380. Telegram 2220 From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State1
2220. Subj: Cuban Military Intervention in Angola: Guyana Reacts to Alleged USG Pressure Tactics. Ref: A. Georgetown 2213; B. State 302692; C. State 303982.
1. Summary: GOG unhappy over public disclosure that USG has expressed concern to GOG over possible use of Guyana by Cuban airlift, which adds to GOG problems in trying to deal with situation. GOG deeply disturbed over information they have received (obviously from Venezuelan Ambassador) implying USG prepared to use force in denying use of Guyanese facilities by Cubans. GOG officially seeks assurance from USG on latter point. End summary.
[Page 984]2. Acting FonMin Hubert Jack (Minister of Energy and Natural Resources) asked me to come to FonOff this morning (30th). He had FonOff PermSec Rudy Collins present as notetaker.
3. With minimal amenities but essentially in friendly tone, Jack said GOG had been taken aback by fact that State Dept spokesman yesterday disclosed USG had expressed concern to GOG over use of Guyana as refueling stop for planes carrying Cuban troops to Angola (reftel C). Jack went on to say that GOG felt obliged to put out statement (reported in USIA media reaction) categorizing this action as pressure. Jack said I was surely aware how delicate this matter was for GOG and that our statement added another complication, because it would make an eventual refusal to Cubans look as though Guyana had caved in to USG pressure. He recalled previous issues (e.g. Reynolds nationalization) which two governments were able to resolve by quiet negotiation, and concluded he hoped we could continue dialogue on this question in same fashion.
4. I said I had not rpt not been aware of USG press statement until I heard it on government radio newscast at 0700. I said I would convey GOG reaction to Washington. Jack said his impression was USG had made no public statements about its démarches to Barbados and Trinidad until after those govts announced their decisions on denial of facilities and he wondered, if this correct, why Guyana being treated differently.
5. Jack then asked how I would define the context in which Secretary Kissinger sent his message to PriMin Burnham. I went over background of my series of talks with FonMin Fred Wills, leading up to point when Barbados and Trinidad denied Cuba refueling facilities and Guyana became next logical place for Cubans to seek accommodation. I said my govt had impression GOG shared our concern over flagrant foreign military intervention in Angola, but then we had heard reports, some later confirmed, that Cuban planes had begun to transit Guyana. It was in this context that Secy. Kissinger appealed to PriMin Burnham not to lend GOG cooperation to external intervention. I put stress on quote appeal unquote.
6. Jack said my statement was of some comfort to him, as he was obliged to tell me that GOG was deeply disturbed at information it received yesterday from source which warranted credence, to effect that USG would even be prepared to resort to use of force in order to deny use of Guyanese facilities by Cuban airlift. He said Guyana had a whole nexus of relations with U.S. resting on foundation of assumed friendship between two govts. Obviously, if there were any foundation to information in question, Guyana, which lacks any significant capacity for self-defense, would have to look for external support. He asked for my reaction.
[Page 985]7. I said I was almost positive I could identify source of this information, since I had picked up report late yesterday (i.e., my conversation with Venezuelan Ambassador, reftel A) which could easily have given impression he described. I added that I was both surprised and dismayed, because I felt I had been privy to my govt’s thinking on the subject and I was unaware of any foundation for this quote information unquote. I said it seemed to me better all around not to identify source of this report, but I could assure Jack that I had already drafted telegram informing Washington of what I had learned yesterday.
8. Jack said GOG would like to have some reassurance from USG as to its intentions. I said I would pass this request urgently to Washington and would let him know as soon as I had a reply.
9. Comment: Tenor of Dept’s instructions to me and of the Secretary’s letter to Burnham left me totally unprepared for Venezuelan Ambassador’s account of what he told Burnham. Of various possible explanations I am assuming either A) Marquez misunderstood his instructions or B) GOV misinterpreted our request. One point I failed to mention in reftel A is that Marquez also spoke as though he had at least intimated to Burnham that his govt was inspired to act by prodding from USG.
10. While I still believe it is probable that Burnham will decide to continue to allow Cubans to refuel here, perhaps delaying public move until after OAU Summit, I believe he is likely to do so in context of defiance to USG threats. He may be dissuaded from public allegations of USG pressure, or at least to mitigate his remarks, if I am authorized immediately to give Jack orally and privately a formal and categoric denial that USG is in any way contemplating use of force against Guyana or this issue. End comment.
11. Action requested:
A) Instructions for reply on use of force question.
B) Indication whether we publicly acknowledged demands to Barbados before or after it took its public stand.
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Summary: Krebs reported that the Guyanese Government was disturbed by what it perceived as U.S. pressure tactics intended to prevent the transit through Guyana of Cuban military flights en route to Angola.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850104–1551. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. In telegram 2213 from Georgetown, December 30, Krebs reported that the Venezuelan Ambassador to Guyana had apparently hinted to Burnham that the United States might use force against Guyana if Cuban flights continued to pass though the country. (Ibid., D750450–0190) In telegram 305226 to Georgetown, December 31, the Department authorized Krebs to “tell Jack orally, privately and emphatically that we have at no time contemplated the use of force against Guyana on this issue.” (Ibid., D750050–0842) In telegram 2227 from Georgetown, December 31, Krebs reported that Jack was relieved by this assurance. (Ibid., P850104–1555) In telegram 33 from Caracas, January 2, 1976, Shlaudeman reported that he was unaware of what the Venezuelan Ambassador might have said to Burnham, but that it was not inconceivable that “the inspiration for such excesses as he may have uttered came from President Pérez.” (Ibid., D750002–0964) Telegram 302692 to Georgetown is dated December 24. (Ibid., P850012–2223) Telegram 303982 is dated February 11. (Ibid., D750449–0493)
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