Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

47. Study Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs¹ ²

Washington, August 11, 1971

SECURITY/MILITARY

• I. The U.S. Security Interest
• II. Description of Potential Threats
  • Missile Attack from Latin America
  • Hostile Non-Strategic Military and Naval Bases
  • Denial of Access to Resources, the Canal and Facilities
  • Territorial Seas
  • Cuban and Chilean Support of Insurgency
  • An Expanded Soviet Presence Extremism, Insurgency, Nationalism and Radicalism
  • Negative Political Developments
• III. Policy Implications of Potential Threats to the U.S. Security Interest
  • A. Preservation of Favorable Majority
  • B. Denial of Area for Launch of Strategic Attack
  • C. Maintenance of Confidence in U.S. Leadership
  • D. Access to the Panama Canal
  • E. A Strong Inter-American Security System
  • F. Transit on High Seas and in the Air Space
  • G. Denial of Bases to Hostile Powers
  • H. Access to Bauxite in Jamaica and Petroleum in Venezuela
  • I. Continued Access to Naval and Air Facilities
• IV. Policy Analysis
• V. Recommendations

[Omitted here are Sections I through IV.]

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations reflect both the broad conclusions in section IV and the policy implications of our analysis in section III.

A. That the IG/ARA’s recommendations to the SRG of January 12 be approved (see Tab A).

The first four of these recommendations, which concern the role of U.S. military personnel in influencing host government military, are directly responsive to the following policy implications of threatened interests discussed in section III:

—the need to increase contact and influence with key sectors of local societies to help maintain a “favorable majority”;

—the need for greater exchange of information concerning Cuban, Chilean, and Soviet activities.

The January 12 study contains additional recommendations which, while primarily designed to serve specific military ends could contribute in significant degree to the above needs. These recommendations are those that concern training, visits and exchange of information (recommendations 8, 9, and 11).

The remaining recommendations of the January 12 study, which concern grant materiel assistance,³ the elimination of legislative restrictions, a responsive FMS credit program, and provision of naval vessels, relate to the need cited in section III for selective military assistance for internal security purposes.

B. That contingency planning be undertaken with regard to the possible establishment of Soviet bases in Latin America.

We foresee the need to formulate a clearly defined policy toward the possible establishment of a Soviet military or naval base in Latin America, and to develop implementing courses of action that might be taken to help avoid the materialization of such a threat. Although our previous discussion makes clear that we do not consider such a threat likely to materialize over the next three to four years, we believe that planning for the contingency is prudent.

A possible scenario is described below. We offer this tentative scenario in full recognition of the facts that the content and timing of its initiation would be carefully reviewed in the light of the circumstances in which the contingency occurred and that the full running of the scenario would depend on the nature of the base.

The scenario might well start with diplomatic warnings to the Soviet Union and the Latin American country involved that the United States would view with concern the establishment of a communist military base in the hemisphere. Diplomatic approaches through the OAS designed to rally the support of Latin American countries might similarly stress that such intervention in the hemisphere is unacceptable. Should political initiatives fail and a hostile base be established, the United States would consider the possible application of economic sanctions through the OAS against the Latin American country which had permitted the establishment of such a base. Were the use of force to be considered necessary, it should be applied under the auspices of the OAS. Should OAS auspices not be possible, some other multilateral arrangement (e.g., one involving a group of like-minded Latin American countries) should be sought. Only as a last resort should force be applied unilaterally.

C. That adequate funding be provided to permit selected Public Safety programs.

We foresee a continuing significant role for AID’s Public Safety program in providing assistance to civilian security forces in selected countries. This program is designed to help participating countries meet short-term security threats, such as terrorism and urban violence, riots, and rural violence that may develop into guerrilla warfare. The program can help build civil internal security mechanisms that can prevent the development of threats to internal order without unnecessary force or deal with them in their incipient stages so that military force will not be required later to redress a full-blown insurgency.

Public Safety programs can thus contribute to the maintenance of internal stability, an important precondition for economic and social progress and political viability. As stated in “United States Policy on Internal Defense in Selected Foreign Countries,” issued by the Senior Interdepartmental Group May 23, 1968, and reconfirmed by NSDM 20 July 10, 1969, these programs have a dual rationale, i.e., development as well as security. This double purpose has been cited in the Under Secretaries Committee’s proposed response to NSDM 76, and we affirm its validity.

In most countries where we have Public Safety programs, particularly those where there are no military forces and internal defense functions are performed by a National Guard (Panama, Costa Rica and Nicaragua), these programs provide a useful means of contact and influence with a key sector of the host government hierarchy. We recognize that from time to time our Public Safety programs can be accompanied by associated political costs, particularly in countries with governments that demonstrate authoritarian or repressive characteristics. It is possible that such costs may increase in the event Public Safety is removed from the developmental rubric and placed within a security context, although they might be mitigated by concurrent legislative affirmation of Public Safety’s dual rationale of development and security. We nonetheless believe it serves our security interest, as well as our overall economic and political interests, to continue these programs and to provide adequate resources for them, when requested and when appropriate.

D. That the Department of Defense examine the possible need for increased submarine surveillance and ASW capability in the Caribbean.

E. That the IG/ARA assure that the importance of retaining our military and naval facilities in the Caribbean, and particularly in Barbados and the Bahamas, is reflected in the FY 73 CASP reviews now underway and in CASP guidance to be prepared for FY 74.

