Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

42. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹

Washington, February 19, 1976.

Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass you the following report.

“The mood at the first two stops on my Latin American Trip—Caracas and Lima—is warmer, and also more unsettled than I had expected.

“In Caracas, I met at length with President Perez. He is a commanding figure, quick, energetic, tireless, proud of his country and its democracy and utterly in control of his government. With the nationalization of the oil industry, he and Venezuela have come to terms with the United States. He can now relate to us as an equal, without rancor or embarrassment. I hope his visit to the United States will come off in the second half of the year, because you will like him and he will give you a sense of the new Latin America, a hemisphere we can work with.

“In Peru, I talked with the President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister; all are military. All give the impression of dedicated, but confused, military reformers, anxious to preserve their third world credentials but now, and for the first time, equally anxious to enhance their relationship with us. We should grasp the opportunity, for the Peruvians, though they can say some ideologically terrifying things publicly, are still a voice for moderation in third world fora. At home, though, they are close to the ragged edge, their international economic accounts are in bad trouble; internally, they have trouble deciding whether they face tougher opposition on the left or on the right. And they want to reform their own country, which is no easy task under the best of circumstances and well-nigh unthinkable in as ancient and rigid a society as Peru’s. They much appreciated the visit, from all the evidence; the feeling all around was warm—though I have no doubt that the very few student noisemakers in the Lima streets will get more press coverage than the much larger crowds who were favorable.

“Cuba, however, is much on the Latin mind; this is already apparent from the first two stops.

“In Venezuela, it has hardly escaped President Perez’s attention that the new government in Luanda came to power on the bayonets of a Latin American state (or rather a Caribbean country, since Venezuela deeply fears that Cuba can create a black Caribbean bloc). The fact that it was in Africa that the Cubans installed a government of their choosing, and not in his hemisphere, is small comfort to President Perez, who as Interior Minister fought Cuban infiltration. Caracas is full of rumors that the Cubans are already in Guayana. It is not hard to imagine that it could cause real trouble any day between the two countries, if the Cubans want it to. President Perez himself has strong memories of the time ten years ago when Castro was deep into political murder in Venezuela itself; Perez was the Minister of Interior then. So he has no illusions, and plenty of apprehensions about the Cubans.

“This is what gives such point to our response to the Angolan adventure. For Venezuela, like the rest of Latin America, has in all practical fact, stood behind the protective security shield of the United States against intervention from overseas. And we have protected them, until now. They see themselves defenseless against the new Cuba, armed to the teeth and, from all appearances, not unwilling to do in this hemisphere what it has already done in Africa. And they are concerned.

“In this sense, Angola, for Latin America, is more important than Vietnam. Now as then, they are interested in what is happening in Washington, not Saigon or Luanda. They know that a Latin American nation—for the first time in history, has launched an overseas invasion of military force with considerable fire power into an internal conflict in another nation with absolutely decisive results—and we tried to do something about it and failed, by our own internal division, to stop them.

“The Venezuelans were as explicit about our failure as courtesy would permit them to be. The Peruvians were a little less willing to show anxiety, probably since Peru treasures its credentials as a non-aligned state. But there was no doubt at either Caracas or Lima that our response to the Cubans in Angola has altered the Latin view of the United States—and not for the better.”

1. Summary: Reporting to Ford on the first part of a trip to Latin America, Kissinger noted that the failure of the United States to respond forcefully to Cuban intervention in Angola had damaged U.S. prestige in the region.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Outside the System Chronological File, Box 1, 12/20/1975–6/1976. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum. In a February 25 conversation with Ford after his return to Washington, Kissinger stated that Latin Americans were “scared to death about Cuba,” adding that he thought that “we are going to have to smash Castro,” but not before the Presidential election. Ford agreed. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 18, February 25, 1976—Ford, Kissinger)