266. Telegram 2128 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of State1
2128. Subject: The US and Colombia: The Problem of Linkages. For ARA Asst Sec Rogers from the Amb.
1. Summary. This cable is intended to give you a tentative overview of the GOC’s perception of US in the hope that this may be helpful to you, particularly in the light of possible forthcoming visits: A significant change is occurring in the GOC’s perception and attitude toward US. It appears to be increasingly one of doubt about the sincerity of our interest or of our capacity to cooperate in the crunches, and a corresponding conclusion that they cannot depend upon close ties with US alone to defend their own interests. This perception is not new in Colombia, but the readiness of the GOC to act systematically on it is. This perception is the result of the linked impact of a variety of factors, especially the Quito conference, the trade act and our response to a series of bilateral issues. It is not that the GOC is becoming hostile; rather it is becoming more calculating and hard-headed, more willing to offset US and to develop more leverage to deal with US. To some degree this is understandable; but the point is that at the moment Colombia is moving away from US, and the ultimate degree of friendship or antagonism, warmth or coolness of our basic relationship is still to be decided. A conscious awareness of how the GOC “sees” US and of how linkages among the various things we do reinforce each other would help optimize beneficial effects. End summary.
2. More than most LA countries, Colombia has approached the whole question of a relationship with US with understanding and moderation. Thus while Colombia shares the Latin American fear of [Page 711] the interventionist tendencies of our power, it has also been more disposed then most to appreciate the benefit side, to be cooperative and to “help US out” (e.g. flowers and countervailing duties). More than most, Colombians have understood what we had in mind when we talked of mutuality, interdependence and dialogue.
3. Now, however, a subtle but significant change is in process in the GOC’s perception of US. The image of the US which increasingly appears to form the basis for the Lopez administration’s attitude toward US may be described approximately as follows: a) whatever the rhetoric, the US as a nation and a people are basically indifferent to Latin America’s ordeal; at least they are unwilling or unable to implement any special treatment for the region; b) the US readily departs from its philosophy and rhetoric when it feels its self interest requires, and it frequently “exports” its problems; in particular the US does not hesitate to use its power as a sanction or to “intervene” when it feels it must; c) all of this is understandable and realistic, but what it means is that for Colombia to depend too much upon close ties with US is to subject Colombian development and national life to US-determined interest, priorities and perceptions and to US domestic crises and swings.
4. This Colombian perception is the result of the linked impact of a number of complex and long-range factors, such as basic changes in the world structure; what they see as the impact on US of our recent and current domestic economic, political and spiritual crises: The CIA “revelations”. But there are three proximate sources for this “cooling” which it is important for US to understand: a) the GOC’s reaction to Quito b) the image of US they saw revealed in the Trade Act and c) our reaction to a series of bilateral issues.
5. Quito. President Lopez said to Ambassador Mailliard that the GOC had assumed that in agreeing to an OAS meeting the US also implicitly agreed it should be a success. The GOC believes it was in our power to help secure the requisite votes, and that therefore our decision not to do so was a deliberate one that left it out on a limb. What it is particularly important to understand is that their unhappiness rests basically on personal dimensions. Colombians are intensely personalistic, and dignity and self-esteem are extremely important. The Foreign Minister and the President, and more abstractly all the GOC, felt personally embarrassed by the results. Their dignity and self-esteem were damaged, and they fastened on us as the cause. One does not, in their view, treat a friend that way. That is why the resentment has been deep and why logical arguments do not alleviate it.
6. Trade Act. The Colombians consider that the Trade Act neither hurts nor particularly benefits them. They understand the concepts behind it and give us credit for them. To them however the conditions [Page 712] in Title V are reminiscent of the Hickenlooper amendment and are evidence that we are still prepared to attach conditions to our assistance. To them import-sensitive exceptions are deliberate departures from our stated philosophy when adherence to it becomes difficult. To them there is little in the act that shows any special consideration for Latin America. What they see demonstrated, in short, is not so much our principles, but how readily we depart from them under pressure when we think we have to. They understand this as realistic and even inevitable, and they do not condemn us for it (as some of their neighbors do). What they simply conclude is that there is doubt as to how much access to markets they really get.
7. Bilateral problems. Consider the Colombian perspective on some current bilateral matters: although somewhat assuaged by the presidential invitation, the GOC still feels it is not as highly regarded by US as some other nations. The Secretary’s March 1 speech, for example, made clear to the world that his trip and yours were important opening guns to grasp the “new opportunity”. Yet as far as Colombian knew at the moment they are left out of both.
8. Textiles may be our most touchy current bilateral problem. The Colombians understand our problems; yet their industry is vital to them, too. And so they are waiting to see what treatment we offer them in the light of all we have said about friendship, access to markets, a new world order, etc. Whether they will agree to limit themselves voluntarily depends upon whether they will think our offer reasonable in terms of their own interests. But more than that, they think that what is at stake here is a test case of the future—of the role of comparative advantage in a new world trading system. What they are afraid of is that we will handle it in terms of the domestic political pressures of the moment, rather than as a problem of mutual interests in a new world system as we talk about.
9. Colombia’s concern with the Urrutia-Thomson Treaty rests more on concepts of dignity and sovereignty than on estimates of benefit alone. What they see is a treaty right they enjoy [garble] although they have periodically brought this subject up over the past year and a half to ascertain our purpose and thoughts, all they have heard us say is, “don’t call us, we’ll call you.”
10. Although Colombia has ratified the Quita Sueno Treaty, we have not. The GOC can only conclude that the matter is not very important to us.
