Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

145. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 11, 1973, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s Meeting with the Foreign Minister of Chile

PARTICIPANTS

• Chile

  • Admiral Ismael Huerta, Foreign Minister
  • Ambassador Enrique Bernstein, Political Adviser, Chilean Foreign Ministry

• U.S.

  • Secretary of State Kissinger
  • Assistant Secretary of State, Jack B. Kubisch
  • John E. Karkashian, Acting Office Director, ARA/BC

The Secretary began by stating that while he was very busy, he was nevertheless eager to see the Minister so that the latter could clearly understand our position. He said the Department of State used to tell other countries how to run their business but he had abolished that practice and now the Department conducted foreign and not domestic policy. He said domestic policy was Chile’s problem and the only time the United States would be concerned with Chilean domestic policy would be when it made our foreign policy more difficult.

The Secretary said that Minister Huerta should understand that the United States was interested in what was going on in Chile. He said that the new government basically was in our interest and that the changes effected in Chile were beneficial to the Western Hemisphere. The Secretary said that the United States therefore would help the new government, and that the Minister should start with this assumption.

Regarding practical problems, the Secretary said, the Minister should first understand the very complex domestic situation in the United States and the fact that we had to advance carefully on specific issues. As an example, he pointed out that it would not be difficult to continue supplying certain military equipment under the arrangements which existed before; however, it would be difficult to supply such items as riot control and police-type equipment. The Secretary noted that it would be easier for us if these items could be obtained elsewhere. He said that if they could not be obtained from other sources, we would do whatever was necessary to help furnish them. Regarding regular military equipment, food, medicine, and the debt problem, the Secretary said we should have no difficulty in helping Chile. He said the United States was determined to see the new government succeed. Even if this proved difficult, the Secretary said, the United States would do what had to be done.

Regarding the domestic situation, the Secretary said, Minister Huerta was the better judge of Chilean necessities. The Secretary said that we realized certain things could cause problems due to the hostile press. He added that we would take the liberty from time to time to make our views known on a confidential basis. He said he would not bother the Minister with particular issues such as the question of asylum which had already been discussed with Mr. Kubisch. The Secretary said that what he wanted the Minister to understand was that our basic philosophy was to be supportive and helpful.

Minister Huerta thanked the Secretary for making the points he said he himself would have raised. The Minister said he had thought it might be necessary to explain the situation in Chile but after listening to the Secretary and after having talked with Mr. Kubisch earlier, he believed he could economize on everyone’s time. He said he had come to Washington to present in absolute frankness the serious situation in Chile but he wanted to make clear that the principal effort for recovery must be made by Chileans. He said the circumstances were favorable because after the nightmare Chile had experienced, all Chileans were ready to go back to work. The Minister said that within this framework he believed it possible for Chile to present its needs and receive help from the United States.

The Secretary said that he was willing to talk about technical and practical matters, but he had total confidence in Mr. Kubisch to carry on such discussions. He said the basic issue was that the Minister understand clearly the United States position. He said Chile would have to help from time to time and take into account the problems of the United States; however, this would not affect the basic position; it would simply be a matter of tactics. The Secretary said that the major effort the GOC must make was to prevent a partisan war in Chile. If the GOC believed it had to be brutal to accomplish this goal it must also understand that this could damage Chile in the external press.

Minister Huerta said that his government was fully aware of the unfavorable image being created by the foreign press. He added that while this was a matter of concern, the GOC was even more concerned with controlling the internal situation.

The Secretary said he thought they understood each other. He noted that the State Department was disciplined and would be more so in time. He said Mr. Kubisch’s Bureau was already very disciplined and he expressed confidence in Ambassador Davis.

Minister Huerta said his government was very happy with Ambassador Davis who was a good friend of Chile. The Secretary said there was no question about that.

Mr. Kubisch noted that he had engaged in discussions earlier in the day with the Chilean delegation on economic and technical matters in which various U.S. agencies had also participated. He said that in these discussions the Foreign Minister had raised the question of how press inquiries should be handled.

The Secretary said that any press release should be as low key as possible and that he saw no need to announce anything now. Mr. Kubisch suggested that it simply be confirmed that a meeting had taken place. The Secretary said that a statement could be made merely noting that an exploratory meeting had taken place in which Chilean problems and needs were discussed. He added that the press should be given as little hard news as possible.

Minister Huerta said that the word “exploratory” could be misunderstood and wondered if it would not be preferable to say that a general discussion of bilateral relations between both countries had taken place. The Secretary agreed and asked if Minister Huerta had been in diplomacy before. When the Minister said “no”, the Secretary noted that was the reason why the Minister was so good at it.

The meeting ended with expressions of satisfaction at the frankness of the exchange and the mutual understanding of each other’s position.

1. Summary: Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Huerta discussed the situation in Chile and the types of assistance the U.S. Government could provide.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL CHILE–US. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office at the State Department. Drafted by Karkashian. Pickering approved the memorandum for Kissinger on October 23. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 6:45 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers) In an October 9 memorandum, Kubisch briefed Kissinger in advance of the meeting, noting that the while it was in the U.S. interest to help the Chilean junta consolidate power, its “actions in the human rights field have rendered our task more difficult.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, POL CHILE–US) When Kissinger was called out of the meeting, Kubisch informed Huerta that a “variety of Chilean governmental and military authorities” had made requests for “rifles, bayonets, submachine guns, ammunition, and tear gas.” Karkashian noted that the Chilean government had also requested “training in such sensitive areas as counter-insurgency, psychological warfare and detention camp organization and management.” Kubisch informed Huerta it would extremely difficult for the U.S. Government to comply with the requests at the present time. (Telegram 207026 to Santiago, October 18; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 777, Latin America, Chile, Vol. 8, 1 January 1973–31 March 1974)