Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

25. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹ ²

Washington, February 17, 1970

SUBJECT:

• Jet Aircraft for Latin America

The memo from the Under Secretaries Committee at Tab A deals with a request by Argentina to buy reconditioned A–4B jet aircraft for its aircraft carrier. This request has been pending since September, but the Committee delayed a response to avoid prejudicing the Foreign Aid Bill then pending on the Hill. Now that that is out of the way, the Argentines are pressing for a reply.

Argentine acquisition of these jet planes for its carrier will give it a new naval air attack capability. This is probably only a marginal increase in its already existing overall attack capability, however, since it already has similar planes in its Air Force inventory. Moreover, our refusal to sell the A–4’s will not keep Argentina from acquiring this naval air capability. The GOA has made clear it intends to turn elsewhere if necessary, and it has the funds to do so.

Our refusal to sell Argentina the planes—or even our continued delay in replying to their request—will clearly have adverse repercussions on the cooperative relationship we have developed with that nation over the past year. Argentina, in fact, has made it clear that it will view our response as a critical test of the value of cooperative relations with us.

Our ability to respond generally to requests for sophisticated equipment is severely circumscribed by very restrictive legislation. Under present law, (1) if a country acquires sophisticated weapons, including jets, we must cut economic aid proportionally; and (2) we cannot offer credit under our military sales program to finance such acquisitions. In both these cases these restrictions may be waived if you find it “important to the national security of the United States.”

In the Argentine case, we could sell the A–4’s for cash without incurring these legal problems—we no longer have an aid program with Argentina which would have to be cut, and Argentina will probably not need credit. Since it is otherwise in the interest of our general relations to be reasonably responsive to this request, the Under Secretaries Committee recommends that you approve such a cash sale. I concur.

The Committee also points out, however, that such a sale will have ramifications which will unavoidably raise the larger issue of supplying sophisticated weapons to Latin America generally:

• —Argentine acquisition of jet planes for its carrier will probably arouse the fears of its neighbors about the military balance, and cause them to speed up their own plans to buy new jet planes. The case has particular implications for Brazil, Colombia and Chile, from which we have indications of interest for similar aircraft.
• —While the Argentine request can be met relatively easily, handling similar requests from the other countries will present legal problems. The other countries have aid programs which would have to be penalized, and most of them may ask us for credit which we would have to give if we wanted to keep them from buying in Europe.

The Under Secretaries Committee, therefore believes that you should also decide how to handle this broader issue so as to be prepared to meet the consequences of a sale of planes to Argentina. It has recommended that you agree to use the national security waiver of the relevant legal restrictions if necessary to be responsive also to Brazil, Colombia and other countries.

This is a more complicated question, however, and some additional information as to Congressional reactions is needed, in my judgment, for you to make a decision on this broader waiver question. I have asked the Committee to provide some additional assessments urgently. When this is received, I will make a recommendation on this general issue, and you therefore need not decide that point now.

In the meantime, however, because of the urgency of the Argentine request, I recommend that you approve the Committee’s recommendation to sell A–4’s to Argentina for cash.

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to inform the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee that you approve the cash sale of these aircraft to Argentina as recommended, and that you will make a decision on the broader issue of waivers later when additional assessments requested are received.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 797, Country Files, Latin America, Latin America General, Volume 3, November 1969–May 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon initialed for approval on February 20. Attached but not published at Tab A is the February 2 NSC Under Secretaries Committee Decision 26. In NSDM 42, February 19, Nixon approved the sale of the aircraft. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs), Numbers 1 through 50, January 1969–April 1970)
2. President Nixon approved the cash sale of jet military aircraft to Argentina and postponed decision on the broader issue of restriction waivers for arms sales to other Latin American countries.