Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

471. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, November 8, 1976.

What to Do About Jamaica . . . and the Caribbean (an Update)

The Problem

Our problems with Jamaica proliferate, with the bauxite disputes followed by the Cuban romance, then the chorus of destabilization charges, and most recently the Agee visit. In the background now is the threat of economic collapse, with attendant opportunities for more Cuban dabbling.

Jamaica cannot be seen in isolation. It is preeminent in the Black, English speaking Caribbean, and our problems there are symptomatic, and quite possibly prophetic, of developments in the other islands.

In most of the islands:

—the economy is deteriorating and population pressures are growing at an alarming rate.

—the population crunch is pushing mounting waves of illegal immigrants into the United States, adding a domestic dimension to our difficulties in the region.

—the leaders are increasingly attracted by radical solutions—seeing no political alternatives.

The radicalization of the Caribbean is against our interests. The destabilization campaigns of Manley, Burnham and Fidel are already spilling over into our hemispheric relations. Moreover, the politics of these small islands so close to us could have an inordinately large impact on relations outside the hemisphere . . . in Africa and in the North-South debate. What can we do to change these trends?

Background/Analysis

The first difficulty in framing a “Caribbean policy” is the bewildering diversity of the region. Conceptually, we find it convenient to deal with the Caribbean in two parts: the Black, English speaking nations—the so-called Commonwealth Caribbeans—and “the others,” i.e., Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the remaining Dutch and French dependencies and Cuba. In this paper we consider the Commonwealth Caribbean, with Jamaica as the focus and Cuba as a key radicalizing factor.

The Political Dimension. The Commonwealth Caribbean countries could be taking on a significance in world politics out of proportion to the size of their population, and their resources. This political factor stems from their strategic position, their articulate leaders, and their ethnic origins.

—Being so near to us and to Cuba, the Black Caribbean leaders can credibly threaten radical alternatives that could give us security concerns. Although the islands are not now seeking satellite status with the Soviets, events and economics could compel lesser leaders in the area in that direction in the future. Moreover, charges of neglect and destabilization coming from the Caribbean are believable to most of the world given the history of U.S. hegemony in the area.

—Manley and Burnham (and Eric Williams?) backed by Fidel, make a loud and effective Third World chorus. They are educated, articulate, compelling leaders who in today’s world can command the attention of most international bodies. Their Socialist policies and still largely democratic systems give them a political and moral impact often greater than their African and Latin colleagues. Their radicalization could well spill over into the neighboring Caribbean area.

—Their racial and cultural make up links them to Africa and the problems of that continent—it also increasingly divides them from the Latins of this hemisphere. The Black leaders of the Caribbean can become effective links to Black Africa—they can also become very troublesome opponents should we find ourselves positioned against radical African leaders.

The Cuba Connection. Cuba’s role in the Commonwealth Caribbean is on the rise:

—The attraction of Cuba’s order, successes in Africa, and machismo is countered by Cuba’s dependency on the Soviet Union, lack of political flexibility and suspect motives.

—Fidel would love to see more “revolutionary” regimes in the Caribbean, but he probably does not expect that Manley or Burnham have the will for revolution.

—Fidel can meddle in sensitive areas (police and intelligence training, ideological and propaganda against us), but the Cubans, in economic trouble themselves, cannot provide significant assistance.

Over the short term, Fidel can continue to play on natural Caribbean suspicions of us. He can also expand his support for Caribbean security forces, building a base for the future. A major challenge to us in the months ahead could come should one of the countries ask for Cuban military assistance. Fidel might be reluctant but tempted. Our posture would be critical. Also, an open conflict in Africa in which we are perceived to be with the whites could rapidly radicalize the volatile Burnham and Manley.

The long range impact of Cuba is more serious. If these small islands are not viable—if they cannot resolve their political/economic problems—their democratic systems will increasingly give way to one-party states like we have seen in Africa. Military and paramilitary factors will then begin to be more important. In that phase, the Cubans and Soviets could play a more important and seriously troublesome role.

