatever was necessary to persuade the Ecuadoreans to return to the negotiating table. Peru, he said, because of its treaty [Page 778] commitments could not negotiate bilaterally with the U.S.; however, if the U.S. could take care of some of Ecuador’s preconditions for returning to quadripartite talks, Peru would be happy to negotiate and would be prepared to offer its good offices so that such talks could take place as quickly as possible.

Mr. Kubisch asked whether Peru would seize U.S. fishing vessels this season, adding that he was very worried about this problem. Garcia Bedoya replied that Peru was worried also and said that for a long time his government had been restrained with respect to seizures. However, nothing had come of that restraint. He stated that it would be difficult to avoid seizures if U.S. vessels were too numerous off the coast of Peru.

Mr. Kubisch asked Garcia Bedoya what he thought of the situation in Chile. The latter said that in his view, things were still confused, but that perhaps it would be better if there were no more paredones de la derecha.

Garcia Bedoya pointed out that his government had provided the U.S. Embassy in Lima with its counter-draft of the inter-governmental agreement which would be issued if the Greene Mission succeeded. Mr. Kubisch said that he had just received the agreement that afternoon and had not had a chance to study it.

  1. Summary: Kubsich and García Bedoya discussed regional issues and investment and fisheries disputes.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, POL PERU–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Frechette on October 29; cleared by Weber and Kubisch. The meeting took place in Kubisch’s office. The text of Kubisch’s speech can be found in the Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1973, pp. 608–613. Belcher informed the Department that even though Velasco had threatened to expropriate the Cerro corporation, he had not. In addition, the Cerro corporation, in Belcher’s words, “using what appears to us extreme language,” had stated that the Peruvian Government had negotiated in bad faith and refused to sell its assets to the Peruvians. (Telegram 7065 from Lima and Telegram 190532 to Lima, both September 25; ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])