Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

384. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 4, 1976, noon.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Meeting with Guyanese Foreign Minister Wills

PARTICIPANTS

• Guyana
• Foreign Minister Fred R. Wills
• Ambassador to the United States Laurence Mann
• U.S.
• The Secretary
• Assistant Secretary William D. Rogers, ARA
• D. Clark Norton, ARA/CAR (Notetaker)

After the exchange of pleasantries, the following discussion took place.

[Omitted here is discussion of the International Resources Bank, the United Nations, and Cuban policy toward Africa.]

Guyana/Cuba Relations

Wills: I hope you do not come to the conclusion that Guyana will provide Cuba logistical support for its African involvement. Cuba does not need to use Guyana’s facilities. I assure you that Guyana will not allow its security to be violated by permitting a Cuban military presence or by becoming a Cuban puppet.

The Secretary: That is very important, and we appreciate your assurances.

Now, what problems do you have?

Guyana/Brazil Relations

Wills: My problems should be well known to you. They concern our borders, especially our border with Brazil.

The Secretary: Are they really doing anything serious down there to you other than attacking Guyana in the newspapers?

Wills: Well, it seems that the Brazilians are mobilizing along the borders.

The Secretary: Really. I have no indication of this.

Mr. Rogers: Do you have any estimate of the size of the Brazilian mobilization?

Wills: We have heard of Cuban exiles being trained in the border region and an increase in the Brazilian patrols along the border.

The Secretary: (to Mr. Rogers) Did you know this?

Mr. Rogers: I had never heard of this report.

Guyana/Surinam Relations

Wills: We also are concerned that the U.S. has chosen to sell military equipment to Surinam. Now that Surinam has attained its independence, it has become hostile toward Guyana. In the Presidential Determination making Surinam eligible to purchase U.S. equipment, we note that the justification is that such sales are in the security interests of the U.S.

The Secretary: I was unaware of the decision to sell arms to Surinam. Although Surinam may be eligible to buy military equipment, it does not mean that we are doing it. I want you to know that.

Wills: Well, your policy not to sell arms to Guyana means that we have had to look elsewhere for our weapons. We have had to go to Europe for most of our needs. We have assumed that it is not in your interest to sell arms to us.

Mr. Rogers: Have we turned down any request by your Government to purchase weapons?

Wills: We have not had a previous need to come to you with any requests.

Mr. Rogers: I will look into this matter of selling weapons to Surinam and give you a report.

The Secretary: I would like to make two points clear. The first is that we have little interest in selling arms to an army trained by Cubans. Second, we are not encouraging anyone to make a territorial claim against Guyana.

Wills: Well, if you refuse to sell us arms or provide training, then we must look elsewhere.

The Secretary: As I understand, you have not made a serious request to purchase arms from us. Let Bill Rogers know what you need and on what terms. We will look at your request, but I must caution you that our response will probably be negative. What terms would you want?

Wills: We would be willing to pay for any equipment.

The Secretary: Although there are many aspects of your policies I don’t like, we are not trying to overthrow your country or government.

Wills: I want you to know that we cannot afford a large Cuban presence in Guyana. We are not fools and know that the Cubans would put Jagan into power.

The Secretary: I agree you are not fools. However, I am not so sure about your Cuban connection. You have told us that you are sending troops to Cuba for training.

Wills: That is true. You have made no meaningful offers to assist us. We have sent people to West Point but found that type of training was useless for our needs.

The Secretary: It is even hard for us to keep some West Point cadets in the system.

Brazil/Guyana Relations

Wills: I am pleased to learn that you are not encouraging Brazil against Guyana. Have you attempted to discourage them?

The Secretary: Absolutely! We have no evidence that the Brazilians are doing anything against you. I will see Silveira (the Brazilian Foreign Minister) on Monday in Santiago and ask him about the situation.

Wills: I don’t think Silveira will be very useful and influential. He can only carry a message back to Brasilia.

