513. Telegram 446 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1 2
Subj:
- Nicaraguan Election Report Number Four
Ref:
- Managua 0330
1. Summary: Conservative Party crushed by Liberals at polls February 6, receiving only estimated 15 percent of total vote and losing all 126 municipal elections. Vote being adjusted behind scenes to increase Conservative share to 25 percent. Attempt to change municipal vote to give Conservatives a few mayoralty victories aborted when exposed by opposition La Prensa. Overwhelming defeat and revelations of collusion with Somoza have dealt blow to Aguero and Conservatives, leaving them definitely down though not yet out. Chances of opposition coalition emerging for 1974 elections enhanced but many elements still missing. In Embassy opinion, election results and long range implications do not threaten US interests. End summary.
2. Latest unofficial election returns for Constituent Assembly are Liberals (PLN) 522,574 votes and Conservatives [Page 2] (PCT) 175,816 with 2277 of 2323 precincts reporting. Total vote in municipal elections is Liberals 314,085, Conservatives 110,761 with 1475 of 2323 precincts reporting. Conservatives are losing in all of the 126 municipal races, including Granada. Final, official election results will not be available until February 27. However, PCT percentage in both Assembly and municipal elections is expected to be about 25 percent.
3. Extent to which final totals will reflect actual election results will probably never be known. There are indications total vote was inflated by about 25 percent. As anticipated reftel, morning February 8 Somoza gave Aguero guarantee that PCT would receive approximately 25 percent of vote. Since the PCT obviously fell short of this figure, probably receiving only 15 percent, returns have had to be “adjusted” to raise its vote to agreed level. Somoza reportedly also agreed to assure PCT victory in a few mayoralty races, including Granada, and accordingly some precincts were apparently ordered to send in “corrected” reports giving the PCT candidate a larger vote. This maneuver aborted, however, when opposition La Prensa obtained copies of telegrams altering the vote in two Granada precincts and published them alongside the original reports afternoon February 8 and 9. This embarrassing expose forced two parties to abandon attempt to rig municipal vote with resultant Conservative defeats in all races.
4. Aguero’s leadership of PCT seriously challenged in face of overwhelming defeat and public revelations of collusion with Somoza. At stormy session February some Party leaders called for his immediate resignation and PCT withdrawal from pact. However he managed to survive attacks and retains control of Party. In public statements he declared that (a) PCT did not expect anything from 1972 elections because they were conducted under old system riddled with corruption and irregularities, (b) real objective was, and remains, electoral reforms and honest elections in 1974 to which Party will now dedicate itself with increased vigor and (c) PCT will continue to adhere to pact as long as it furthers this objective.
5. Aguero’s statements have not stilled criticism of opposition groups and La Prensa. Not surprisingly, these opposition elements maintain election results prove [Page 3] that they were right all along. A Social Christian Party (PSC) spokesman conceded there was electoral fraud, but in favor of Somoza not against Aguero whose poor showing proved public contempt for PCT. He said results confirmed that PSC was not allowed participate in elections because it would have beaten PCT, adding that if PSC was “mini-party” then PCT was “micro-party”. The Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI) said elections proved no single party could take on Somoza and reiterated its call for an opposition coalition. The dissident Popular Conservative Movement (MPC) said aguero’s defeat and alleged heavy abstention were a great triumph for the people and repudiation of the kupia kumi.
La Prensa alleging massive abstention, claimed success for its call to boycott the “electoral farce”. The newspaper attacked the elections from many angles and laid particularly heavy fire on Aguero personally. However, after first week, media and opposition commentary on the election tapered off sharply; it may revive when the official, detailed returns are released February 27.
6. The justifiable pride of Liberal Party leaders in the juggernaut performance of their political machine has been offset by the realization that their crushing of the Conservatives precipitated a crisis for the pact and created problems for Somoza. Throughout the campaign the PLN demonstrated overwhelming strength while the PCT projected weakness. Consequently, Liberals should have realized that some braking of other adjustments of the machine were necessary to fulfill Somoza’s pre-election guarantee to Aguero of a respectable percentage of the vote and some mayoralty victories. Although this question was reportedly raised in Liberal strategy sessions, no orders were issued. It now appears that Somoza deliberately allowed Liberal machine to demonstrate to Aguero his basic weakness. Somoza is, however, annoyed by PLN failure to properly allow Conservatives to win in Granada. He is reportedly particularly angry at Foreign Minister Guerrero who apparently engineered unwanted Liberal victory in Granada.
[Page 4]7. Comment: Aguero has clearly been hurt because he failed the critical test of a candidate—he did not deliver the votes. While the election was only pro forma and he was not expected to win, there were limits to how bad he could look and he may have exceeded them. Thus, in addition to the formidable task of rebuilding the PCT, which he had just begun, he now has the added burden of refurbishing his own image. Our earlier estimates of the PCT’s chances of emerging as a meaningful opposition participant in a two-party system by 1974 have been 50–50; we now revise this to 30–70 against.
8. Implications for the US: Regardless of the outcome for Aguero and the PCT, we do not see US interests threatened. As stated in our recent CASP there are various alternative solutions which do not appear inimical to US interests. At this juncture, the most likely is the emergence of an opposition coalition which Somoza has indicated he would be willing to accept. There is already room for such a coalition and issues on which it can focus, but no one has emerged to lead it and there is no agreed political unit on which to build it. We will be watching closely for emerging signs of these missing elements in the months ahead.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 NIC. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Guatemala City, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, San José, USCINCSO, and USCINCSO for POLAD.↩
- The Embassy reported that President Somoza’s Liberal Party had crushed the Conservative Party in the February 6 elections and that the loss actually enhanced the chances an opposition coalition would emerge for the 1974 elections. The Embassy concluded that the election results and long range implications did not threaten U.S. interests.↩