277. Telegram 5516 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of State1
5516. Subj: Narcotics Assistance.
1. During my farewell call on the Foreign Minister, Lievano let his hair down on the narcotics program. He said that the Minister of Defense had become quite irritated (Molestoso) and felt that the discussions we had had with his staff on the narcotics program indicated a lack of confidence in the military. In addition, since the proposal we had made did not correspond in level or nature to their concept of what they felt they should and could do, the Minister of Defense has decided there was no point in getting involved in the narcotics field; the ministry will therefore not undertake the coordinated major interdiction efforts they had talked about.
2. I said to the Minister that I was very disturbed to hear that and especially that there was irritation. I believed that there was probably misunderstanding over what we were able and not able to do. I noted, for example, that levels offered were dictated by Congressional appropriation. Our proposal was designed to make optimum use of admittedly only very limited available funds. I also pointed out that we were required to comply with certain procedural and congressionally mandated restrictions as to use of equipment, and that ProAgs had to reflect this.
3. The Minister said he understood all of that and he was not implying any lack of good faith on our part. However, he said, the whole US approach did not appear to be consonant with the depth of the problem. The Minister then entered upon a calm and gentle lecture. For the future, he said, the US should bear in mind that the narcotics traffic problem is very deep and very big. If we felt it was as serious as we said it was, and if we felt the effects of the narcotics [garble] were as deleterious to our society as we said they were, then the only logical conclusion is massive action to combat it. The US cannot handle [Page 744] the problem with small, haggling (regateo) limitations and restrictions every step of the way, nor, he added, with relatively small amounts of funds. Colombia had felt that the problem was of such magnitude that a major and all-out “war” was necessary to cut the traffic. I told the Minister that we did believe that the problem was serious and required major efforts, but I did want to point out that the nature of the problem did not really require massive movements of men and equipment but good operational intelligence and quick responses to take advantage of that intelligence. Therefore, it should not be a question of large levels of funds or even equipment, but really of people and strategy. The Minister added that he could understand that. But while he agreed it was not a question of just levels of funds, part of the problem lay in what he continued to call “haggling” and restrictiveness in procedures.
4. I asked the Minister where, then, we should go from here and he suggested that we continue as we are and continue to cooperate with the F–2 and other agencies. Until there was further internal consideration of whether to have a central point of command/coordination, we should just continue the present pattern. I said we would do so and would probably even seek to expand cooperation with the F–2.
5. Comment: Operationally, I do not think the situation we have arrived at is catastrophic. We will still be able to work fruitfully with the agencies as we have been doing. Psychologically, however, I fear we have not fared very well. The perception at high levels, and certainly in the military, appears to be what we feared it might, viz., that we did not consider the matter serious enough to cut red tape, take chances, make special efforts and provide high levels of aid. To judge from the Minister’s repetitive use of the word “regatear” they see our insistence on the conditions we were instructed to [garble] out to them as nitpicking and haggling. The MOD’s irritation apparently reflects a) disappointment at the level of our response to their proposals and, I think more seriously and specifically, b) their reaction to our position on helicopters, i.e. that the helicopters would be flown and maintained by a private company under contract instead of being given to the FAC. (Although State 61912 gave us a fall-back position to permit FAC operation and maintenance “if the GOC is adamant”, we were never able to get that far; as soon as we laid out our suggestion, the military just froze up and walked away.) Not used to negotiating ProAgs, the military, with perhaps more pride than justification, assumed that we took their intentions in good faith and that we would give them the tools to do the job; our explanations as to requirements and procedures simply looked like small haggling to them and they apparently decided the levels of aid were not worth the trouble of negotiation (unless they have second thoughts later). There may not be much equity in that [Page 745] perception, but that is the way they apparently saw it, and therefore that perception is a political fact.
6. My impression is that at high levels, and certainly at the two Ministers’ level, they have concluded that since we are apparently not going to be in a position to backstop a large “war” on drugs, they too might just as well relegate the matter back to the nature of an on-going police operation and let the technicians work it out. I do not rpt not believe their goodwill, their concern or their intention to continue cooperation at the police level is adversely affected. But I doubt they will be very patient with any exhortations they may receive from any future visiting Congressman or official seeking to stimulate Colombia to greater efforts.
7. In my farewell call on the President I will, if it seems appropriate, discuss the matter further with him. In the meantime, I do believe we can expand cooperation effectively with the F–2 and we intend to begin to concentrate our efforts there and with the judicial police. We should be able to use much of the funds currently earmarked in various kinds of additional programs with the existing agencies.
8. Action requested: I ask that pending my talk with the President, the funds which had been earmarked, and which I understand from State 133234 would be available until August 31, continue to be reserved for Colombia to give us time to study additional activity with the national police.
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Summary: Vaky informed the Department that Lievano was disappointed with the level of U.S Government funding of anti-narcotics efforts, and perceived a U.S. lack of confidence in Colombia’s military to lead the effort. Vaky requested that the Department continue to reserve previously earmarked anti-narcotics funds for Colombia.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760217–0970. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Caracas, USCINCO, and DEA. In telegram 146051 to Bogotá, June 14, the Department informed the Embassy it was concerned that the Colombians seemed to be backing away from López’s declared intention to undertake a major anti-narcotics effort, and it instructed Vaky to inform the Colombian President of the Department’s policy. (Ibid., D760229–0184)
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