11. Their efforts up to now to find out what we think about a new coffee agreement have elicited no real answer. Because they have had no indication we wanted a new agreement, Colombia stopped entering actively into tech discussions in the ICO, feeling it pointless. We in turn interpreted that as meaning Colombia had no interest. And so we [Page 713] have danced around each other waiting for evidence of each other’s good faith. What the Colombians look for is private consultations and a meeting of the minds with US.
12. In short, the Colombian perception of US is a total perception. All of these—and other—factors reinforce each other, and it is their linked impact that has added up to doubt a cumulative doubt of the sincerity of our interest, of our willingness or capacity to be helpful in the crunches (which is when they think they need our help the most), and even of how much Colombia itself really wants to open up to US.
13. It is not that Colombia is becoming hostile, far from it. But it is becoming hard-headed. It is less disposed to be cooperative to “help us out”. It is more prepared to balance and offset us than to follow our leadership. In short the GOC seems to be moving to a conception of a relationship with US that is based on a calculation of their own interests and a toe-to-toe bargaining strategy, even if it means risking our irritation, displeasure or opposition.
14. All of this is coupled with the growing conviction that the GOC needs to create new relationships and arrangements to advance Colombia’s interests and improve its leverage. Thus Colombia is more disposed now than it ever has been to [garble] into a dumb-bell pattern and to regional arrangements such as SELA.
15. There is nothing particularly unique, extraordinary or surprising in all of this. These perceptions are not particularly new. What is new is that the Lopez admin is more prepared than its predecessors to act systematically on these perceptions. The Lopez govt is a far different thing than the Pastrana govt. To some degree, too, Colombia’s desire to be master of its own fate is understandable, even desirable. But the point is that Colombia is at the moment moving away from US and it is not clear where it is going to stop. The precise degree of warmth or coolness, alienation or cooperation, irritation or politeness which the basic relationship will ultimately exhibit is still very much in doubt. A subtle erosion in our relationship is in process—some of it unavoidable—and it will take a conscious effort to arrest it.
16. Like most LA’s, Colombia judges the value of cooperation with US, and the sincerity of our [garble] and it decides how to deal with US—in short it “sees” US—in terms of how we respond to their concrete problems, situations, interests and needs. This egocentric attitude should neither irritate nor surprise US. LA’s have no other way of conceiving a relationship with US, given their long history of gravitation around our power pole and their list of past grievances. “What have you done for me lately?” is to the Latinos a perfectly legitimate question to ask. And so when we talk of mutual adventures they first seek to test our good faith, and the only way they know how to do that is to judge how we relate to what they consider their major concerns and needs.
[Page 714]17. This situation is still with US. The Secy’s March 1 speech was excellent. Cellos are more soothing than trumpets. But ultimately the question will be the same: What does it mean for me? When the Secy says commodities policy is essential, the Colombians will say, “fine, how about coffee?” when we say access to markets is vital to the developing world, the Colombians say, “we agree; how are you going to treat me on textiles?”
18. None of this argues for simply catering to every Latin whim. It does mean we have yet to win Latin America’s confidence. That in turn underlines the importance of an accurate understanding of how the Colombians “see” us and of a conscious awareness of linkages, i.e. how separate issues reinforce or offset each other. Many of our problems obviously maybe intractable, e.g. textiles. But our style and responsiveness on others might be shaped differently were we aware of the linkages, e.g. visits, and canal question.
19. Curiously we often forget about this linkage effect. Our bilateral policies are often the prey of two interrelated circumstances a) the domestic structure of our bureaucracy which means different experts handle different problems with different perspectives and criteria, and b) the absence of any consensus as to a fundamental purpose governing our relations with LA which can serve as an arbiter when contradictory US sub-interests are involved. Neither the “special relationship” nor any other concept of LA importance has ever really received bureaucratic-wide consensus or acceptance up to now. In the absence of such an accepted over-arching concept or purpose, issues tend to become decided on tech, parochial or individual bases, without particular regard to on-going relations or to each other.
20. No matter how you slice it, Colombia is unique in the hemisphere and uniquely positioned to be consecutive. It is, after all, large enough—fourth in size, third in population—to be important, it is democratic enough to be listened to with respect by the left; non-ideological and pragmatic [enough] to work with the right; dynamic and rich enough—the most industrialized country in the Andean Pact including Venezuela—to be a force in economic integration; poor enough to be a spokesman for the third world in any international forum; and moderate and realistic enough to be willing to respond to us if we prove ourselves willing to help them with their problems.
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Summary: Vaky reported that the outcome of the Quito MFM, the provisions of the U.S. Trade Act, and the U.S. Government’s handling of bilateral issues had caused the Colombian Government to doubt the sincerity and reliability of the United States.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750078–1057. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. The Quito Conference is discussed in Documents 386, 389, and 396. In telegram 519 from Bogotá, January 17, Vaky reported on January 14 conversations between U.S. and Colombian officials on textiles, stating that the Colombians sought to stabilize and increase their share of the U.S. market. (Ibid.) The Urrutia-Thomson Treaty of 1914 guaranteed Colombia’s right of access to the Panama Canal. López, in a conversation with Mailliard and Vaky, expressed concern that the current Panama Canal negotiations maintain Colombia’s rights under the Urrutia-Thomson Treaty. The U.S. officials assured him that Colombia would be consulted with regard to U.S. capacity to comply with the Treaty. (Telegram 802 from Bogotá, January 27; RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750031–0766) Kissinger’s March 1 speech is in the Department of State Bulletin, March 24, 1975, pp. 361–369. In telegram 4902 from Bogotá, May 29, Vaky reported that a U.S.-Colombian agreement on textiles had been signed. (Ibid., D750189–1046)
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