504. Memorandum for the Record1 2
PARTICIPANTS:
- President Nixon
- President Somoza
- General Haig
President Nixon welcomed President Somoza and recalled the many years of friendship that have existed between Nicaragua and the United States and more particularly, his own warm personal relationships with President Somoza and his father. President Nixon noted that his reception in the 1950’s by President Somoza’s father was one of the highlights of his trip to Central America. President Nixon added that the warm relations that have existed over the years have and will continue to grow stronger under his Administration.
President Nixon explained that he was aware of certain trade issues which had developed as a result of shifting attitudes in the United States Congress and certain elements of the bureaucracy. These difficulties had focused on textiles, sugar, meat and tobacco. He added that he would attempt to be as helpful as possible in these difficult areas in which his own flexibility was somewhat limited by legislative obstacles.
President Nixon then asked President Somoza for his personal appraisal of the situation in Latin America and especially in those countries in which difficulties had recently surfaced.
President Somoza stated that he was most appreciative for the reception he had received in the United States and grateful that he had an opportunity to meet with President Nixon, a free world leader in whom he had always had the greatest confidence and for whom he held the utmost respect.
President Somoza then explained that the situation Latin America remained complex and dynamic. He noted that he was especially pleased with President Nixon’s policies towards Peru. President Velasco was an [Page 2] individual with a military background who had himself been faced with the greatest of difficulties since 80% of his population were of Indian blood and were easy prey for the Marxist ideology. It was, therefore, essential that President Velasco adopt a policy designed to prevent a drift by Peru towards extremist solutions. President Somoza considered that President Nixon’s patient and understanding approach to the unfriendly actions taken by Velasco had been highly effective. He now sensed a definite shift in Velasco’s attitude and policy in the direction of more constructive relations with the United States. President Somoza emphasized that the problem with the IPC had been a long standing one in Peru and one in which the actions of the IPC itself had been a major contributor to ensuing difficulties.
An additional contributing problem had been the phenomena of past U.S. attitudes towards the Latin American military, in general. These were men who lacked philosophical roots beyond a fundamental patriotism. When the United States adopted policies designed to downgrade the military’s role in Latin America and to sever U.S.-Latin American military relationships, many in the Latin American military were driven to adopt extreme nationalist policies. To some extent U.S. problems with Peru and other military dominated Latin American regimes were a direct outgrowth of self-defeating U.S. policies with respect to the military.
President Nixon stated that he agreed with President Somoza’s analysis and noted that he did not share the attitude held in many U.S. circles about the military. He noted that General Haig could attest to his respect for the military profession and its influence in both Latin America and the United States.
President Somoza summarized the situation in Peru as being one which will require continued patient handling by President Nixon. Thus far the results of this kind of policy on President Nixon’s part had been most encouraging to him and he was confident that President Nixon was on the right track.
Concerning the situation in Chile President Somoza stated that the events that had occurred were the result of the belief within the Christian Democratic Party that they could permit Allende to stick his neck out to such an extent that he would become vulnerable to [Page 3] having it chopped off by the Party. In his view, however, it was more likely that Allende would sever the neck of the Christian Democratic Party.
President Nixon asked about the situation in Argentina and President Somoza replied that it did not look good at the moment. He stated that frequently reformist regimes, especially military regimes, adopted extreme positions which were counter-productive to successful evolutionary development. In the case of Argentina, he believed that consideration should be given to permitting Peron to return since his forced exile had established a psychological cause celebre which was far more dangerous than the alternative of permitting his return. President Nixon commented that he understood Peron was in Spain, and President Somoza affirmed that this was the case. He added that he knew Peron well and that Peron had been his father’s friend and that Somoza’s father had hosted Peron at the time of his early difficulties in Argentina. In Somoza’s view, Argentina would be well-served by removing the Peronist incentive for trouble making in Argentina based on Peron’s exile.
President Nixon stated that he was very pleased with the performance of the military regime in Brazil. He noted that economic difficulties had been rapidly disappearing and that internal stability was making great progress. He stated that he was contemplating asking President Médici to visit the United States and he asked President Somoza whether he thought this would be a constructive step.
President Somoza stated he shared our assessment of the effectiveness of the current regime in Brazil. He noted that here again the patriotism and responsibility of the Latin American military was evident and he supported the idea of a visit by President Medici to the United States.
