Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

157. Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting¹

Washington, January 31, 1974, 3:08–3:58 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

Mr. Kubisch: We’ve got a problem arising from Chile with heavy armaments that affect our arms program and other considerations. The Chileans have just informed us informally that they’re going to request the opportunity to buy 18 F–5 aircraft at a cost of about 50 or 60 million dollars and that they would like to go ahead and acquire 15 medium tanks that they had requested last September, just before Allende was overthrown, under an FMS credit arrangement. The problem here is this: We don’t have the official request yet on the aircraft. If they spend 60 million dollars of their own money, they’re talking about borrowing the money on their own commercial terms for buying the aircraft; and it’s going to make it very difficult for us and for some of the financial institutions to give them the kind of economic and financial help they’re going to need over the coming months, because the attitude will be that they’re spending for aircraft and things they don’t really need.

On the other hand, the military junta in Chile feel they definitely need this because the Soviets have delivered Soviet medium tanks to Peru. And, as you know, there’s a real problem between Peru and Chile. We just are really becoming seized with this problem and will be doing an analysis on it and making recommendations on it.

Secretary Kissinger: But what do you think your recommendations are going to be?

Mr. Kubisch: I think my recommendations from ARA are going to be to give the tanks, about 15 million dollars worth, under the FMS program, because it was on credit sales requested from the Allende government and from the Soviet tanks in Peru.

On the aircraft, we will probably recommend that we give them the license to buy them—they buy them with their own money. But we’re going to have to do it after weighing the implications of that on economic assistance programs. And, finally—

Secretary Kissinger: Can they be given an option of weighing these economic programs?

Mr. Kubisch: Consult.

Secretary Kissinger: Consult—but don’t beat them over the head. I mean we’re not—no: I know we have the strong conviction that we know better what’s good for other people than they do.

I think we have to reassess the whole arms delivery program in Latin America. With the military markets being what they are, I don’t see why it is in the American interest for French planes—not to speak of Russian planes—to be bought by governments.

Mr. Rush: Right.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me that military governments are going to buy equipment and can not be denied equipment by our conception of what their country requires. And all we’re going to do is to create a group of Nasser-like colonels in these countries. And, therefore, I think—basically, I mean, we should tell them what the impact on the aid program will be.

We should also make clear that we’ll support an aid request for them anyway. But if then they want to go ahead, my inclination would be to let them buy it.

Mr. Kubisch: That’s certainly my inclination.

I should say that there was a meeting on the Hill with Ambassador Popper and Harry Shlaudeman in our Bureau, with about 15 administrative aides of Senators and Congressmen, earlier this week, on Chile. And several of them—particularly, an aide to Senator Church, an aide to Senator Kennedy, an aide to Senator Inouye—

Secretary Kissinger: I have no doubt.

Mr. Kubisch: —said, “We want you to know, Ambassador Popper and Mr. Shlaudeman, that we’re watching very closely what the Administration is going to do on assistance to Chile—another Greece-sort of problem. Then we’re going to crank it right into the legislation and tie your hands to it.”

So that’s another aspect of the problem.

Secretary Kissinger: But it is a curious thing that we can sell the tanks because a left-wing government that was moving towards Communism requested it. But it’s certainly more advantageous for the United States than the Allende government was—in any international forum that you can imagine.

Just think of the Mexico City meeting with an Allende government there.

Mr. Kubisch: It would be impossible.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t think we could have it. That we can not consider on its merits.

Now, I know that that’s what Church is going to do. I would certainly not have generated the request from the Chileans. And, if it comes, we should try to find some way of meeting and go to the Congress and tell them.

Mr. Kubisch: We’ll have to mount a fairly massive program on the Hill to line up supporters and sympathetic people and build on them.

Secretary Kissinger: Look, if Chile, after the impact of this request on its aid program, chooses not to pursue it, we shouldn’t be heartbroken.

Mr. Kubisch: You know, the real—

Secretary Kissinger: But we should not engage in a massive lecturing to them of what is best for their country.

Mr. Kubisch: Absolutely. And they perceive a real threat, in the new government in Chile, to themselves. And this is worrisome too for Peru and Bolivia because we’re now coming up on the 100th Anniversary of the War of the Pacific, when the Chileans marched all the way up to Lima, occupied the country, took away several major provinces rich in minerals in Southern Peru—took away Bolivian access to the sea—and retained those provinces well into the 20’s and 30’s and retained some of them until this day—until they were finally negotiated out. And there is a kind of revanchism in Peru and Bolivia to get this territory back from Chile. As a result, they’re buying Mirage aircraft and buying Soviet aircraft, as they have the Chilean military responsible for their own security and feel they are responsible for themselves.

And we really can’t do it for ourselves; we just can’t.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this we ought to make a request for to the Congressional Committee.

Mr. Kubisch: Twenty million dollars of economic aid. I have no doubt in my own mind they’re going to opt for 60 million dollars of military arms.

Secretary Kissinger: So do I.

Mr. Kubisch: The tanks are one thing, but F–5 aircraft—which not only denies them 20 million dollars of an A.I.D. loan but maybe two or three hundred million dollars of support worldwide—that might be deferred, if not thrown to them—which they really need.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the international institutions ought not to be so affected by the 60 million, by the military purchases. I can see that the 20 million dollars coming out of American appropriations could be affected, but why should World Bank and other credits be affected?

Mr. Kubisch: Well, the attitude among the Socialist governments in Europe and the governments in Europe that have strong Socialist and Communist parties has been, as you know, very much against this overthrow of Allende, and they have hosts in the international institutions and they have been lobbying to defer institutions in the World Bank and elsewhere, for the time being, until they see what happens in Chile—see what kind of a course the government will follow—so there will be some pressure from other governments, I think.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me talk to [Robert] McNamara about that.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

1. Summary: Kissinger and Kubisch discussed the Chilean Government’s interest in acquiring heavy weaponry. Kubisch noted that large purchases of tanks and warplanes would make it politically more difficult for the U.S. Government and international financial institutions to provide needed economic assistance to Chile. Kissinger expressed the view that the Chilean Government should be allowed to decide for itself whether or not to buy the equipment.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 2, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. The Mexico City meeting to which Kissinger referred was a regional Meeting of Foreign Ministers planned for February 1974. In telegram 680 from Santiago, February 11, the Embassy reported that Kubisch had affirmed to Huerta in a February 10 meeting that U.S. policy was to support the junta in Chile and had added that the Chilean Government would have to do what it could to deal with the human rights situation and to improve its international image. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) In telegram 710 from Santiago, February 13, the Embassy reported that Kubisch and Huerta had discussed Peru’s military buildup and the possibility of a Peruvian attack on Chile. (Ibid.)