The Soviet Role. The Soviet Union might be tempted to increase its support for a more radical Caribbean:

—A deteriorating Caribbean (Black, a U.S. neighbor and dominated by U.S. aluminum and oil) provides a virtual model for Soviet propaganda. But a Jamaica and a Guyana looking to the Soviets for massive help would also pose problems for the USSR.

—The Soviets do not generally supply the major monetary support Jamaica—and now Guyana—seek. The Soviet policy on this score is unlikely to change.

—The USSR has diplomatic representation only in Guyana, but a mission is likely to be opened in Jamaica shortly after the upcoming Jamaican elections.

—Soviet relations with us are likely to be a major moderating factor in the pace of Soviet entry into the area. Also, neither Burnham nor Manley want the Soviets in now except as potential donors, and to intimidate the United States.

In sum, the Soviets would probably prefer a Caribbean that troubles and costs us rather than one that troubles and costs them. Should they take on another nation in this hemisphere, they would probably want assurances of the irreversibility of its “revolution.”

The Economic Dimension. The Commonwealth Caribbean was largely left out of U.S. bilateral economic assistance programs. In the 1960s, when the Alliance for Progress began massive bilateral programs, we made a decision to leave the aid effort primarily to the U.K. and Canada. We used our multilateral lending to reinforce the abortive federalist effort. (The only exception was Guyana, where we were trying to avoid the installation of a Communist regime under Cheddi Jagan—now we have Burnham.)

In the 1970s as Congress and we increasingly decided to concentrate our assistance in the most seriously affected areas, we found that the Commonwealth Caribbean did not qualify. Our assistance to the area has often been indirect and multilateral ($42.3 million to the CDB), providing us little political influence.

The leaders of the Commonwealth Caribbean take very seriously the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The remembered trauma of slavery adds to their perception of a basic and terrible inequity between the wealth and power of the United States and their own poverty and weakness. We cannot reach them emotionally or influence their political decisions without economic measures.

To turn the Commonwealth Caribbean around, we must change their perception of the United States as uncaring of their economic plight.

—The most important deterrent to Cuban influence in the area is the general need for foreign loans and investments which Cuba cannot provide.

—The wave of illegal immigrants takes its main impetus from the need for jobs which are not available in the island economies.

—Nationalism in the Commonwealth Caribbean as elsewhere is expressed most frequently in economic terms.

Jamaica. Jamaica is the largest and most important of the Black English-speaking nations of the Caribbean. In many ways it is the key to the Commonwealth Caribbean—and our relations with Jamaica have been deteriorating since 1973. Jamaican Prime Minister Manley believes:

—that we are indifferent to Jamaica’s acute economic problems and not disposed to help;

—that we favor the opposition party because of his relations with Castro and his efforts to get more from the aluminum companies;

—that we may be trying to overthrow him by “destabilizing” Jamaica.

Manley came to power in 1972 promising a better life for Jamaica’s poor masses. He has largely failed. Jamaica’s economic and social problems are worse, not better. Unemployment—particularly among young males—remains dangerously high; violent crime is endemic; the country’s balance-of-payments position is critical; and opposition to Manley’s rule has grown.

At some point the Prime Minister decided that Jamaica’s ills demanded a radical change in the system. He began to move left, particularly after his first meeting with Fidel Castro in late 1973—an occasion Manley has described as “one of the great experiences of my life.” A visit from Nyerere in 1974 reinforced his tendency to see the solution in terms of a one-party, Socialist state.

The prospect of a tough election campaign also probably influenced his yearning after the kind of social discipline and control offered by the Cuban model. Manley must call general elections before May of next year. The opposition Jamaica Labor Party has been making gains—at least up until recently—and still seems to have some chance of winning under the vigorous leadership of Edward Seaga.

