253. Study Prepared in the Departments of State and Defense1 2
State-Defense Study of the Advisability and Feasibility of Escorting Specific Vessels Potentially Threatened by Cuban Attack
ADVISABILITY
1. Present Situation
Currently, the principal targets of possible Cuban seizure and/or attack are the four remaining “Express” vessels of the Babun family interests, presently being operated by their Miami-based company, the Bahama Lines.
A second category of potential targets are the six vessels identified by Castro on December 22 as having engaged in past raids against Cuba and four other vessels not mentioned by him but which we believe have been used in maritime operations against Cuba. We are attempting to determine the present whereabouts of these 14 vessels—the list of which is attached.
Also representing potential targets are the more than 100 small craft used in actual landings during the past 10 years against Cuba which are almost impossible to identify at the present time and which may not be known to the Cubans now. However, some of them could, through prisoner interrogation or similar means, come to their attention.
In order to reduce the risk of Cuban seizure, the “Express” vessels are, at U.S. recommendation, now being routed to remain at the farthest practical distance from Cuba to reduce exposure time to Cuban attack. U.S. naval and air units monitor these sailings daily along with Cuban naval activity as a protective and deterrent measure. To carry out this mission, the U.S. Navy is employing three destroyers and one P–3 aircraft. These elements also have conducted close surveillance or escort of a specific vessel for a limited period of time in specific ocean areas and retain such a capability.
In their sailings between Hispanola and Miami, the “Express” ships are now following a course through the Mona Passage (between the Dominican Republic and [Page 2] Puerto Rico), east of the Bahamas to the Providence Channels and then to Miami rather than their former route via the Windward Channel (between Cuba and Haiti) and then by the old Bahama Channel, off Cuba’s north coast to Miami. From Hispanola to Central America, these vessels are now sailing south of Jamaica.
On the diplomatic side, we still have not received an official reply from the Cubans to our protest notes of December 16 and 21, in which we requested the immediate repatriation of Captain Jose Villa; however, Castro in his December 22 nationwide television address implicitly rejected our request by declaring that Villa will be brought to trial.
At our urging, the British Government has also protested in Havana the possible violation of Bahamian territorial waters by the Cubans when they seized the Johnny Express. The Cubans, however, replied that it was seized 20 miles from the nearest Bahama island.
A three-men Panamanian delegation which went to Cuba at the latter’s request, December 23–27, succeeded in obtaining the release of 24 out of 28 crewmen of the two vessels as well as agreement in principle from the Cubans to release the vessels. At the same time Panama is continuing efforts to bring about the release of the 4 remaining crewmen.
Panamanian Foreign Minister Tack requested on December 30 that the U.S. withhold for a “prudent time” any actions we may be considering to recover Captain Jose Villa until Panama has an opportunity to see what it can do. At the same time, he affirmed Panama’s right to determine whether any ship under its registry and any master of a Panamanian-flag ship has engaged in illegal activities. The Panamanian delegation which negotiated the release of the crew members of the two seized vessels indicated upon its return from Cuba that the Cuban Government had evidence that the two seized vessels had engaged in illegal activities and that the four crew members, including Jose Villa, had committed the acts charged by the Cubans.
[Page 3]As a consequence in part of these combined military and diplomatic actions, there have been no further Cuban attacks on or harassment of Panamanian vessels or any other commercial vessels nor has any activity of Cuban patrol craft been detected outside of Cuban waters. (Movements of Cuban patrol craft maintaining a radio silence remain a possibility, however.)
2. Prospective Situation
Although Castro in his December 22 broadcast stated that any vessels which are suspected of having been engaged in raids against Cuba will be subject to Cuban seizure, we are inclined to believe that Castro feels he has achieved his objectives of retaliating for the October 12 exile raid and of reducing the likelihood of future exile raids for the time being. This Cuban attitude combined with the actions described above make it appear that Castro probably will not engage in further attempts to seize ships unless the “Express” vessels sail near Cuba within range of his patrol craft or unless Cuban exile groups attempt subsequent infiltration raids against Cuba. To insure that these two important provisos remain in effect, we will continue to urge the “Express” vessels to continue the present routings away from Cuba and reiterate our warning to Cuban exile groups that U.S. law enforcement agencies will enforce vigorously U.S. laws prohibiting the use of U.S. territory as a base for any military actions against a foreign country.
