Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

379. Telegram 2196 From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State¹

Georgetown, December 26, 1975, 2200Z.

2196. Subj: Cuban Military Intervention in Angola: Guyana Transit Facilities. Refs: A. State 302692; B. Georgetown 2195 (Notal); C. State 303329.

1. I delivered Secretary Kissinger’s message to Prime Minister Burnham at his country residence at 1600 Dec 26. FonMin Wills, through whom I arranged appointment, also present. Conversation lasted 90 minutes, atmosphere friendly but marked by constant needling of USG policies by Burnham.

2. In response to Secretary’s appeal regarding transit facilities, Burnham authorized me to convey following to Secretary:

A. No rpt no Cuban flights of nature described in Secretary’s message (first para) have passed through Guyana.

B. Cuba has made no rpt no request for facilities for such flights (he acknowledged existence of civil aviation agreement).

C. Just as USG is decrying intervention by Cuba and Soviet Union in Angola, and with greater emotional intensity, Guyana protests South African intervention and is unable to accept failure of USG to single out South Africa intervention publicly.

D. When I asked Burnham what GOG would do if Cubans did request facilities, he pretended at first to take offense at implied derogation of sovereignty but conceded in end that he was unprepared to make advance commitment.

3. Our conversation covered a wide range of topics once we had disposed of immediate question, but time and again both Burnham and Wills reverted to criticism of USG attitudes and inactivity on African liberation. Our triple veto (with UK and France) on South African resolution [garble] UNSC, our policy on Rhodesian chrome, our private investment in South Africa, our arms sales to South Africa, figured among examples they cited as showing our hearts were really with the South Africans and we still don’t give a fig for oppressed Blacks in Africa. Wills was especially offended at South African use of UN Trusteeship Territory of Namibia for staging. I attempted as best I could to put each of the issues into perspective and to indicate we would be greatly relieved if South Africans would go home. But the theme song could not be turned off: South Africa is the real bad actor; you’ve got to help us put an end to white oppression and minority rule in South Africa before you can expect us to pay attention to your structures on Soviet and Cuban involvement.

4. USG involvement in Angola, as seen in news reports of $50 million arms assistance to Zaire, plus recent allegations that Americans are piloting spotter planes over Angola was another target of Burnham’s needle. He asked how we could object to Soviet/Cuban involvement when we were also, though admittedly indirectly, involved. He even asked rhetorically at one point if U.S. would cut off assistance to FNLA/UNITA if he guaranteed not to allow Cuban military airlift to transit Guyana.

5. Comment: Burnham was obviously on defensive, but he chose a fairly good offensive tactic to put off our appeal. I believe Burnham hopes to avoid becoming involved in this particular issue, at least until after he sees what transpires at OAU Summit meeting Jan 10–11 (in fact he mentioned specifically GOG policy remained tied to OAU consensus). I imagine he hopes by that time a clear consensus will emerge in favor of MPLA and he can then allow Cuban flights to transit without qualms of conscience.

Krebs

1. Summary: Krebs reported that he delivered to Burnham a message from Kissinger regarding the use of Guyanese facilities by Cuban flights en route to Angola.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850104–1548. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except those indicating garbled text. In telegram 302692 to Georgetown, December 24, the Department transmitted a message to Burnham in which Kissinger appealed to him “to insure that Guyana not lend its cooperation and support to that [Cuban] effort of external intervention in Africa.” (Ibid., P850012–2223) In telegram 2194 from Georgetown, December 24, Krebs expressed his doubt that a high-level message from the United States would produce a desirable result. (Ibid., P850104–1543) In telegram 2195, Krebs reported that Wills favored conveying Kissinger’s message to Burnham. (Ibid., P850104–1545) Telegram 303329 to Georgetown is dated December 25. (Ibid., P850012–2230)