Despite Manley’s clear shift to the Left and despite his government’s repeated allegations about U.S. destabilization, he has reached out to us. In fact the basic reason he thinks we are destabilizing him probably stems from his sense that we have not responded to his vague but real pleas.

Late last year Manley sent a special emissary to the U.S. with a vague plan for economic cooperation. The chief feature was a request for loans and credits over the next ten years to make up a substantial part of Jamaica’s projected $150 million annual balance-of-payments shortfall. Given Jamaica’s relatively high per capita GNP and their badly managed economy, we were only able to suggest strategies for getting more help from the international lending agencies.

All is not lost for us in Jamaica. On October 6, after more than two years of negotiations, the GOJ finally signed an agreement with Alcoa. If, as expected, this agreement is followed by similar agreements with the other aluminum companies, a major irritant will have been removed from our bilateral relations. (The bauxite disputes are the reason for strong Treasury and OMB opposition to AID lending in Jamaica.) The President’s decision—taken after an appeal from you—to continue a small P.L.–480 program for Jamaica is important as a symbolic indication of our continuing goodwill.

The aluminum industry also should take an upswing next year which could help the Jamaican economy. We also have other advantages on which to build:

—The economic tie is obvious, with virtually all of Jamaica’s export earnings coming from the West.

—The bauxite connection is especially strong: we get over half of our bauxite imports from Jamaica and cannot quickly shift to other sources, while revenues from bauxite sales to the U.S. amount to about 70% of Jamaica’s total export earnings.

—There may be as many Jamaicans in the U.S. as in Jamaica, the United States is still viewed as the “land of opportunity” by ordinary Jamaicans, and the American life style is the ambition of most Jamaicans (which is a large part of the problem—they cannot afford it).

—Jamaica still maintains democratic institutions similar to our own—and Manley still professes attachment to them.

Clearly we are faced with a need for large resource inputs if we are to offer Manley a way out of his economic difficulties. Aside from the difficulty of finding such large resource inputs, we would want to consider very carefully the wisdom of a major lending package on the eve of Jamaican elections, and in the immediate wake of the Agee affair. But a long delay, much less a failure to act, could also face us with a situation past repair.

Guyana. Guyana represents what we do not want to happen in the rest of the Commonwealth Caribbean.

—Prime Minister Burnham aims at transforming Guyana into “the first truly Socialist state on the continent of South America,” and he has said publicly that Guyana will be a Marxist-Leninist state. We are skeptical.

—Burnham has taken a leading role in rallying Third World nations to confrontation positions vis-à-vis the U.S. and the developed nations. On UN votes, from the U.S. point of view, only Cuba has a worse record in this hemisphere.

—Ties to Cuba are strong. Several hundred Guyanese troops have been trained in Cuba, Cuban security experts are close to Burnham, and Cuba was allowed to set up a refueling facility (though it was apparently never used) at the time of the Angolan airlift.

—Burnham’s recent speech, accusing the United States of responsibility for the Cubana crash which cost 73 lives, has brought our relations to an all time low. Burnham’s accusations probably reflect a Cuban effort to influence him as well as his own keen memory of past U.S. interventions in Guyanese affairs.

The Guyanese seem to recognize that they have gone too far in their confrontation politics. We have received numerous signals that they would like to forget both Burnham’s speech and our sharp public rejoinder. In particular, they are eager to get our Chargé, John Blacken, back to Georgetown; Blacken has had singular success in establishing rapport with Burnham and Wills, and they apparently believe he can help them get their relationship with us back to at least pre-Cubana crash norms.

The Guyanese concern to restore normal relations with the United States may reflect increasing recognition of economic as well as political realities. Because of high sugar and bauxite prices in the 1974–75 period, Guyana had until recently a comfortable balance-of-payments surplus. Now, however, lower sugar prices, poor crops, labor troubles, and mismanagement in the bauxite industry have combined with worldwide inflation and high fuel prices to cut deeply into Guyanese reserves. The outlook is for BOP difficulties next year, and the possibility of a serious crunch later on.