FEASIBILITY
Aside from assessing the advisability of providing ship-to-ship escort for potential victims of Cuban seizure, judging the feasibility of such action is directly related to determining how many such ships are likely to require this type of protection. Beyond the 14 ships listed in the attachment as being possible victims of Cuban seizure, there are, for example, over 450 vessels which navigate the Caribbean with physical characteristics similar to the two largest Bahamas Line ships, the Lincoln Express and the Omar Express. The number of smaller vessels closer in configuration to the Akuarius II which we believe was the mother ship in the October 12 raid at Boca de Sama is unknown. It is apparent that any measure as drastic as ship-to-ship escorting for all [Page 4] vessels in the Caribbean which resemble the Bahamas Lines ships is not feasible even though it is possible that the Cubans might attempt to seize one of them in the mistaken belief that it is on their suspect list.
Narrowing the potential targets to the attached list and verifying the whereabouts of these ships is proving in itself to be a formidable task. Except for the four “Express” ships, the other vessels frequently change names as well as their places of registry. Consequently, as noted on the attached list, the present whereabouts of nine of the ships remains unknown. These ships could be sailing under different names or no longer be in operation.
Providing escort for the primary targets—the four remaining “Express” ships—would require the employment of four DD type naval vessels and one replenishment ship (AO) or eight patrol aircraft for daylight surveillance. Each additional commercial ship provided escort would require that the U.S. naval escort force be augmented by one surface ship or two patrol aircraft. In addition, we would need to preposition in the area four F–4 type fighter aircraft on alert status.
The above escort requirements would exceed forces now deployed to the Caribbean and would further strain CINCLANT’s capability to carry out all his currently assigned tasks, which include Sixth Fleet and Middle East Force operations and surveillance of Soviet SSBN activities. Any increase in the tempo of CINCLANT’s operations in the Caribbean must be reflected in reduced operations in support of other Atlantic Fleet commitments or a substantial increase in authorized ships and aircraft utilization rates and associated operating funds.
While operationally feasible, escorting of commercial vessels in the Caribbean would involve such other-mission degradation and financial costs as to make it an impractical alternative to our present course of action.
[Page 5]RECOMMENDATIONS:
We believe that if the collective measures described above are maintained, further Cuban attacks on or harassment of third country flag vessels engaged in commercial pursuits in the Caribbean appear unlikely. Moreover, we are reasonably assured that with the continuation of these measures, the forces currently assigned could intervene in time to prevent, if so authorized, a Cuban seizure of any of the four “Express” vessels. In our judgement, further additional deterrent or protective measures such as escorting specific vessels that may be vulnerable to Cuban attack are not warranted at this time.
Accordingly, we recommend that the U.S. continue: the present sea and air monitoring of the sailings of the Babun vessels; surveillance of Cuban naval activity; and the maintenance of its naval presence in the area as a deterrent.
We also recommend that the situation be kept under review with the object of reducing the presently assigned military assets as the perceived Cuban threat diminishes to a point where their mission could be terminated.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. IV, 1972. Top Secret. It was sent to Kissinger under a January 10 covering memorandum from Eliot. In a February 8 memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense, Kissinger indicated that President Nixon had approved the January 10 study’s recommendations and had directed “that no substantial change in the nature of the current mission designed to prevent or forestall further attempted seizures by Cuba, nor any major alteration in the level of forces devoted to this mission, be made without his specific authorization.” (Ibid.)↩
- Study on the feasibility of escorting vessels potentially threatened by Cuban attack.↩