Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

200. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers), the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (McCloskey), and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Vest) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, September 20, 1975.

Security Assistance Levels for Chile—FY 76 and 77

The Problem

Our proposal for security assistance levels for Chile for inclusion in the Congressional Presentation Document should go forward to Congress September 25. The President earlier approved FY 76 $20 million for FMS and $0.9 million for MAP training. Recent events in Chile have made a credit program, at least, indefensible in Congress. We would at the same time like to sell for cash at minimum some spares and anti-tank weapons.

Background/Analysis

We had hoped—and had been promised—that President Pinochet would announce major improvements in internal security practices in his September 11 address. He did not. He lowered the state of siege one level and announced release of some political prisoners. We believe the GOC announcement will have a negligible practical result, in Chile and in the perception here of Chile.

—repression continues. Since postponement of the UN Working Group visit, the GOC has purged the universities, arbitrarily arrested—but subsequently released—several Christian Democratic and labor leaders, and has generally ignored the provisions of the new National Security Law announced in May with much fanfare. In addition, circumstantial evidence suggests a GOC role in the affair of the “missing 119”. And there is no give on rescheduling the UNHRC Working Group, or in substituting an OAS Human Rights Commission trip.

The Options

1. Submit the CPD with the FY 76 FMS credit level of $20 million approved by the President; support unlimited FMS sales authority.

Advantage

—it would maintain in the minds of the military governing Chile the impression that the U.S. Executive supports them and does not hold their human rights practices against them.

Disadvantage

—it will focus critical Congressional debate on Chile, which eventually will weaken our ability to defend other parts of our military assistance programs.

—it will also help convince Frazer and others who are particularly bullish on this issue that we are so insensitive to their concerns that we are willing to push a program for the country most publicly identified recently with human rights violations.

2. Delete Chile FY 76 CPD for credits but, following Congressional consultation, provide some $10 million of spares and TOWs in FMS cash sales.

Advantage

—the fact that we asked $20 million for Chile last year and eliminate the program this year would show that we do, at least in paradigm cases, take human rights practices into consideration in our military assistance program proposals.

—it would make us more credible when we say we do not condone abuses.

—it would be a clear signal to all in Chile, military and civilians, that we mean business on human rights.

—the cash sales would off-set our military assistance to Peru, help maintain stability in the area, and preserve at least some influence in the GOC military.

Disadvantage

—we single out Chile for punishment.

—by tailoring our program to avoid criticism from some quarters in the Congress, we risk having them attempt to impose their views in the future.

3. Whatever our decision, we believe we must inform Congress. We also believe that no FMS sales should be made without Congressional approval.

Advantage

—it demonstrates our desire to consult on “difficult” cases.

—to move on the sales questions behind Congress’ back would be unwise.

—we would present a balanced posture on human rights.

—it gives us a chance to discuss the Peruvian threat.

Disadvantage

—it reminds Congress of the sales aspect and might encourage a total cutoff.

Recommendations:

1. That you reject option 1, forwarding the CPD with a FY-76 credit level of $20 million and pressing ahead with large cash sales.

ARA, H, PM, L, D/HA recommend you approve rejecting this option.

2. That you approve option 2, the deletion of Chile from the CPD and at the same time that you approve the provision of a discreet FMS cash sales defensive package consisting of:

20 TOW Launchers

400 TOW missiles

100 Sidewinders for the previously purchased F–5

Navy spares and munitions

$0.9 million of FMS cash training (mainly for the F–5)

Substitute 3 F–5-F trainers for 3 F–5-E’s in the F–5 contract, signed in FY 74.

This package could cost roughly $10 million.

ARA, H, PM, D/HR, and L recommend approval.

3. That no FMS sales to Chile take place until we have consulted with and obtained at least passive approval of the Congressional leadership.

ARA, H, PM, D/HR, L, and IO recommend approval

4. That you inform Foreign Minister Carvajal of our decision during your bilateral with him September 29.

ARA, H, PM, D/HR, and L recommend approval.

Alternatively

That Ambassador Popper inform the GOC in Santiago

That you inform Ambassador Trucco

That Mr. Rogers inform Ambassador Trucco

1. Summary: Rogers, McCloskey, and Vest recommended that Kissinger authorize roughly $10 million in FMS sales to Chile after consulting with Congress.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810150–1436. Confidential. Drafted by Driscoll and Fimbres on September 19. Sent through Maw. Rogers wrote on the memorandum, “Bremer discussed with Rogers 29–9 [September 29]. Matter to be raised informally with DOD through Scowcroft.” Rogers indicated that Kissinger approved the first two recommendations on September 28. Neither approve nor disapprove was checked for the other options.