617. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 2
Subject:
- Soviet Airlift to Peru
The Soviet Union is undertaking a large-scale airlift of disaster-relief supplies to Peru. This will be the largest disaster-relief airlift ever mounted by the Soviets, although previous airlifts providing military aid have been larger in scope: a military airlift to the UAR in 1967 had over 300 flights in a three week period, and at the end of 1967 some 200 military flights were made to the Yemen within two and one-half months. The present airlift, by comparison, is to involve the flight of sixty-five Soviet aircraft to Lima within a period of approximately eight days.
Thus far our information regarding this Soviet airlift has come from third parties. According to the Government of Iceland, which has been asked to provide stopover facilities, the Soviets plan to send sixty-one AN–12 and four AN–22 transport aircraft at the rate of 8–10 per day. The aircraft will fly from Moscow to Lima via Iceland, Newfoundland or Nova Scotia, Cuba, Venezuela, and Colombia. Originally single technical flight was scheduled to initiate the airlift on July 3, and the other flights were to start on July 7. However, we were informed on July 3 that the Soviet Foreign Ministry advised the Canadian Embassy in Moscow that the July 3 technical flight had been cancelled, and that the Soviets were unable to give any indication as to when either the technical or relief flights would commence.
After consultation with the U.S., the Icelandic Government agreed that, given the humanitarian purpose of [Page 2] the flights, a refusal would result in unfavorable publicity. The Icelandic Government has therefore assented to the Soviet landings for refueling only. The Canadians have also been in touch with the Department. They are approving a landing at Halifax or Gander for the initial Soviet flight, and we assume that Canadian Government approval will also be given for the follow-up flights. It is not known what supplies the Soviets will deliver, but they may provide prefabricated housing (as they did after the Yugoslav earthquake of 1963).
The USSR is obviously seeking to capitalize on the provision of this aid, and can be expected to publicize the airlift. Moscow’s initial failure to come forward with prompt promises of assistance was severely criticized in Lima, but the magnitude of the forthcoming Soviet effort may offset the earlier criticism. In addition, the Soviets probably seek to show with this airlift that they have the capability to conduct such operations on a world-wide basis. The military significance will speak for itself.
Any attempt by the U.S., or by others at our behest, to hinder the Soviet airlift could result in unfavorable publicity which would undercut the good will already created by the aid which we have extended to Peru. On the other hand, we do not wish to promote the Soviets’ relief operations any more than is required by courtesy and the interests of safety. With respect to the safety considerations, the proposed Soviet flight plan crosses oceanic areas for which the U.S. provides air traffic control services under the International Civil Air Organization. In order to ensure the flight safety of these aircraft, as well as aircraft of the U.S. and other countries, it is necessary to obtain more flight plan data. Accordingly, we have instructed Embassy Moscow to express this concern for safety to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and to ask for routing and communications information. We also asked our Embassy to indicate our cooperation in assuring the safety of these flights and to say that we will lend whatever assistance is necessary and available in the event of emergency. We are in touch with DOD and FAA on this problem.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Secret. Brewster signed for Eliot. Attached but not published is a map of the world, a picture of a Soviet AN–22, and the Department’s Contingency Press Guidance.↩
- Eliot discussed the Soviet airlift bringing disaster relief supplies to assist Peru in rebuilding following the May 31 earthquake. He discouraged interference by the U.S. Government to avoid negative publicity. In addition, he opined that the U.S. Government should not promote the Soviets’ relief operations beyond the requirements of courtesy and safety.↩