President Somoza then turned to his assessment of conditions in Central America. He stated that recent problems between Honduras and Salvador had stalled progress within the Central American Common Market and this had in turn contributed to serious economic problems in all of the countries including Nicaragua. He hoped that the impasse between these two countries could soon be resolved.
On Nicaragua itself, President Somoza made the following points:
—President Nixon’s enlightened decision to terminate the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of 1914 had been a major psychological [Page 4] step in Nicaragua. This action had disarmed those elements in Nicaragua which had long decried the United States as imperialistic. President Somoza was both officially and personally grateful for this sagacious and statesmanlike decision by President Nixon. President Somoza then handed President Nixon a letter which expressed his personal gratitude for the decision.
—President Somoza stated that he had adopted a policy directed towards the distribution of federally-held lands and he believed that this was contributing substantially to Nicaragua’s economic potential and its internal stability. He noted that just as in the United States we had moved underprivileged and potential dissidents westward, he had initiated a land distribution program designed to move his underprivileged elements eastward. Land distribution was being made in Nicaragua’s eastern provinces without any ceiling on acreage; an individual could acquire as much land as he could constructively till.
—Concerning the future development of Nicaragua’s economy,—contrary to the policies adopted by many of the developing states in Latin America, policies directed towards the development of a sophisticated industrial potential—Nicaragua had launched a development program designed to supplement and complement the industrial base represented by the United States. In other words, rather than attempting, with limited resources and skills, to establish an industrial economy which would attempt to compete with the United States, Nicaragua was working in a direction which took cognizance of United States supremacy, Nicaragua’s limited technical skill and the need to move in directions which the United States itself did not emphasize. For example, labor costs in the agricultural area suggested that the United States would soon price itself out of the market in certain extractives, fishery, and agricultural areas. For this reason, Nicaragua was striving to develop its extractive business, its food processing and truck farming and the modern manufacturing processes which supported this kind of development. It was not going to attempt to compete on the basis of heavy industrial development.
—Concerning Nicaragua’s political future, he had just obtained an agreement between Nicaragua’s Conservative Party and his own Liberal Party designed to insure the political stability of Nicaragua for the next 20 years. The agreement provided for his stepping down at the completion of his term next year and the establishment of a compromise government in which he would serve as the Chief of the National Guard. Presidential elections would be held in 1974 with Somoza then becoming the [Page 5] Liberal Party’s candidate.
—Concerning trade relations with the United States, he asked for assistance in the following areas: increased textile quotas and increased quotas for sugar, meat and tobacco. He noted that recent United States action on sugar quotas had been especially troublesome.
—He noted that he had received assurances from Allen Dulles at the time of the Bay of Pigs that Nicaragua’s sugar quotas would be maintained in return for certain assistance given to the United States with respect to Cuban exile activity.
—He concluded that the termination of the Bryan-Chamorra Treaty underlined the need for United States assistance in financing his government’s desire to open the San Juan River to oceangoing vessels.
President Nixon stated that he would be as helpful as possible on the issues raised by President Somoza noting that it was essential that the United States support its friends in the hemisphere.
At the conclusion of the meeting, President Somoza stated that he had one additional request to make. He stated that there was a field piece in the City of Philadelphia that had been taken from Nicaragua by United States Marines at the time of the Nicaraguan campaigns and that he hoped that President Nixon could be helpful in achieving the return of that cannon to Nicaragua. President Nixon replied, good-humoredly, that he was not aware of this situation and directed General Haig to look into the possibility of returning the weapon.
President Nixon stated that tonight’s dinner was designed to honor President Somoza and members of the Class of 1946 at the United States Military Academy. He noted that several of the illustrious members of the class had been invited to the dinner and that after the dinner he hoped President Somoza would remain as long as he wished in order to reminisce with his former classmates. The President stated that in this context “Mi casa esta su casa.”
The group joined the other members of the official party in the Yellow Room at 8:15 p.m.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 790, Country Files, Latin America, Nicaragua Vol. I (1969–1974). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Treaty Room. An attached sanitized version was prepared for transmittal to the Department of State.↩
- President Nixon and Haig met with President Somoza and discussed the military in Latin America, the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, economic developments, including quotas for commodities, and Nicaragua’s political future. Somoza indicated that he had reached an agreement to step down at the completion of his term, but noted that he planned to run as his party’s presidential candidate in the 1974 election.↩