257. Ambassador’s Overview, Country Analysis and Strategy Paper1
AMBASSADOR’S OVERVIEW
Colombia is one of the very few less developed countries that has achieved considerable progress in finding solutions for basic economic and social problems in a free and democratic context. While we do not expect any significant change from this performance within the CASP timeframe, we do foresee within the middle future—the next decade—the probability of political instability and deterioration of the present social system. Some of the principal factors which will contribute to these developments include: a) high population growth, b) rapid urban growth, c) insufficient savings and capital investment, d) depletion of natural resources, e) an increase in misguided nationalism and f) an incapacity to develop rapidly enough to meet the challenge posed by the more severe problems the future will bring. Progress will continue to be made, but with cities growing at six and seven per cent each year (doubling in size in less than twelve years) there will be serious problems involved in attempting to increase employment and redistribute income.
During the CASP timeframe we expect no startling political changes and no major social or economic upheavals. The threat of an unguided populist “revolution” has considerably diminished as a result of the severe loss suffered by General Rojas Pinilla’s ANAPO in last year’s election and the present disorganized leadership of that party. The established parties are again dominant, and the partial dismantling of the National Front agreement that will permit the participation of all political parties in the 1974 presidential election comes at a most propitious time for the change-over.
[Page 688]The situation will in fact be measurably better if the Liberals take to heart the bitter political lessons of the past and decide to present only one candidate. In the best of possible situations this would mean, we believe, a victory by a comfortable if not overwhelming majority for the Liberal candidate and a Liberal majority in the Congress. The alternative is a divided government: a plurality president, Liberal or Conservative, and a split Congress. This would not be a catastrophe, however. The Colombian political system is sufficiently flexible and stable, as the National Front experiment itself has proven, to permit the normal functioning of the government under trying conditions.
The ideological differences between the two most probable candidates of the traditional parties are not so great as to threaten the workings of the present system. The probable Liberal candidate is slightly left of center, and the probable conservative candidate is, in our terms, a moderate conservative, who is already aware that a laissez-faire response to Colombia’s problems is not possible. We do not expect, in any event, that either a Liberal or Conservative government will be successful in finding solutions to Colombia’s long term basic problems, which are bound to become more acute as the decade advances.
How are U.S. interests involved? Though the next two years require no drastic change in our approach or effort aside from a little more attention to specific areas such as economic assistance, trade, military assistance and high level exchanges of visits, now might very well be the time, in view of our fears as to what the middle future otherwise holds for us, to give thought to what changes should be made in our longer term programs. In fact, in the event of any widespread agricultural disaster, such as frustration of India’s hopes for the forthcoming monsoon or another hard year for Soviet agriculture, we shall be in the middle future sooner than we plan. Population will “catch up” and surpass the food supply sooner than the green revolution had given us hope to expect. The repercussions in Latin America can easily be predicted.
Barring this or a similar catastrophe in the next two years in the resource or world trade field, we will have no basic problems in our relations with Colombia. Our bilateral assistance program, even if we begin its gradual reduction during the CASP timeframe, will continue to be a political asset. It would also be helpful to recognize more fully Colombia’s importance to us by an interchange of high-level visits, i.e. a State visit by President Pastrana and, in due time, his successor, with a return visit by President Nixon, if he should visit Latin America or a visit by the Secretary or Under Secretary of State.
Colombia is primarily concerned, at least on the political surface of the Inter-American system, with trade preferences in the world markets and commodity agreements, specifically coffee, and with [Page 689] bridging the widening gap between rich and poor nations. Colombia desires a more substantial transfer of the resources and technology necessary for development—but free of burdens which could become onerous even for Colombia.
Because of the multilateral nature of the problem, we have not included coffee as one of the major issues in the CASP. Nevertheless, I want to emphasize that Colombia’s concern over the coffee issue is one of the primary irritants in our bilateral relations. The President and Foreign Minister have repeatedly emphasized that our bilateral assistance in no way makes up for the losses in the purchasing power of its coffee income which Colombia has sustained as the result of dollar devaluations and their effect on Colombia’s terms of trade outside the dollar area.
Another major concern of the Colombian government is its position vis-à-vis the developed nations, especially the United States, in the world trade arena. Any steps which the United States could take to open up greater opportunities for Colombian exports would have a significant and beneficial impact on our relations, as well as on the economy of Colombia.
Concerning the Law of the Sea, the GOC still feels that consultations over a matter of such great mutual concern should be much closer than they have been in the past. Visits to Colombia by high level U.S. officials, suggested in the body of the CASP, could help assure that Colombia maintains its present LOS position and continue to serve as a bridge between the 200 mile states and the more restrictive position of the United States.
We obviously are seriously limited in responding effectively to these concerns, just as Colombia and Latin America are limited in making the corresponding bootstrap effort, but undoubtedly we must attempt to respond if we consider the Inter-American system important to our well-being and security. Current proposals for U.S. withdrawal from the Inter-American system are not mere intellectual exercises, but reflect a growing disillusionment with what many Latin Americans consider a half-hearted U.S. commitment to the system.
[Omitted here are the FY 74 Policy and Resource Planning Table; Section II, Analysis of Major Issues; Section III, Interest, Policy and Resource Analysis; and Annex A, Summary of Resources.]
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Summary: Ambassador Saccio informed the Department that economic and military assistance, trade, and high-level visits were the means by which the U.S. Government could maintain pro-U.S. stability in Colombia.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, POL 1 COL–US. Secret. Sent as an enclosure to airgram A–52 from Bogotá, March 13, 1973. On February 5, the Ambassador informed the Department he thought coffee, the Darien Gap, and narcotics would be the key issues in U.S.-Colombian relations in the short- and medium-run. (Telegram 958 from Bogotá, February 5; ibid., POL COL–US)
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