F. That, while maintaining our support for the maintenance of a twelve-mile limit for naval and maritime purposes, we seriously consider an interim arrangement that would alleviate tensions relating specifically to fisheries jurisdiction pending the achievement of international agreement on the Law of the Sea.⁴

G. That the SRG commission a thoroughgoing technical study of the strategic requirements for bauxite, oil and possibly other resources of which Latin America is an important source for the U.S.

H. That the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in cooperation with the IG/ARA, conduct a study of the feasibility of a possible arms limitation initiative.⁵

Attachment A

List of Recommendations

Washington, undated

(Taken from the IG/ARA study of January 12 on U.S. Military Presence in Latin America)

1. Utilization of Military Personnel.

That the Departments of State and Defense send to the field definitive guidance removing any doubts about the permissibility, propriety and desirability of utilizing mission personnel and attachés for purposes of influencing host government military leaders toward U.S. foreign policy objectives.

2. MILGP Manning Level.

That the freeze on further implementation of the MILGP study be lifted and that a new level of not to exceed 290 U.S. military spaces for the region be approved, leaving the detailed breakdown of each MILGP to be worked out among the Ambassadors, USCINCSO and Washington. In deciding upon the new levels for individual posts, the IG/ARA will oppose any increases that are not demonstrably contributive to the objective of increasing U.S. influence.

3. Size of Attache Offices.

That the Departments of State and Defense take action as feasible to provide for the small increases in several attaché offices recommended by the Ambassadors.

4. Quality of Military Personnel.

That the Department of Defense take concrete measures to improve the quality of MILGP and attaché personnel. These measures should include actions to improve overall military qualifications, language proficiency, knowledge of the area, the attractiveness of career and promotion patterns (to include possible establishment of foreign service career fields), military and civilian education levels, and personal qualities such as degree of empathy and political sensitivity.

That the Department of Defense report to the SRG by March 15, 1971 the actions taken and to be taken.

5. Grant Materiel Assistance.

That the present policy of phasing out grant materiel programming activity in Latin America be modified to permit materiel programs for selected countries. In determining the selection of countries and the size of country programs the IG/ARA will take into careful consideration all relevant factors including the security need, the local budgetary implications, and the political impact.

That the programs stress high-impact items in order to achieve the maximum influence.

That, accordingly, sufficient funds be reprogrammed for FY–72 in order to provide a program on the order of that funded in FY–70 ($9.3 million exclusive of supply operations).

That funds be programmed for subsequent years at levels not below that for FY–72, with possible small increases to be determined through normal interagency procedures.

6. Legislative Restrictions.

That the Administration make concerted efforts to eliminate from the Foreign Military Sales Act such burdensome legislative restrictions on our military sales program as the “Conte” Amendment (precluding credit funds for “sophisticated weapons systems”), “Pelly” Amendment (reference to preclusion of sales and credit following fishing boat seizure), and “Reuss” Amendment (reference to sales to military dictators).

That in the upcoming security assistance legislation, the present $75 million regional ceiling on military materiel to Latin America be eliminated or raised in order to permit flexible response to materiel requests.

7. FMS Credit Requirements.

That Latin American requirements for FMS credit be accorded a sufficiently high priority in relation to other regions to support a dependable and responsive program of military credit sales particularly for those countries in which such sales can significantly affect our ability to retain influence with the host country military (not less than $70 million annually for FY–72 and subsequent planning years).

8. Training Program for Latin American Officers.

That training programs for Latin American military personnel in U.S. military schools and the Information Program for Foreign Military Trainees be maintained at at least the FY–72 level ($10 million).

9. IAGS.

That the LAGS continue to be supported and adequately funded to permit continuation of mapping and school operations (not below $2.9 million per year as compared with $4.2 million in FY–71).

10. Naval Vessels.

That the United States be responsive to Latin American requests for naval vessels, particularly for those countries in which such response can significantly affect our ability to retain influence with the host country military; and that sales of excess naval vessels rather than loans be emphasized to the extent such vessels are available.

11. Related Military Programs.

That the following related military programs be continued and supported:

• —Inter-American Chiefs of Military Service Conferences and Latin American VIP visits.
• —Latin American Liaison Personnel Program (currently being expanded).
• —Combined exercises.
• —Visits of U.S. officials to Latin American defense establishments.

12. Related Non-military Programs.

That within the context of the primary purposes and legal restraints of CU, USIS, and development assistance programs, those activities that provide maximum opportunities for influencing the military be expanded. A report of actions taken or to be taken should be submitted by the IG/ARA to the SRG by March 15, 1971.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–59, SRG Meeting, Latin America/Caribbean, 8/17/71. Secret. The title of the Report is “Latin America—NSSM 108 and Military Presence Study.” Attached but not published at Tab B is “The Future of Grant MAP Material.” The January 12 study has not been found.
2. This 8 page NSC Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (NSC–IG/AR) study provided a list of recommendations for improving security assistance programs to Latin America.
3. Attached at Tab B are the principal options, with Pros and Cons, that were considered by the IG/ARA in arriving at this recommendation. These options are also discussed in an IPMG memorandum of January 19 to Mr. Kissinger.
4. See also the Political-Psychological sector paper.
5. Although not a matter constituting a current threat to the U.S. security interest, the recent series of reported purchases of French Mirage aircraft (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and perhaps Venezuela) indicates a possibly increasing arms race potential in Latin America and demonstrates the kind of problem to which an arms control initiative might well relate. While recognizing the unimpressive record of previous arms limitation initiatives in the hemisphere, the IG/ARA has concurred in a suggestion from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that the Agency, in cooperation with the IG/ARA, conduct a study of the feasibility and nature of a possible Latin American arms control initiative and the role of possible U.S. support for such an initiative.