262. Telegram 3504 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of State1

3504. Subj: Election Analysis.

1. With almost all votes counted and a breakdown available by department, we are now in a position to offer a preliminary analysis of the elections.

2. The most striking features of the election were the high abstention rate, the low Conservative vote, the virtual demise of Anapo and the absolute majority for the Liberals that will give them clear control of both Houses of Congress.

3. That a smaller percentage of eligible voters should go to the polls in this, the first Liberal/Conservative face-off in National Elections in twenty-eight years, than in 1970 is a source of speculation and wonderment. The Liberal vote was just about what we had anticipated, [Page 704] but Conservatives abstained in large numbers as did Anapistas. The great mass that has never voted remained out of the electoral process again this year.

4. With respect to the Conservatives, what seems to have happened is that Gomez’ strategy of not provoking the Liberals into a massive turnout was successful, but with Conservatives, not Liberals. Gomez’ cool and bland approach left Conservatives in a distinctly apathetic mood. Nor did Gomez’ hopes for an overwhelming return of Conservative Anapistas to their former party materialize. Rather than vote for either Gomez or the Anapo candidate, Mrs. Moreno, they stayed home on election day. In comparing the 74 and 70 elections, there is a close correlation in many departments between the drop-off in the Anapo vote from 70 and the decrease in the Conservative vote. For example, in the department of Cordoba the Conservatives (including Conservative Anapistas) received 79,000 votes in 70, of which 41,000 went to Anapo. In 74, Anapo received 5,000 votes in Cordoba, down 36,000 from 70. The Conservatives won 42,000, down 35,000 from the combined Conservative Anapo total in 70. This pattern was repeated throughout the nation, although it does not hold in every instance.

5. Another factor in the route of the Conservatives was the inactivity of the progressives in that party. The leaders of that group, Belisario Betancur, a proven vote getter, Hernan Jaramillo and J. Emilio Valderrama, remained on the sidelines throughout the campaign. Their followers were treated harshly by Bertha De Ospina and the old Lareanistas and received poor position, or no position, on Congressional lists. In the wake of defeat the recriminations we anticipated in Bogota A–51 of March 14, 1974 have begun and the Conservative party has entered into what promises to be its most difficult period in many years.

6. The Liberals who went to the polls seemed not so much inspired by Lopez, a most uncharismatic figure, as they were impelled by fear that Gomez might win. Despite Gomez expensive effort to present himself as a man of peace (an effort that included posters showing him holding a dove), many voters saw in him the spirit of his father, Laureano, and hustled to the polls to vote against the old man.

7. As for Anapo, the movement may well be finished as a major opposition force. The few Congressmen elected on the Anapo ticket probably will drift back to their old parties. Mrs. Moreno has made brave statements that she intends to keep the organization together and prepare for 1978, but no one believes her. Not only did she lose the Conservative Anapo vote, but the urban Liberals on whom she counted decisively rejected her and her party. The person most responsible for the Anapo debacle probably is Senator Samuel Moreno Diaz, the candidate’s husband, a corrupt and singularly unintelligent politician.

Vaky
  1. Summary: In reporting López’s victory in the presidential election, the Embassy commented on the high abstention rate, the low conservative vote, and the Liberals’ control of both Houses of Congress.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740096–1180. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Cali, Medellín, and USCINCSO. On July 14, Vaky reported on the Electoral Court’s official vote tally for the presidential election. Out of a total of 5,174,224 votes cast, López received 2,911,292; Gómez received 136,736; Rojas de Moreno received 490,530; Echeverri received 136, 736; and Duarte received 5,657. (Telegram 6256 from Bogotá, July 16; ibid.) In an August 5 memorandum, the CIA concluded that while López would probably be more aggressive than his predecessors in reaching out to Communist countries, and while he might criticize some aspects of U.S. policy, the new Colombian President saw his criticism as constructive and therefore it would not damage bilateral ties. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 79T00863A: Intel Pub Files, Box 34, Folder 1: Colombia Under A New President, No. 1035/74)