Burnham is feeling the economic pinch, and he does not want to cut back on his development plans. This is probably a main reason for a somewhat improved atmosphere in our relations and a specific request (pre-Cubana crash) from Burnham that we go ahead with two long delayed AID loans. Another reason is he does not want help from the Soviets or Chinese.

Dearest to Burnham’s heart is a hydroelectric/smelter project that may cost as much as $1.5 billion. We could not fund it, and we doubt the Soviet aid team which just left Guyana will offer Burnham much encouragement. But if relations improved we could help with smaller projects, notably in administration and food crops.

Clearly Burnham is not going to be persuaded that he should abandon his Socialist course. But we are also not certain he knows what his Socialist course is. Probably he will remain on good terms with Castro no matter what we do. But it is not too late to improve our relations to the point where we can at least cooperate in some areas and avoid systematic ideological hostility.

Trinidad. Alone among the Commonwealth Caribbean nations, Trinidad has oil and gas. But it has not joined OPEC. Because of natural endowment, Trinidad’s long-term economic prospects are excellent. Foreign reserves jumped tenfold in 1974 and now are well over $800 million.

Trinidad is also blessed with Eric Williams, the scholarly—and often prickly—dean of Caribbean statesmen. Williams has just won an election by a wide margin, getting two-thirds of the seats in his Parliament. Tough and authoritarian, Williams is right more often than he is wrong, and overall he has been good for Trinidad. From our point of view, he is moderate and usually constructive—a welcome contrast to Manley and Burnham.

Despite these advantages, Trinidad is not without real problems. Williams is in a race in which he must create employment for his youthful population more rapidly than unemployment and his radical opposition can generate social discontent. He is hampered by shortages of managerial skills and a variety of bottlenecks typical of rapidly expanding economies.

We could probably be of considerable help on the technical and managerial side. We will certainly wish to continue to cultivate our present good relations with Williams—while keeping a careful eye on those most likely to succeed him.

Barbados. Most conservative of the Commonwealth Caribbean states, Barbados nevertheless briefly joined Burnham and Manley in the “destabilization” chorus against us a few months ago. Elected in early September, the new Prime Minister, Tom Adams, publicly discounted these charges, thus opening the door for what will hopefully be a fresh start in our relations with this small and generally moderate nation.

However, the apparent sabotage by anti-Castro Cubans of an Air Cubana flight bound from Barbados to Trinidad may again raise suspicions of USG covert actions. We are trying to allay such suspicions, but the incident could chill our relations at the outset of the new government.

Barbados relies on tourism, sugar and remittances from the U.S. to earn its foreign exchange. All are down. Moreover, the traditional safety valve for this already densely populated island—emigration to the UK or the U.S.—is twisting closed.

Barbados will probably look to the United States for some assistance in the course of the next few years. We have already had some indications of an interest in bilateral economic assistance.

The Associated States. Five small islands associated with the UK are in various stages of preparation for independence. One or two will probably opt for cutting the ties with Britain as early as next year.

With populations ranging from 64,000 to 110,000 and almost no natural resources, these new mini-states will plainly be unviable. They want independence in large measure because they see it as a way to get more external aid. If we are not disposed to be helpful, some may turn to Cuba, the Soviets or organized crime for help.

We already have some indications of Cuban activity in Dominica. Several of the islands have active radical movements. With independence, it is likely that British democratic forms will fade rapidly.

We cannot write off these mini-states. They are too near home. They will have votes in the UN and the OAS. In one, Antigua, we have a military facility of some value to us. Perhaps most important is the consideration of what it would mean politically in the region—and at home—for us to have a proliferation of Cubas (or Grenadas) in what used to be our lake.

The Options

The U.S. should devise a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the Caribbean which would over the short run:

—maximize the advantages to the Caribbean nations of associating with us;

—involve significant costs to those whose policies affect negatively our national interests.

