360. Telegram 4697 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State1 2
Subj:
- Discussions With High GOG Officials on Subject of Violence
1. Over past 36 hours I have had extended conversations with Minister Government Jorge Arenales and Minister Foreign Affairs Roberto Herrera in which I have carefully started dialogue on violence issue using gambit of Guatemala’s image abroad. Herrera in conversation during presentation of copies of credentials October 14 gave me convenient entre this subject by saying he wished explore with me what GOG might do to improve its image.
2. During very frank private conversation evening October 28, MinGov Arenales told me GOG now has definite plans lift state of siege, “probably before Christmas.” Arenales said GOG would not take this action immediately because it did not wish appear to be bowing to recent agitation by students and other groups, but would pick time in next few weeks when it not under pressure. Arenales added in strict confidence that at time state of siege lifted government intends have Congress pass amnesty law for persons who have committed political crimes since July 1, 1970 (date of Arana’s inauguration) (see HGG–56604).
3. Arenales went on at some length, and at times heatedly, about Alan Riding article on Guatemala in [Page 2] October 23 New York Times which states there is campaign by Army moderates to have President end rightist violence and divorce himself from “hardliners” such as Arenales, Min Defense Vassaux, and President of Congress Sandoval. Arenales said he believed article, which he feels inspired by local opposition, including US resident newsman Robert Rosenhouse, was deliberate attempt encourage split in Army, and to cause difficulty between Arana and his principal advisors on security affairs. Arenales said, knocking on wood, that as of now there was no serious dissension in military over government’s security actions. He noted that in response to article, in attempt head off any potential damage it might cause, Min Defense Vassaux had called in all zone and brigade commanders to discuss article with them along the above lines and have them discuss it with officers under their command. Arenales said this consultation by MOD had been very well received by lower echelon officers.
4. Arenales and President Arana has for some time been seriously concerned about rightist terrorists activities led by Congressman Oliverio Castaneda (who, he claimed, was responsible for killing of Mijangos without government knowledge). Arenales added that after gentle attempts bring Castaneda under control had not been successful, President had called him in to tell him that while government did not want kill him, he would force government to do so if he did not halt his terrorist activities. On general subject of President’s desire bring halt to violence, Arenales noted that government was deliberately refraining from reacting harshly to student provocations. Government had to display firmness but without use of undue force. In this connection he noted three recent examples: (a) arrest of students distributing anti-government propaganda outside USC campus on October 21 who were detained overnight and turned over to parents following morning; (b) detention without strong arm action of students who had left university to demonstrate in streets evening October 27 and morning October 28 [Page 3] who will be processed and released to their parents with stern lecture that they would be in serious trouble if they did not behave; (c) arrest and [Page 4] notification of courts on October 28 of two leftist terrorists found with explosives, firearms and propaganda. (He added that police had even rescued some students from congressional bodyguards who reacted violently to student taunts against them.) Arenales said his primary concern with student problem was that hard core of agitators would continue induce small demonstrations in hopes of producing a student martyr—an eventuality GOG strongly wants to avoid. I noted government’s sophistication in handling the incidents mentioned above and discretely encouraged a continuance of this policy.
5. In course of conversation subject turned to Guatemala’s image abroad and how it could be improved. I noted that one difficulty seemed to be that Arana refused see foreign newsmen, no matter how prestigious or reliable they might be, and that consequently most of information gathered and reported by them was likely to have come from opposition. Thus stories could not be expected portray positive aspects Arana’s programs and give balanced picture situation in Guatemala. Arenales said he agreed, but that it was difficult to tell who might be responsible and who would distort and misquote President’s words after an interview, as had happened in past. He said that if reliable US newsmen wished see Arana, he would arrange such appointments if we would call him and recommend reporters. I pointed out that while I knew number of reliable newsmen specializing in LA, [Page 5] I could not, of course, give any guarantees about what they would write after interviews.
