In transmitting the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) for
Bolivia, FY 1972–74, I would like to underscore an element of special
importance in this year’s submission. We have an interest in Bolivia
which may transcend the relatively modest importance of the country
itself. This is the test whether a government which launched itself as
extremist, leftist, and possibly even Castroist can be nurtured back to
moderation, induced to pay for what it took in exercising its undisputed
sovereign right to nationalize property, and shown that its true
interests lie in resumed constructive collaboration with the US and its
neighbors. The results of this test may well have hemisphere-wide
importance, for better or for worse.
Enclosure
Country Analysis and Strategy Paper
[Omitted here is a cover sheet and table of contents.]
[Page 3]
I. Statement of Rationale and Basic
Strategy
Bolivia is important to us in large part because of its location in
the strategic center of South America where developments can engage
the interests or threaten the security of more important neighboring
countries. Bolivia is also important to us as a leading free world
supplier of wolfram and antimony.3 Finally, because we have a special
relationship with Latin America, we consider it important to make,
if possible, a special effort to assist Bolivia, as a fellow member
of the hemisphere community, to attain reasonable aspirations
through self-help, regardless of transitory governmental forms. In
short, our interests, although relatively few, are real; and, in the
present setting, probably more difficult to satisfy than in the
atmosphere of previous years.
In one perhaps short-term respect, we have an interest in Bolivia
which may transcend the relatively modest importance of the country
itself. This is the test whether a government which launched itself
as extremist, leftist, and possibly even Castroist, can be nurtured
back to moderation, induced to pay for what it took in exercising
its undisputed sovereign right to nationalize property, and shown
that its true interests lie in resumed constructive collaboration
with the US and its neighbors. The results of this test may well
have hemisphere-wide importance, for better or for worse.
Major factors leading to the current Bolivian situation, following a
military coup, have been the nationalization of the Bolivian Gulf
Oil Company with possibly other American firms threatened, economic
stagnation and the development process interrupted and continued
uncertainty regarding the final orientation of the Revolutionary
Government. In this setting, key US interests, in priority order,
are:
- 1.
- Restoration of political stability and internal
security.
- 2.
- Economic stabilization and eventual resumption of economic and
social development, with due regard to the role of the private
sector and to Bolivian responsibilities under international
law.
- 3.
- Fulfillment by the Security Forces of their legitimate role as
guarantors of internal security in a changing society,
consistent with national aspirations.
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Our basic posture should be that of a friendly, sympathetic, but
unobtrusive and patient partner. As such, we should be ready and
able to assist this or successor governments meet positive and
mutually agreed upon goals, provided they desire our cooperation and
make it possible by respect for obligations under international law.
Politically, this means working realistically with the government in
power, yet urging, as appropriate, governmental responsiveness to a
wider spectrum of opinion and the return of some form of broadened
participation to national political life. Economically, it means
supporting Bolivian efforts to restore health to government finances
and to resume the development process, assuming international
obligations are met. Militarily, it means maintaining, through
continued military assistance, a degree of influence with the Armed
Forces, Bolivia’s strongest single institution and one generally
counted on the side of moderation, and turning them toward goals of
professional competence and away from the corrosive and
self-destructive direct exercise of political power. It also means
helping to make the Bolivian Police an effective force for security
in a changing society. Psychologically, it means sensitive action to
counter the negative and sometimes hostile Bolivian attitude toward
the US and Americans, engendered by Bolivia’s dependent status in
the donor-receiver relationship which has characterized our contact
for so many years; to combat waves of anti-democratic propaganda
(which often precede unpalatable actions) stemming mostly from
intellectual, left labor, and student circles; and to improve the
climate for meaningful cooperation with the Bolivian government. To
be effective we must be enabled to move quickly and with
flexibility, sincerity, sensitivity, and understanding. Our purpose
is to affect political decision-making and to nurture an attitude of
moderation and true understanding of US policies and motives. Our
effort is to demonstrate that the better interest of Bolivia lies in
moderation and in continued cooperation with us.
Given the nationalist atmosphere in Bolivia and our own desire to
avoid the appearance of paternalism, our activities will attempt to
project the lowest possible profile. We should neither seek the
limelight nor attempt to share the stage. Bolivians should be
encouraged to face up to the problems they have created for
themselves, and we should avoid actions which might enable them to
export responsibility onto us. We may face a problem here in that
Bolivia is not strong in its capacity to execute local initiatives,
and programs of merit may require bringing into the country a number
of technical assistance teams. Within practical limits, we would
promote the utilization of qualified Bolivians in-country or
currently working abroad, and of third nationals.
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If this or a successor regime shows little or no inclination to move
toward moderation, fails to make progress on a Gulf settlement
(perhaps moving on to other nationalizations), and, indeed,
construes our willingness to assist as license to follow heedlessly
the design of close-minded nationalism, we face a different
situation requiring a different posture. In such a circumstance, we
would have little alternative but to batten the hatches and
drastically reduce program, staff, and visibility. On the assumption
that it is better to maintain some presence than lose touch
altogether, we would hope to survive in-country as a small,
tightly-knit, largely reporting unit. In this case, our immediate
options would lie in external actions. Since this scenario implies a
rapid deterioration in the Bolivian economy with similar impact upon
the political situation, we should publicly consider Bolivia a
hemisphere problem to be treated within the context of the
Organization of American States. Privately and perhaps more
crucially, we should see it as a problem to be treated in
consultation with interested neighboring countries with a view
toward reaching a regional solution.
[Page 6]
[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]