And over the long run:

—build a more stable Commonwealth Caribbean which is more closely associated with the U.S.;

—limit the polarization affect of Cuba on the rest of the Caribbean.

There are a series of options, not all mutually exclusive, which could accomplish these objectives.

Option 1. The Divide and Rule Option. Under this option, the U.S. would de-emphasize our existing policies of strengthening regional cooperation. We would place particular emphasis on bilateral economic and political favors for Caribbean countries such as Trinidad/Tobago, The Bahamas and Barbados and contrast these with a relatively cool approach toward Guyana, and Jamaica. We would (as we do in Eastern Europe) make clear distinctions in economic assistance, trade and other bilateral ways, and generally not deal with the Commonwealth Caribbean as a group. We would undertake propaganda efforts and a subtle diplomatic campaign to undermine the appeal of Burnham and even Manley in the other English-speaking areas.

Pro:

—demonstrate most quickly and clearly the cost/benefit to present and future leaders of undertaking policies that clearly are contrary to U.S. interests.

—make Burnham and Manley feel the pinch that comes from isolation from the U.S. and force them to make choices.

Con:

—leave us allied with conservative regimes and undermine our stated policy of accepting diversity.

—possibly backfire should other hemispheric (and African) nations become convinced that we are really trying to isolate two of the few “democratic” leaders in the hemisphere.

Option 2. Modified Divide and Rule with a Regional Stress. We could give new stress to our support for regional unity (CARICOM and the Caribbean Development Bank) by launching a regional donor’s effort for the entire region. We would bring Canada, Venezuela, Colombia and perhaps others to give new emphasis and attention to improving the region. Our stress would be on strengthening the economies, on education and technical assistance. We could supplement such a regional program with greater bilateral assistance and political attention to the region’s moderates, while offering some opportunities for bilateral assistance to Burnham and Jamaica should they seek improved relations with us.

Pro:

—would enable U.S. to expand its role while including other nations such as Canada and Venezuela which are in some parts of the Caribbean less distrusted than we.

—could serve to provide new impetus and new directions in the area. The costs of new programs would be relatively modest in the small islands. A new commitment might move Manley toward a more pragmatic path and give Burnham a clearer option.

Con:

—we probably would not be able to develop significant new resources, even with Canada and Venezuela, to satisfy even a half of Jamaica’s needs or of Burnham’s ambitions.

—there would be strong opposition in other government agencies and in Congress to important new program costs for the Caribbean because of its relatively high per capita income.

Option 3. Bold New Program for the Caribbean. We could make a major effort to turn around the adverse trends in the Caribbean, both working with the moderates and dangling the hope of substantial support before Manley, and perhaps even Burnham. We would make it very clear that the Caribbean is important to us, and we want to work with Caribbean leaders. Once the Jamaican election is over, we would attempt to repair our political relations with Jamaica through candid, high-level discussions designed to build a political foundation for solid economic cooperation.

The economic effort would be bilateral, but in the context of a donor consortium, probably spearheaded by the IMF. U.S. contributions in the range of $20–30 million per year for Jamaica for several years might be required—with the expectation that the Jamaican economy can be put back on a solid foundation in a relatively short period if the GOJ takes the IMF medicine (devaluation, tough controls on imports, cutbacks in some social programs), if bauxite demand goes up as expected, and if the GOJ gets more support from its friends in the interim.

Pro:

—best chance of turning around the Caribbean situation, ensuring that U.S. interests in that key region are well served, and obtaining Caribbean support in Third World and African contexts.

—provides an effective counter to Cuban blandishments and the appeal of radical solutions generally.

—demonstrates to Third World and African leaders that cooperation with the U.S. pays.

—offers best hope of moving effectively to resolve our illegal immigrant problem, both by increasing employment in the Caribbean and by opening the door to positive cooperation by area governments.

Con:

—would require substantially more resources than are now available for the Caribbean, possibly entailing special justifications and/or requests for Congress.

—may stimulate demands for similar treatment from other regions.