6. With regard state of siege, I noted that its very existence created bad image abroad and said that if GOG believed security situation permitted its lifting, they might be wise do so without regard for pressures from students or other groups. Holding off because of such pressures, I added, tends give pressure groups control over government action in this matter. Conversation also touched upon expressed fears of opposition leaders (particularly DCG) that their lives were threatened by GOG and fact that there had been no dialogue between Arana and DCG leaders, although they had sought meetings with him. Arenales said, as he has to other EmbOffs, that DCG involved in plot against government and that they too impatient to wait until 1974 to attempt gain power through elections, but want to sit in palace right now. However, he said it might be good idea for President talk to them, as well as PR leaders, (and get word to Fuentes Mohr) that government had no intentions against them, that they would be permitted free political play in 1974 presidential elections, but that they would have to be patient and stop plotting. He noted happily that such move now might also have extremely divisive effect on opposition parties, as each would be pushing for own advantage rather than talking coalition.
7. During meeting with FonMin Herrera October 29 I did not get into as much depth on subject of Guatemalan image because discussion came at end of long session covering other topics. I noted of President Arana’s isolation from foreign press and said this might be part of problem. He agreed and said that if I notified him of reliable US reporters who wish see President, he would attempt arrange appointments. I told him I would bring to his attention such requests as I might receive, also emphasizing with him that reporters [Page 6] would write as they saw things and I could not predict nature of their copy. He thought it would be good idea occasionally have foreign reporter accompany President on working trip to outlying [Page 7] departments so they could see him in action among people. On state of siege, Herrera also agreed that its continuance was causing bad impression. He said he had written President memo recommending that it be lifted and confirmed that there were plans in wind to do so. I told Herrera (as I had Arenales) that I thought moderate and sophisticated actions taken against recent student demonstrations and ex-student captured with subversive propaganda and weapons would be type of thing that would help in improvement of image. When Herrera mentioned to me that US citizen head of CARITAS causing President concern because of allegations he attempting stir up priests make anti-GOG statements and that President considering ousting him, I told him I hoped no such drastic action taken without my having opportunity to speak to Mr. Forster to get his side of story and discuss situation again with FonMin. In this context I noted adverse impact another expulsion on Guatemala’s image. He understood and agreed to my method handling charges against Forster.
8. Comment: Arenales, who is one of staunchest hard-liners advising Arana, seems to be moving with and reflecting apparent moderating trend in high levels GOG although he probably not in complete agreement. Not long ago he was fighting hard to block lifting of state of siege, but now says he agrees with plan do so. In past Arenales has maintained [Page 8] to Embassy officers that GOG should do whatever it had to do—legal or illegal—to protect itself and fight terrorists regardless of how actions might affect Guatemalan image in US and other countries. Now, he seems more interested in problem of Guatemalan image and seemed reasonably receptive to points made in discussion this subject. It should be noted that with regard question dialogue with DCG, Arenales is probably dissimulating when he talks of assurances of free political play for DCG in presidential elections, since he has repeatedly told EmbOffs (as have such other hard line leaders like Mario Sandoval) that under no circumstances could DCG be allowed to assume power in Guatemala as result would be “another Chile or Cuba” and rightist leaders would lose their heads. Arenales, like a number of his colleagues in GOG, continues to harp on leftist plot to overthrow Arana, but cannot really come up with any specifics when pressed.
9. The indications that GOG may be becoming more flexible and sophisticated in dealing with subversives should not be taken as sudden change of heart on part of hard-liners nor of a general turning of hawks into doves. It is probably due combination greater confidence resulting from knowledge they have hurt terrorist groups and growing sensitivity to criticism over state of siege. We can still expect see govt and rightist violence against people they believe are subversives, but indications that high level GOG officials are trying use more sophisticated methods and are aware problem Guatemala’s image are encouraging.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 GUAT. Secret; Exdis. In telegram 5049 from Guatemala City, November 23, the Embassy reported that Arana had lifted the state of siege. (Ibid., POL 15–1 GUAT) In telegram 5197 from Guatemala City, December 1, the Embassy related that Arana was “generally satisfied he has broken back of guerrilla movement in Guatemala City.” (Ibid., POL 14 GUAT)↩
- Ambassador Bowdler reported on extended conversations with Foreign Minister Herrera and Minister of Government Arenales on political violence and Guatemala’s image in the United States.↩