Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

486. Airgram A–115 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹ ²

Managua, June 9, 1969

SUBJECT:

• A New Look at the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty

Introduction. The Embassy wishes to alert the Department to President Somoza’s discussions with Governor Rockefeller concerning the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, and to suggest initiating preliminary discussions soon with President Somoza on the question of the future status of that Treaty.

Background. The Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of 1914 gives the United States an option to construct “an inter-oceanic ship canal” by way of the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua. The Treaty further stipulates that before construction can take place the Governments of Nicaragua and the United States will have to reach some mutually satisfactory agreement concerning the actual terms of construction and the operation and maintenance of the canal. To protect a canal, should it be built, the Treaty gives the United States a 99-year lease on Great and Little Corn Islands and the right to maintain a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca.

The treaty has been a perennial source of irritation for Nicaraguans ever since its signature a half century ago. Many Nicaraguans consider that the grant of right-of-way along the San Juan River constitutes a negative option in that it prevents Nicaragua from proceeding with the development of the San Juan River basin.

Rockefeller Talks. The Embassy understands that in his talks with Governor Rockefeller May 16–17, President Somoza asked for U.S. help in studying the potential of the San Juan River basin. President Somoza has told the Ambassador that Nicaragua would like U.S. support in making the San Juan River navigable for shallow-draft vessels, so as to permit access to, and development of, this isolated region.

In a separate conversation with the Ambassador, President Somoza did not specify what form this support would take—a loan, a feasibility study, etc. Further, he told the Ambassador it is now clear no canal deal will be struck between the United States and Panama in the near future, either with the present junta or at any time soon with an elected successor regime. In any event President Somoza is convinced, and presumably so informed Governor Rockefeller, that continued development of the San Juan River region should not await the outcome of developments in Panama. He also told the Ambassador he would expect the United States, in the remote possibility that we would subsequently decide to build a canal along that route, to “reimburse” Nicaragua for any investment the GON were to make to improve the San Juan River channel.

Governor Rockefeller reportedly promised President Somoza he would take up this matter in his report to President Nixon. In response to pointed questions from the press on this subject at his May 17 press conference here, the Governor said he had discussed the subject with President Somoza, but otherwise was non-committal.

Press Flurry. At some time prior to his discussions with Governor Rockefeller, President Somoza reportedly instructed his Ambassador in San Jose to urge the GOCR to mention to Governor Rockefeller the importance which Costa Rica also attaches to the development of the San Juan River basin. This the Costa Ricans did accompanied by considerable press play (San Jose 1459). The Nicaraguan approach to Rockefeller was initially not disclosed to the public here; however, when the opposition press heard of the Costa Rican initiative, it complained that the GON was sacrificing Nicaragua’s sovereign rights over the San Juan River to the Costa Ricans. The opposition press contended that the Costa Ricans should have nothing to do with improvement of navigation on the San Juan, on the basis that the entire bed of the San Juan River is situated in Nicaraguan territory.

Canal Studies. There have been repeated studies of a Nicaraguan canal route over the years, most recently in conjunction with or search for a sea-level canal site. The Embassy understands that the Inter-oceanic Canal Study Commission has an interim report due to be published this summer, with a final report scheduled for December, 1970. A draft engineering study of the various possible Nicaraguan canal routes, prepared as an appendix to the Commission’s report, makes clear that Nicaragua will not be the site of a new canal.³ Indeed, the Executive Director of the Commission in a recent memorandum noted that the Nicaraguan route “has already been publicly eliminated from further consideration by the Commission.”⁴

The Commission’s engineering study postulates three alternatives—a sea-level canal, a lock canal, and a sea-level canal excavated by nuclear devices. The study indicates that a sea-level canal could be constructed by conventional excavation in approximately fifteen to twenty years for a cost of about $8.5 billion. A lock canal along a divergent route would require approximately twelve years to construct at a cost of from $3.5 billion to $4 billion. A sea-level canal excavated by nuclears would cost approximately $3.5 billion and require nine years to build. However, nuclear excavation would involve the complete evacuation for three years of 225,000 people in the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border area, and the temporary evacuation of many high rise buildings as far away as 150 miles from the canal site. This would necessitate the evacuation of the major population centers of Nicaragua and Costa Rica and consequently would have a massive socio-economic impact on both countries. Such a mass exodus is politically untenable.

The study concludes by affirming that a nuclear route through Nicaragua is impracticable. A conventional sea-level canal while entirely feasible from an engineering standpoint is extremely costly, while a lock canal would not provide much of an alternative to the present canal in Panama.

Action Requested. The Embassy considers that the issue of the San Juan River could readily become a sore point in Nicaraguan-U.S. relations and that there is an element of risk in not taking some initiative on this matter at an early date. President Somoza, should he choose to do so, could at any time make excellent use of this issue to drum up nationalist sentiment. Particularly if the present nation-wide economic difficulties continue, he might adopt just this course of action in an effort to divert attention away from his government’s handling of economic policies.

The possible argument that the Treaty is important in terms of U.S. national security is not viable. We have never chosen to exercise sovereignty over the Corn Islands, and in any event the security consideration of having the naval base concession and access to the islands would only be relevant in the event we were to build the canal through Nicaragua.

Public announcement in Nicaragua of the conclusions reached in the current canal studies, whether this summer or subsequently, could trigger promptly a nationalistic and even jingoistic response in Nicaragua, predictably leading to difficulties in U.S.-Nicaraguan relations. We should not allow our relations, harmonious for decades, to deteriorate over the outdated and anachronistic issue of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty.

To obviate these potential difficulties, we request the Department’s authorization for the Ambassador to initiate discreet discussions with President Somoza with regard to the future status of the Treaty. These discussions would cover what the GON desires of the U.S. Government, and analyze what alternatives might be open to the U.S. Government in meeting these GON desires. Such discussions would be exploratory and tentative in nature, with any information and recommendations deriving from the discussions to be reported to the Department. GP–4

Crockett

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–3 NIC. Confidential. Drafted on June 6 by David W. Burgoon (POL) and approved by Malcolm R. Barnebey. Repeated to San Jose. Stamped notations on the Airgram indicate that it was received at the Department of State at 8:29 a.m. on June 12 and at the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on June 13. Ambassador Crockett signed the Airgram. In telegram 1435 from Managua, August 14, Crockett urgently requested authorization to initiate discreet discussions with Somoza on the future status of the Treaty. (Ibid.) In telegram 142594 to Managua, August 22, the Department of State replied that Panama Canal Treaty negotiator Ambassador Anderson felt strongly that without prior consultation with appropriate members of Congress, Panama Canal negotiations would be affected adversely. (Ibid.)
2. During Governor Nelson Rockefeller’s visit to Nicaragua, President Anastasio Somoza indicated his interest in developing a transportation route along the San Juan River basin. Since the Byran-Chamorro Treaty of 1914 prohibited Nicaragua from developing the region on its own, the Embassy requested permission to begin discussions with Somoza regarding the Treaty’s future.
3. Draft Report of Inter-oceanic Canal Studies (Annex V-Study of Engineering Feasibility, and Appendix II—Conceptual Study of Route 8) prepared by U.S. Army Engineer Nuclear Cratering Group dated April 1, 1969.
4. Memorandum dated April 21, 1969, from John P. Sheffey, Executive Director, Inter-oceanic Canal Study Commission, to Mr. Viron P. Vaky, Chairman, Foreign Policy Study Group (and other addressees).