Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

494. Telegram 83319 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nicaragua¹ ²

Washington, May 30, 1970, 2326Z

Subject:

• Cuban Exiles’ Proposed Meeting with President Somoza

Ref.

• Managua 830 and 886

For Charge from Hurwitch

1. Department is concerned that President Somoza’s proposed reception by Cuban exile leaders during stopover at Miami airport June 8 could be detrimental for both U.S. and Nicaraguan interests.

2. Situation has largely returned to normal in Havana following release of kidnapped Cuban fishermen by radical Cuban exile group, Alpha 66. Kidnapping of fishermen and seizure and sinking of two Cuban fishing boats by Alpha 66 had created a serious condition in U.S.-Cuban relations in which Castro threatened to seize the former American Embassy building, end representation of U.S. interests in Cuba and cancel Cuban airlift.

3. Meanwhile, investigations by U.S. law enforcement agencies, dating back to July, 1969, have developed considerable evidence that certain Cuban exile groups, including Alpha 66, are in serious violation of U.S. statutes. Leader of Alpha 66, Nazario Sargen, is under indictment (with several others) for allegedly stealing weapons from Colt factory in Hartford, Connecticut, apparently used in Alpha 66 landing in eastern Cuba in April. These investigations and indictment of Nazario, who is activist yet to be apprehended, have resulted in demands by vocal activist elements of Cuban exile community in Miami for end of U.S. “harassment” of exiles engaged in illegal activities.

4. In the past, exile activities, including pin-prick armed raids, have been counter-productive and turned by Castro to his advantage both internally and externally. Castro, in his recent speeches, has charged U.S. complicity with these exile activities, rejecting U.S. statements of non-involvement, and he has linked unnamed Central American countries with the Miami-based exiles as well.

5. Given foregoing, Miami airport conference would, in Department’s judgement, risk providing occasion for certain exile leaders to try to exploit Somoza’s presence in U.S. to support their campaign against U.S. efforts to enforce its laws. Moreover, meeting of Somoza with exile activists on U.S. soil could also be exploited as “evidence” that U.S. is behind some “plan” to shift base of exile operations to Nicaragua.

6. Drawing on above, you should indicate to President Somoza that meeting with exile groups could lend itself to misinterpretation, and therefore we would find it preferable if he were to adhere to his original plan of transferring immediately from Air Canada plane to Lanica aircraft parked nearby. Needless to say, any public reference on Somoza’s part to the above stated preference could fuel the discontent of activist elements in exile community cited in preceding paragraphs. In order to ensure opportunity for full and confidential explanation to President Somoza, Department believes you should request private meeting with him prior to airport departure.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 NIC. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. For Chargé from Hurwitch. Drafted on May 30 by Funseth (ARA/CCA) and Eltz (ARA/CEN); cleared by Killoran and in S/S; approved by Hurwitch. In telegrams 830 and 886 from Managua, May 19 and 26, the Embassy requested assistance in arranging a meeting between Somoza and Cuban exile leaders in Miami. (Ibid.)
2. The Department of State indicated that it was concerned about President Somoza’s proposed visit with Cuban exiles in Miami, and that the visit could be detrimental to both U.S. and Nicaraguan interests, particularly in light of problems involving Alpha 66.