285. Telegram 310 From the Consulate in the Netherlands Antilles to the Department of State1
310. Subject: Secvisit LA: Memorandum of Conversation—Secretary Rogers and Prime Minister Mercado of Peru. Secto 175.
1. Secretary Rogers met with Prime Minister Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, at the Minister’s office on May 16 at 5:00 p.m. Participants [Page 763] were US side: Ambassador Taylor G. Belcher and Assistant Secretary-Designate Jack B. Kubisch; Peruvian side: Mr. Igor Velasquez of the Foreign Office.
2. After the customary exchange of pleasantries in which Mercado referred to the present meeting as an opportunity to continue the talks he had held previously with the Secretary when he was in Washington and New York as Foreign Minister, Mercado made a short presentation of the revolutionary government’s philosophy. He said that the US should not think that the anti-American tone of some of the news reporting was an expression of his government’s policy. The revolutionary process was one of freeing Peru from the shackles of the past when less than 10 percent. What the revolutionary government wanted was a more equitable sharing of Peru’s wealth. In carrying out the measures required to assure this better distribution, US and other private interests naturally had been affected and this had led to investment and other disputes with the US.
3. The Prime Minister referred specifically to the 200-mile problem and went into some detail in expressing the well-known Peruvian position. In doing so, he reiterated his government’s pledge that this claim of sovereignty was a limited one in that the Government of Peru did not contest the right of free passage and over-flights and jointly agreed to scientific surveys. Despite this fact, the US government had applied the Pelly Amendment to Peru and this adversely affected the security interests of his country. Mercado said that Peru needed to carry out a modernization program and they preferred to buy US equipment. He referred to the several lists which had been provided the Embassy and he handed the Secretary an abbreviated list of items which all three services wished to purchase. When Secretary Rogers asked what the priorities might be on this list, Mercado indicated that spares, aircraft and medium tanks were the most urgently needed items, in that order.
4. The Secretary said that he had had an opportunity during his meeting with President to discuss both the 200-mile problem and Foreign Military Sales. He said he would like to present in general terms his view of US attitude toward the revolutionary government. First, he wanted to assure the Prime Minister that we wanted the revolutionary government to succeed in achieving its program. Second, we wanted to assure the Prime Minister that we had no worries with regard to the basic ideology of the government. Third, he wanted to observe that military officers were practical men and he suggested that we talk in practical terms. Secretary Rogers observed that the US was the strongest nation in the world and that our position traditionally had been in support of a three-mile limit. And that we could enforce our will should we choose to. However, such was not our policy and [Page 764] we had no intention of using force to enforce our views throughout the world. Different nations were making different claims with regard to territorial seas. Some were proposing 12, others 50. Canada, for instance, was claiming 100 miles for pollution control purposes. The US Government could not accept any of these positions pending the outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference. The Secretary also described the USG position with regard to the use of seabed resources beyond a specified territorial sea and our hope that this might be made subject to regulation and exploitation by an international regime. Until such time as there was an international agreement resulting from the LOS conference, the US would never approve a concession with regard to the many and differing individual claims for a more extensive territorial sea.
5. The Secretary suggested that we might deal with the fishery problem as a separate issue. In itself it was not a serious matter economically but the principle involved is vital to US interests. Therefore, what we should try for is an interim agreement pending the LOS conference decision. He suggested that we were fortunate in that we had probably six months during which there would be no fishing for tuna in this area, so we ought to be able to discuss the matter without the embarrassment of further seizures and during the period hopefully we could reach an agreement which would not compromise either country’s juridical position. The Secretary said that he understood that any such interim agreement would have to be acceptable to Ecuador because of the Santiago agreement but that there were various suggestions which could be considered in informal talks and that perhaps with the help of Peru, Ecuador could be brought along.
6. Mercado commented that at our request, when he was Foreign Minister, he had arranged for the GOP to hold off on seizures for over a year in order to give us a chance to come up with some proposals for an interim agreement but that we apparently had been unable to reach agreement within the US Government and no proposals had been forthcoming. The cause of public reaction to the fact of the Ecuadorian seizures and the general knowledge that the tuna boats were in Peruvian waters. The GOP had been unable to continue its conciliatory policy during the last fishing season. As a result, we had again applied the coercive Pelly Amendment, thereby depriving Peru even of spare parts required for pilot safety. What the Prime Minister wanted to know was whether or not we were prepared to act favorably on their requests for arms. If the answer was no, then obviously they would have to look elsewhere.
