Attached is the report on insurgency in Bolivia requested in Dr.
Kissinger’s memorandum of July 24, 1970. It reflects interagency views.
It consists of a brief summary and a more detailed attachment. It
concludes that there is no need for special United States efforts at
this time beyond the accelerated delivery of supplies in the pipeline,
some MAP diversions, and cash sales of
ammunition. If the prospects for the threat change, we will promptly
reassess the situation.
Our review of the Bolivian insurgency issue has led us to decide to
undertake a separate study of the degree and nature of links among
insurgent groups across national boundaries in Latin America (such as
those reportedly existing between the Tupamaros of Uruguay and some
other groups in other countries).
Attachment
Interagency Report
SUBJECT:
- Insurgency in Bolivia: A Summary Statement
A. Size, Nature, Scope and Potential of Guerrilla
Threat
The immediate threat is the existence of a small band of armed men
who recently dynamited the installations of an isolated
American-owned mining company, abducted two employees (later
releasing them in exchange for the government’s release of ten
guerrilla prisoners) and who presently are attempting to elude army
pursuers and make their way through jungle and mountains in the
direction of the Peruvian border. Of an original group of 60–70 men,
including third country nationals and Bolivians trained in guerrilla
tactics in Cuba as well as inexperienced university students, nearly
a score have surrendered or been killed in clashes with the army.
The raiders belong to a pro-Castro guerrilla organization called the
ELN, which survived the demise of “Che” Guevara in 1967. In addition
to the Cuban training inputs, the Tupamaros of Uruguay have provided
financial and possibly other help to the ELN. There exists an ELN
apparatus capable of committing acts of terrorism in the major
cities, but we have little information regarding its size, extent,
or intentions. We are [Page 3]
unable to assess with any degree of certainty the ELN’s capability
to carry out sustained guerrilla operations at this time. However,
the attack on the mining camp thus far has not been followed by any
other outbreaks of ELN activity elsewhere in the country. Prompted
by the ELN’s example, the pro-Chinese Communist party, which
probably does have limited capability for guerrilla operations and
terrorism, recently has shown signs of intent to initiate some level
of violent activity separate from that of the ELN.
B. Bolivian Capacity to Contain Insurgency
While the present threat marks the first time since “Che” Guevara’s
death that army troops have had to be committed to the field, the
Bolivian military should be able to eliminate or at least neutralize
the existing pocket of activity. However, should there occur various
outbreaks of guerrilla activity simultaneously in different parts of
the country, the military would be poorly prepared to cope with such
a situation and police capability to control possible major urban
disturbances would be extremely limited.
Another factor which could potentially limit the troops’ capacity to
deal with the insurgency is the serious political rift which has
developed in recent weeks between President [Page 4]
Ovando and his military chiefs
over policy direction. These differences led to the resignation of
Ovando’s cabinet on August 3–4. The cabinet crisis was resolved,
temporarily at least, with Ovando’s acceptance of the resignation of
the foremost radical civilian cabinet member, the Minister of
Information, and the reconfirmation of the rest, including the
military ministers. The political problems in La Paz thus far appear
to have had no adverse effect on the troops’ fighting capability in
the field. This conceivably could change, however.
C. Summary of Present MAP and Public Safety
Internal Security Assistance
The FY 1970 MAP program, divided evenly
between training and materiel, totaled $1.6 million. Delivery has
begun on FY 1969 and 1970 items, including small arms, ammunition,
communications equipment and tactical vehicles. Due to the Cambodian
emergency the MAP materiel program for FY 1971 has been suspended
and there presumably will be further reductions in the training
portion. A modest public safety program is being reinstituted in FY
1971 with a proposed budget of $118,000 (which may reach $175,000),
including the provision of a two-man advisory team, training and
equipment. Commodities procured in FY 1970 have recently arrived in
Bolivia.
[Page 5]
D. Additional or Special Assistance Possibly
Necessary to Meet Threat
At the Bolivians’ request, we have expedited the delivery of
C-rations already in the MAP pipeline. We also understand the
Bolivians desire our expediting additional items under the MAP grant
program as well as selling them ammunition on a cash basis. In view
of the limited nature of the present threat and the likelihood that
most Bolivian government requirements could be satisfied within the
framework of existing MAP, FMS and
public safety programs, we see no need for additional special
efforts at this time beyond the accelerated delivery of supplies in
the pipeline, some MAP deviations, and cash sales of ammunition.
While it would be desirable to do so, there is no feasible way to
attempt to significantly increase the intelligence capability of the
Bolivian government under present and foreseeable circumstances. If
the prospects regarding the threat were likely to change, we would
be prepared to reassess the situation at that time and promptly
submit revised recommendations.
E. Third Country Assistance
The Argentines, who traditionally have shown concern that their own
internal security could be affected by [Page 6] instability next door, recently sent 5,000
first aid kits to Bolivia and alerted one regiment to contingency
plan for possible duty in the Bolivian insurgency. There is no
information that the Bolivians actually made any request to the
Argentines, however, and given the present level of threat, it is
unlikely that the Bolivians would do so or that the Argentines would
commit troops without a Bolivian government request. Nor is there
information that any other neighbors have provided special
assistance or that the Bolivians have asked or even desire this.
Should Bolivia’s neighbors assume greater share of the cost burden by
responding to specific Bolivian requests for help to meet its
guerrilla problem, this would be desirable from the viewpoint of
U.S. interests. However, active intervention by the neighbors in
Bolivia beyond financial or materiel assistance, particularly troop
deployments, could cause serious conflict in the center of the
Hemisphere because of traditional national rivalries in the area.
Whether or not such intervention would be in the U.S. interest would
depend upon our assessment at the time of the specific circumstances
of the case. The neighbors themselves appear to be cognizant of the
problems involved in providing manpower support.
[Page 7]
[Omitted here is the body of the report.]