What the Brazilians are doing makes us believe we are being destabilized. For instance, the Brazilians are increasing their development of the border zone and attack our Socialist system in their press. Then there is the problem of the white Brazilians attempting to maintain power in Brazil. The white Brazilians believe that if they are successful they will have upheld the principle of white rule in South America.

The Secretary: Why does a small country like Guyana have so many border problems?

Ambassador Mann: It is a fact of history, a legacy from the British.

Guyana/Surinam Relations

Wills: We are also concerned at Surinam’s intentions toward us. I note that Surinam’s Prime Minister is going to France to see Giscard D’Estaing on a sensitive matter.

We further understand that France has recognized Surinam’s claim to a portion of Guyanese territory. Even Surinam’s new maps extend Surinam’s boundary to include the disputed territory in Guyana. We cannot accept this. As long as Surinam lays claim to this territory, we cannot develop the uranium and bauxite located there.

There are also a number of right-wing “hawks” in Surinam who are against Guyana. This also concerns us.

The Secretary: I have never heard of Surinam as an offensive country. In fact, I don’t know where Surinam is on the map.

I want you to know that I have had no contact with anyone from Surinam.

Bilateral Relations

The Secretary: There should be no obstacle to an improvement in our relationship so long as Guyana is not being used as a Cuban base.

Wills: I want to assure you that Guyana does not intend to be used as a Cuban base.

Is it possible to use your “good offices” to investigate whether there is really any truth to the rumors of a build-up on our borders?

The Secretary: I will talk to both the Venezuelan and Brazilian Foreign Ministers at Santiago and get their views of the situation. We have no interest in destabilizing Guyana.

Wills: I do not want to go to Santiago because of my opposition to the present Chilean regime. I have heard rumors that the OASGA will appoint a committee to monitor the presence of Soviet/Cuban advisors in the hemisphere. If such a committee is set up, I invite them to visit Guyana and inspect first hand our territory so that you can see there is not a Cuban military presence in Guyana.

The Secretary: We have heard nothing of such a committee being established at the OASGA.

Mr. Rogers: I doubt if Cuba will even come up at the Santiago meeting.

Wills: Why can’t we cooperate better?

The Secretary: There is no reason why we cannot cooperate. Let us start on improving our relationship.

UN Votes and AID

Wills: I recall the New York Times article stating that the USG had decided to cut off aid to Guyana.

The Secretary: There are two separate problems.

Votes on specific issues rarely give us problems, except on matters which we consider to be of “life and death” importance. Such votes are rare and come up only once every five years. On the normal issues, we have little reason to do anything to those who vote against our position.

However, as I told you before, if a country opposes us across the board on all issues, then this should affect our overall relationship.

Take a country like Peru, which considers itself to be non-aligned. From time to time, Peru takes opposing positions on key issues. Nonetheless, we still have a good relationship with Peru.

Wills: Why do you choose to pick on Tanzania and Guyana?

Mr. Rogers: I assure you that hostility is not a principle of our policy toward Guyana.

The Secretary: I am sorry that I have a lunch to attend. Thank you for stopping by. I enjoyed seeing you again.

1. Summary: Mann, Wills, and Kissinger discussed Guyana’s relations with its neighbors and with the United States.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820118–1504. Secret. Drafted by Norton and approved by Covey on July 12. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. In telegram 817 from Georgetown, April 28, Krebs reported to the Department that he and Wills had discussed the possibility of arranging another meeting between Wills and Kissinger. (Ibid., D760161–0761) In a June 29 meeting, Rogers and Luers informed Mann of the result of Kissinger’s discussion of Guyanese border concerns with Brazilian and Venezuelan officials. In addition, Mann seemed pleased with Kissinger’s assurances to Wills that the United States was not seeking to destabilize the Guyanese Government. (Telegram 169170 to Georgetown, July 8; ibid., D760264–0872) Rogers informed Kissinger of the meeting with Mann in a July 1 memorandum. Kissinger rejected a suggestion in the memorandum that Wills be sent written assurances on the destabilization issue. (Ibid., P760104–1389)