Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

92. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, February 26, 1976.

SUBJECT

• Mexico’s Narcotics Problem

In recent years, Mexico has become the main source of illicit narcotics, especially opiates, entering the U.S. The flow of drugs across the border continues despite extensive eradication and interdiction efforts. [4 lines not declassified]

Both President Echeverria and his designated successor, Jose Lopez Portillo, have recently spoken of the social and economic impact that the government-run narcotics enforcement program could have in rural areas. For the first time since Mexican drug production, particularly heroin, began skyrocketing in the early 1970s, they have emphasized the need to provide alternate sources of income for the peasants who grow the illicit crops.

In the past, Mexican officials had not paid any apparent attention to the social and economic implications of drug growing among the rural poor. They tended to view the activity as strictly illegal and gave no thought to compensating peasants for refraining from breaking the law.

The new concern over what would happen if this source of cash income were cut off implies that the government is worried about the possibility of rural unrest. More important for the longer term, it may indicate that Mexican leaders have come to believe that, in addition to eradication and enforcement programs, the government must deal with the root causes of the problem.

[2 paragraphs (16 lines) not declassified]

[2 lines not declassified] The appointment of Dr. Alejandro Gertz as Attorney General Ojeda’s assistant has brought definite improvement. He has taken a tough line against corruption and incompetence. The Mexicans have made the politically unpopular decision to use herbicides. Thousands of poppy and marijuana fields are being destroyed by the herbicides being sprayed from fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.

Inefficiency and the logistic and coordination problems that plagued the program when it began last November are slowly being remedied, but it is too early to know how significant an impact will be made during the current growing season.

The Campesino Involvement

There is probably good reason for the Mexicans to be thinking about finding alternate sources of income for those involved in drug production.

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

Those involved in opium production most often are subsistence-level campesinos who earn many times more income from opium than from the equivalent in corn or beans. In fact, they usually grow opium to the exclusion of anything else, relying on their cash income to buy food and other staples. Opium is far and away the most important crop in the growing areas and hence is nearly the sole source of income for entire villages in the High Sierras.

The economies of the states where most of the trafficking takes place are heavily affected. The Governor of Sinaloa has reportedly stated that his whole state economy is tied to the traffic, both through the operation of large trafficking organizations and through the involvement of the thousands of individual growers.

The role of the campesino varies considerably. Some are paid by large organizations to plant, cultivate, and harvest the fields. The organization provides the seed, tools, irrigation equipment, and protection from the authorities.

Other campesinos work independently, financing themselves and selling their opium to known collectors or directly to someone who operates a heroin laboratory. This campesino may make a larger profit but—without protection from an organization—apparently is the prime target of the government’s enforcement efforts.

In some cases, campesinos are simply hired as day laborers to work fields run by the organizations. In the State of Guerrero, for example, they may be paid as much as $16 a day—about four times more than normal agricultural laborers. Thus, while the campesino’s share of the profits is quite small when compared with the middlemen, producers, and distributors, he is economically much better off than if he devoted his time to regular farming.

The lands used for poppy production are usually not suitable for other crops. There may be land nearby that is suitable for legitimate farming, but it is not necessarily available to the campesino on favorable terms. He simply cannot match the returns that drug production reaps. Some areas, such as the States of Sinaloa, Sonora, Durango, and Chihuahua, are rich agriculturally and could probably absorb the campesino in legitimate farming pursuits. Other areas, such as the State of Guerrero, are very poor and narcotics production offers relatively bright economic prospects that would otherwise not be attainable.

Government Control

Because of the remoteness of the drug production areas, governmental control or authority of any kind is sporadic or nonexistent. This is particularly so in the lawless parts of Guerrero and the Culiacan area of Sinaloa. In emergencies, such as labor union battles or student disturbances, the army is called in to maintain order. Otherwise, the federal government is likely to let State authorities run their own affairs. In many areas, local political bosses hold sway and federal authorities and the army have been reluctant to step in and assert control, although the army frequently engages in gun battles with growers and traffickers.

[5 paragraphs (46 lines) not declassified]

[1 chart not declassified]

[6 paragraphs (72 lines) not declassified]

Positive Factors

Fortunately, some positive factors are working to the advantage of the program. Mexico is committed to the anti-narcotics effort for very important reasons: 1) its aspirations as a Third World leader require an impeccable moral posture before the international community; [2½ lines not declassified] 3) Mexico is quite genuinely concerned about its own drug abuse problem [1 line not declassified].

1. Summary: This memorandum discusses the growing narcotics problem in Mexico.

   Source: Central Intelligence Agency, [text not declassified] Files, Job 85T00353R, Box 1, Folder 25. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence. All brackets appear in the original except those indicating text that remains classified.