—could be seen as rewarding Manley and Burnham for their opposition to us.

—may only moderate Manley and Burnham’s policies in the short run, i.e., until they are past present economic problems.

Option 4. Political/Security Activities. In support of an economic assistance program, we would undertake a political action program designed to strengthen our own relations with key segments of the Commonwealth Caribbean and minimize the Cuban ties. We could seek a secret agreement with the UK or other friendly governments whereby we would pay for the training of Jamaican and other security forces in order to preempt Cuban or other Communist activity in the security field. We would undertake gray or black propaganda efforts to discredit Cuba and Cuban activities and to surface the extent of Cuban intelligence activities in the area. (A more complete discussion of other covert options with my comment is at Tab 1.)

Pro:

—an action plan to counter Cuban and Soviet activity in the area is important in turning around the current deterioration of our relations with the area.

—over the long run, we will want to assure continued dominance of UK and other friendly nations within the security forces of the area since these forces are likely to take on increasingly important roles.

Con:

—any “covert” effort however modest could give rise to suspicions that we are destabilizing. The potential for discovery in these small, open islands is great.

—the key to the area is through the building of mutually beneficial relations, not through political action which is on the margin.

Option 5. The Cuban Option. How the U.S. deals with Cuba bilaterally will have an important impact on our future relations with the region. Cuba is no longer isolated and its relations with the area will expand. We will eventually want to reestablish relations with Cuba in order to provide Cuba with a cost/benefit consideration in undercutting our interests. “Détente” with Fidel could lower the tension and diminish the trend toward polarization in the region.

Pro:

—rapproachment with Cuba would likely lead to trade and economic ties that could be more important to Cuba than to the U.S. Such leverage would be useful.

—the hostility that now exists between us could be diminished and give credibility to our statements that we accept diversity and are not destabilizing.

Con:

—U.S. initiative toward early dialogue with Cuba could encourage Cuban adventures in Africa and elsewhere.

—U.S. relations with Cuba would likely increase Cuba’s acceptability in the region and promote more rapid development of bilateral relations with the Caribbean Commonwealth nations.

Recommendation:

I recommend that you agree to variants of Options 2 and 3. My own sense is that we should:

—begin immediately to demonstrate a more supportive political and economic posture toward Barbados, Trinidad/Tobago and the Associated States by high level visits (Phil Habib and/or me), high level treatment here (Chuck Robinson has seen the Barbadian Foreign Minister), and discussions of bilateral aid.

—begin planning now for a new regional initiative early next year, after the Jamaican elections (December 14, probably) and after Burnham has sweated. Looking to that approach, we could talk with the Canadians, the UK and the Venezuelans.

—consider with other agencies ways to mount a more effective propaganda effort in the region.

—discuss with the CIA whether ways can be found to finance UK or other third country training of Caribbean security forces.

—work out with the Director General of the Foreign Service a plan to install in the Caribbean an effective group of career Ambassadors and substantive officers who can begin to build the type of bilateral relations that we need after decades of assigning political appointees and weak career officers to the area. (See Tab 2.)

I recommend that you authorize me to proceed as proposed.

1. Summary: Noting the increasingly problematic nature of relations with Jamaica and with the Caribbean more generally, Shlaudeman reviewed several policy options and recommended the United States take a more supportive political and economic posture toward the region.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860055–1143. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Luers and Heavner. A note on the memorandum reads: “No action taken. No longer relevant for this Administration.” A portion of Tab 1, Schlaudeman’s September 20 memorandum to Habib, is published as Document 468. The remainder of Tab 1, a covert action proposal with Shlaudeman’s comments on it, is attached but not published. The text of Tab 2, a proposal to develop a Caribbean career specialty within the Department of State, not published, is contained within Document 468. In telegram Secto 34014 from the Secretary in Acapulco, December 29, Kissinger responded that the proposal on the Caribbean was “no longer relevant for this administration,” adding that the memorandum would be returned to ARA without action. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760474–0771)