385. Telegram 1209 From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State1
1209. Subject: Action Memorandum: AID Lending for Guyana (S/S 7611843). Ref: A) State 141011, B) Georgetown 256.
1. Summary: Country Team, except AID Director, dissents from ARA recommendation and notes preference for continued deferral (as supported by IO) or even cancellation both loans. End summary.
2. Embassy notes that ARA quote strongly unquote favored option one of reftel A, which would have USG sign agreements for the two pending loans.
3. Reftel B gave Embassy Georgetown’s comments on this issue in early February. In that cable, we stated our belief that Guyana’s hostile actions toward U.S. interests and the likelihood of further unfavorable political evolution made signature of new loans and further aid commitments difficult to justify to Congress and the American taxpayer. We then outlined several options, one of which (our option C) was to delay both loans until near end of FY76 or until FY77 allowing chance to see how Guyana behaved toward U.S. interests in the interim period. Because of the delay, that option was in large part adopted without an affirmative decision to do so.
4. The key members of the Country Team (except for the AID Director who was out of the country until today, have therefore taken a fresh look at how Guyana has behaved toward U.S. interests during that interim period. Our facts do not differ appreciably from those cited in the action memorandum, and to us indicate that, aside from FonMin Wills and some other GOG officials’ continued personal friendliness and readiness to talk with us, Guyana’s actions have in that interim continued to be almost uniformly hostile to our interests. The Cuban tie in particular has intensified, several hundred Guyanese soldiers have been sent to Cuba for training, Guyana joined Cuba as the only other [Page 1004] Western Hemisphere nation to vote against the U.S. International Resource Bank proposed at UNCTAD, and Guyana’s active role at the Algiers NAM was of no apparent help on Korea or anything else, despite FonMin Wills’s supposed intention. Internally, Burnham is rapidly transforming the country into the second Marxist-Leninist state in the Western Hemisphere. His apparent hostility toward the capitalist West, and particularly the United States, has reached the point that we are not sure whether he will any longer accept these loans. Particularly the public service training loan, even if offered.
5. Key members of Country Team (except AID Director) feel that signing these loans now in face of intensified hostility, repeated charges of destabilization, and no sign of inclination by GOG to accommodate U.S. interests will confirm to Burnham, GOG and other Third World countries that the best and easiest way to get something out of USG is to attack, oppose and threaten it. Signing these two loans under present circumstances would also seem to confirm that we are not serious about our démarches requesting support and indicating that hostility to our interests will not be cost-free. Embassy Georgetown therefore supports either Option 3 or 4 of the action memorandum, and would consider Option 2 preferable to Option 1.
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Summary: Citing intensified Guyanese hostility towards the United States, the Embassy recommended canceling or continuing to defer economic assistance to Guyana.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760229–0619. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. In telegram 256 from Georgetown, February 6, the Embassy recommended that the Department consider further reductions in aid to Guyana in response to continuing hostile actions. (Ibid., D760046–0526) In telegram 141011/Tosec 160130, June 9, the Department transmitted an action memorandum from Ryan to Kissinger which contained a recommendation from ARA and AID that a proposed food crops loan to Guyana be allowed to go forward (Option 1). IO recommended the continued deferral of both a food crops loan and a public sector training loan (Option 2). Other alternatives offered included proceeding with the food crops loan and canceling the public sector training loan (Option 3) and canceling both loans (Option 4). (Ibid., D760222–0468)
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