511. Airgram A–3 From the Embassy in Nicaragua1 2

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SUBJECT:

  • Ambassador Meets with Social Christian Leaders

REF:

  • Managua’s A–116, October 3, 1971
  • Managua 2935, December 23, 1971

Leaders of the Social Christian Party (PSC) met with the Ambassador at a luncheon held at the residence on December 14, 1971. PSC leaders had expressed interest in such a meeting during their frequent contacts with officers of the Political Section. They were particularly eager that the luncheon take place prior to the December 21 deadline for a decision from the Supreme Electoral Court regarding the PSC petition for recognition as a legal party with a right to participate in the February 1972 elections.

As the luncheon progressed, it became apparent that the PSC leaders had requested this opportunity to express the party’s views to the American Ambassador in an attempt to elicit his support for its campaign for legal recognition. By the end of the afternoon they mentioned the subject several times and bluntly requested that the Ambassador see President Somoza to present the PSC point of view with a USG endorsement. The Ambassador’s response was noncommittal. The full memorandum of conversation is attached.

Shelton
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Attachment

Memorandum of Conversation

Participants:

  • Ambassador Shelton, Amembassy Managua
  • Cesar Delgadillo, President, Partido Social Christiano (PSC)
  • Eduardo Rivas, Ex-Senator PSC
  • Ignacio Zelaya Paiz, Ex-President PSC
  • Manuel J. Morales Peralta, Fiscal PSC
  • Roger Miranda, Secretary for International Relations PSC
  • James R. Cheek, Political Officer, Amembassy Managua
  • Dan E. Turnquist, Political Officer, Amembassy Managua

After the usual amenities the PSC leadership got directly to the point and began discussing the party’s petition campaign and the possible repercussions if the Petition was not accepted by the Supreme Electoral Court. Although the conversation touched on many other matters, this was the central theme, the topic which the PSC leadership always returned to and the note that closed the conversation.

Party President Delgadillo reviewed the internal struggle in the party which had led to the petition campaign. (Managua A–116) He emphasized that once the Petition was decided upon all party elements combined in collecting signatures. The party was both surprised and pleased by the “outpouring of support” received and it collected the necessary signatures in considerably less time than originally thought necessary. Now everything depended on the decision of the Supreme Electoral Court.

Senator Rivas stated that if the Court turned down the PSC petition that he and other more conservative elements would be incapable of restraining the youth who wanted to opt for violence. He observed that he was an old man and would not become involved in a violent revolution, but he would have no choice but to advise those younger and fitter than he that this was the only road to ending the “Somoza dictatorship” if constitutional methods were foreclosed by rejecting the party petition.

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Morales agreed with Rivas commenting somewhat truthfully that he was too fat to be a revolutionary but that he would no longer, in good faith, be able to advise the youth of the party that violence was wrong if peaceful means failed.

Zelaya suggested that the ultimate decision would be a political one made by President Somoza and asked if the Ambassador had any notion what it would be. The Ambassador answered that Somoza had assured him the law would be observed but had gone no further than that. Zelaya then suggested that acceptance of the petition was in the best interest of the USG and party leaders would be grateful if the Ambassador would discuss the matter with Somoza and present the PSC position, hopefully with a U.S. endorsement.

The Ambassador protested that the PSC leadership was ascribing much more influence to him than he actually possessed and jokingly observed that if his influence was indeed as great as they thought, he would be greatly surprised. The PSC leaders laughed politely, but clearly were unconvinced.

The Ambassador inquired about what changes the PSC had in mind if and when it became a majority party in Nicaragua. The party plans expressed were rather vague, concentrating on such areas as eliminating nepotism and corruption from government and orienting the government away from the “oligarcy” and toward the “people.” It was made emphatically clear that the PSC believes in private property. However, several suggestions were made that it might be necessary to divest the Succession Somoza of some of its properties which, according to the PSC, have been acquired at the expense of the people during thirty-five years of “dictatorial rule.” They failed to explain how this belief in the sanctity of private property could be reconciled with their statement that there should be a more equitable distribution of property presently owned by this “oligarchy.”

The Ambassador asked about the PSC’s view of the U.S. role in Nicaragua. Zelaya attacked the AID program stating that Nicaraguan contractors had profiteered on the Rama Road project and that many roads built with U.S. aid were built for the specific purpose of serving lands owned by the Somoza family rather than the nation of Nicaragua. The Ambassador defended the performance of the AID mission in properly monitoring the contractors. He discussed with the participants the wealth of documentation which had to be furnished on each contract and stated that the AID auditing procedures were too tight to allow such “fraud” as they alleged. He further pointed out the [Page 4] difficulty in locating a road in Nicaragua which did NOT pass near a Somoza farm since they are the largest property owners in the country. He closed by observing that while he was in no position to defend GON contracting procedures in general or the Somoza family since that was not his function he could and would vouch for those projects supervised by AID.

On the international scene, the PSC leadership was even less precise than when discussing domestic politics. Miranda’s observation that the party would recognize the Peoples Republic of China was greeted with general laughter, but when an inquiry was made about Cuba, there was talk about being clearly identified with the Western world and a commitment to the interamerican system.

Throughout these remarks on the party’s aspirations for Nicaragua both domestically and internationally, all of the PSC participants made it clear that their first and primary concern was the petition campaign and legal recognition for the party. They stated quite frankly that if an honest and open election were held tomorrow they would probably obtain no more than 100,000 votes. They admitted that the Partido Liberal Nacional (PLN) led by Somoza has an excellent nation-wide organization. They also volunteered that Somoza was personally popular. It can bring pressure to bear on nearly every member of the population through a relative who is a government employee or through some needed favor from the government or the national guard. As an example of this kind of pressure they cited the telegrams which were flooding the Supreme Electoral Court requesting that names be removed from the PSC petition. Most of these have been produced through PLN pressure brought on PSC petition signers.

Legal recognition is simply a step in a long campaign to gain political power in Nicaragua in the opinion of PSC leaders.

The conversation closed with one last plea to the Ambassador to use his influence with Somoza to affect the outcome of the Court decision. The Ambassador thanked the PSC leaders for an interesting afternoon, expressed a desire to see them more frequently.

Comment:

When analyzing the dire predictions made by PSC leaders regarding the aftermath of rejection of their petition, it must be remembered that they were trying to convince the Ambassador of the necessity of U.S. intervention. The petition was rejected by the Supreme Electoral Court on December 21 (Managua 2935).

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The luncheon participants subsequently have taken a much less radical public line and promised to keep working within the system with the hopes of participating in 1974. They have however noted that some dissident elements in Nicaragua may take the Court decision as proof that violence is the only way.

Certainly one of the most interesting aspects of the whole afternoon was that a group that is frequently publicly critical of U.S. “intervention” in Nicaragua was willing to ask for just the kind of intervention they denounce when it was convenient for their purposes.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 NIC. Confidential. Drafted by Turnquist, cleared by Cheek, and approved by Shelton. Repeated to Guatemala City, San José, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO for POLAD. Stamped notations on the Airgram indicate that it was received at the Department of State at 8:34 a.m. on January 12, at the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on January 14, and at the RS/AN Analysis Branch.
  2. Ambassador Shelton met at his residence with the leadership of the opposition Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), who stated that if the Supreme Electoral Court rejected their petition, the only road to ending Somoza’s dictatorship would be through violent revolution. The Embassy reported that the December 21, 1971, Supreme Electoral Court ruling against the PSC’s petition could convince some dissident elements in Nicaragua that violence was the only way.