7. Secretary Rogers reminded General Mercado of the reasons for Congressional actions such as the Pelly Amendment. He said he could accept almost any solution to this problem which did not involve [Page 765] conceding on the question of sovereignty. He asked whether Peru in using force against our fishing boats was attempting to force the US Government to accept Peru’s position. He reminded the Minister that we were not asking Peru to give up its juridical position. We wanted to await a general decision as a result of the forthcoming LOS conference. All we were proposing now was a modus operandi for the forthcoming fishing season in the belief that the basic problem would be solved at the LOS conference.
8. Mercado said that the informal talks might be restarted through the Foreign Ministry on a very confidential basis, with the talks taking place outside Peru, perhaps in connection with jointly attending international conferences. If these were successful, then they could be formalized in a new quadripartite conference (Peru, Ecuador, Chile, and US) which would be of public knowledge.
9. Secretary Rogers then asked whether Peru would go to such informal, confidential talks in good faith and be prepared to take into account not only its own political problems but also those faced by the US Government in this connection with this issue. Mercado said he could not make such a commitment if the question of Peruvian Sovereignty was involved. Despite several attempts on the part of the Secretary to clarify exactly what it was he was proposing, Mercado seemed not to understand, making several references and in an almost belligerent tone to the fact that we had to appreciate the 200-mile question was a serious internal political problem for the government. Finally the Secretary said, “why can’t you just say yes, we will try with good will to reach an agreement taking into account each other’s political problems? Can you agree to that?” Mercado hesitated for a moment and then said yes. The Secretary then noted we had reached an agreement which would enable us to lift the ban on FMS for spares and A–37–B aircraft as soon as a date could be set for the first informal, confidential discussions to be held in Washington.
10. Having in mind the rumors of an impending take-over of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, the Secretary asked Mercado point blank whether his government was planning any further moves which might cause him (the Secretary) any embarrassment in the near future. After a pause, Mercado said no, and then went on to mention the fact that there could be a problem in the future over Cerro. He described briefly the present situation of the company in Peru and its investment needs and problems, saying that the matter was under study by a Government Commission which had come at variance with the value set by the company. He said that this was a matter which would have to be discussed and negotiated but he did not expect any action until late July or early August. There would be no confiscation, on the contrary, there would be negotiation.
[Page 766]1. In view of the late hour and our next appointment, only passing reference was made to the following matters:
1) General Mercado brought up the matter of US Trade Legislation, referring to the fact that with regard to general preferences the law included a paragraph on expropriation which was prejudicial to Peru. The Secretary reminded the Prime Minister that the language referred to expropriation without compensation and not just expropriation as such.
2) The Prime Minister then said that our stockpile disposal program was damaging to Peru’s interests. The Secretary said that we were conferring with the governments concerned and no action would be taken prior to these discussions. Whatever we decided, we would attempt to assure there was no disruption of the world markets.
-
Summary: Rogers and Mercado discussed Peru’s maritime claims, fishing rights, and the lifting of a ban on Peruvian participation in the Foreign Military Sales program.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated for information to Lima. On May 14, Nixon signed Presidential Determination 73–13 waiving the Pelly Amendment allowing FMS of 24 A–37 aircraft. (Memorandum From Peet to Clements, June 3; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78 0001, Latin America 092.2–850, 1973) In telegram 3361 from Mexico, May 14, Rogers requested Belcher’s and Crimmins’s views as to whether he should inform the Peruvian Prime Minister in his upcoming May 16 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, ORG 7 S.) In telegram 3101 from Lima, May 14, Belcher recommended Rogers inform de la Flor in their first May 16 meeting. (Ibid.) In telegram 91988 to Caracas and Lima, May 14, Crimmins suggested that Rogers should demur if the matter came up in the conversations in Peru. Instead, Crimmins recommended that after Rogers returned to Washington he could then inform the Peruvians that the waiver had been issued as a result of the conversations in Lima. (Ibid.)
↩