250. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird1 2
SUBJECT:
- USG Actions in Front of Cuban Hostile Acts Against Third Country Vessels
Situation
The US has indicated that it is prepared, if necessary, to take unilateral military action in response to any future Cuban hostile actions which may constitute a threat to freedom of navigation or international commerce, in the Caribbean, or to the safety of American citizens. (McCloskey statement of 17 Dec at 1630—Tab A).
Two issues remain ambiguous: (1) how actively the US will solicit a request from the affected government(s) and whether absence of such a request will bear on US actions, and (2) how to interpret the phrase “under international law.” For example, US unilateral military action consistent with the McCloskey statement would not be in accord with international law if taken on behalf of a third country without a request from that country.
On 17 December, CJCS directed CINCLANT to “prepare, as soon as possible, plans to implement this policy.” CJCS indicated in the message, that “this policy” of US intent “to protect American citizens and freedom of the seas against Cuban threats” would not apply to third country vessels unless their governments had requested such protection. (JCS to CINCLANT, Message No. 172245Z, Dec 71—Tab B.)
For purposes of this paper, it is assumed that (1) if it were not readily forthcoming, the US would solicit, and in most cases obtain, an invitation for intervention from affected government(s)—the government in registering the affected vessels and/or the government in whose territorial waters the Cuban hostile act occurred, and (2) the US would probably be subject to charges of having violated international law if it acted upon an unsolicited basis-perhaps even if we acted to protect American citizens.
Since we have already taken a public position, we are likely, now, to come under pressure to explain our inaction should we fail to respond to another Cuban hostile act.
[Page 2]In your letter to Mr. Kissinger of 17 December (Tab C) you forwarded three broad options which had been developed by the CJCS. These were:
- Option A—US Renders Assistance and Provides Protection.
- Option B—US Renders Limited Assistance.
- Option C—US Provides Support, Remains Neutral and Uninvolved.
This paper analyzes aspects of Option A and summarizes the military assets available and required to implement them. Option B would only partially fulfill the objectives of the policy statement; Option C is probably no longer realistic in view of our already stated public posture.
Options
As indicated in Tab C, US military actions under Option A could include surveillance, escort (surface), harassment, quarantine of Cuban ports, capture or sinking of a Cuban vessel, attack against Cuban naval and/or airbases, attack against other Cuban and invasion of Cuba. Most of the actions suggested by the CJCS in option A, because they are based on an assumption of Cuban escalation, are considerably more forceful than we would be likely to undertake. The three most realistic levels of US action are:
- —Surveillance of the sea areas beyond Cuban territorial waters.
- —Surveillance, with an immediate response to a call for help. This requires propositioning of air units and ships. It could include harassment of Cuban vessels that have taken a captured vessel under tow and/or have taken its crew members on board, in order to impede its passage into a safe haven, of armed counter-attack against Cuban vessels to ward off attempts to size or destroy the victim vessel(s).
- —Surveillance, coupled with air and/or ship escort of potentially vulnerable vessels or ship patrols in the shipping lanes around Cuba. This could also include counter-attack of Cuban vessels attempting to seize commercial vessels.
(The requirements for these three courses of action are comparable to those for the six courses treated in Tab D.)
There are several advantages to limiting our consideration of US actions to the range indicated above. The actions can be undertaken in stages, thus maximizing our control of conflict should it occur. Our intention to implement these actions, if necessary, can be made public at an early point, thus [Page 3] affording us the opportunity to explain them at each stage—to the Cubans for potential deterrent purposes, to friendly nations to solicit support or avoid condemnation, and at home. The first action can be fully implemented with forces available in the area; the second with limited, rapid augmentation of those forces; the third with greater augmentation that could still be accomplished without significant drawdown of forces required for other purposes.
As of 18 December, the following measures falling into the first action category had already been taken:
- —Surveillance flights conducted on a case by case basis to track innocent shipping and provide information concerning potentially hostile craft.
- —Surface combatants deployed on a case by case basis to conduct surveillance operations, establish US visibility in the area, and provide protection if directed.
- —Fighter aircraft rapidly available from Guantanamo when required for surveillance and protective operations.
- —Unified Commander has submitted a concept to JCS for a permanent OP-PLAN to provide protection to third country shipping in the Caribbean upon a third country request basis and to be considered and planned for on a case by case basis. Upon receipt of JCS approval (expected sometime today), the permanent plan will be prepared.
It is recommended that the first course or action—surveillance only—be continued. A public announcement should immediately be made describing steps underway and planned, and explaining their purposes. We should, as a matter of priority, call in appropriate Latin Ambassadors to announce our surveillance plans. We should stress that our actions are directed at protecting the right to conduct commerce on the high seas and protecting the rights of US citizens. This should be followed by similar notification to the OAS.
At the same time, prepositioning of units to implement the second course of action should be directed. Now, or within a few days, public announcement or the prepositioning should be made, again explaining its purpose. At that point we will have active surveillance of the area and an immediate response capability to come to the aid of and protect or rescue attacked vessels.
[Page 4]We should reserve decision on the third series of actions for at least two reasons. First, we have not yet determined the full extent of the US military requirement for implementing them, nor identified precisely the US military assets available. Second, the first and possibly second steps may have a deterrent effect on Cuba and obviate the necessity to move into the third. We should prepare for this requirement now, however, to the extent we can do so without inviting counterproductive press and public speculation about US plans.
Latin American Reactions
Latin American reaction will, to some degree, depend on the circumstances under which we act. A US response to a Cuban attack against a vessel on the seas, for example would not be as critically received as a preemptive operation. But, in almost any conceivable case, we are likely to raise fears throughout much of Latin America that the US was reverting to past “interventionist” practices. Adverse reactions, particularly by Latin Governments, could be somewhat ameliorated by consultation in advance in the OAS. Consultation after the fact, on the other hand, would probably be counterproductive.
Soviet Reactions
The Soviets would react predictably to any of the three US actions outlined above. It is extremely doubtful, however, that their reaction would go beyond the normal propaganda blasts. They would make a particular effort to embarrass us in Latin America, and might take the issue to the UN.
This memorandum has been coordinated with the Joint Staff. A copy has been provided to the Chairman.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. III, 1971. Top Secret. It was sent to Kissinger under cover of a December 18 memorandum from Laird. The enclosures are not published.↩
- Nutter discussed contingency plans to protect U.S. citizens and freedom of navigation against Cuban hostile actions and actions already taken in response to the seizure of the Johnny Express.↩