Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

244. Abstract of Research Study Produced in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹ ²

Washington, October 1, 1971

CUBA: DIFFICULT CHOICES FOR CASTRO

This paper is an analysis of problems confronting Castro, both domestically and internationally, and the possible implications of these problems and of Castro’s likely reactions to them. Rather than attempting to describe in detail recent developments in Cuba and related developments abroad, the paper emphasizes (1) how such developments may present problems for Castro and (2) how Castro may react to these problems, both now and in the immediate future.

ABSTRACT

Fidel Castro seems to be struggling with a growing realization that his simplistic militancy of the past no longer serves. Within limits, he appears capable of shifting his policies accordingly. If so, this could have important implications for the US, as well as for Cuba itself.

The struggle for development at home. The failure of Cuba’s drive to obtain a 10-million-ton sugar harvest in 1970 appears to have been an important watershed, bringing home to Castro the need for more pragmatic economic policies. Since then, he has repeatedly cautioned against overly “idealistic” development goals. On July 26 this year, he appeared to believe that his new strategy was paying off. But Castro has good reasons for feeling defensive and even discouraged over the state of his revolution. He had long promised a marked improvement in living conditions by 1970. In addition, he probably hoped that an economic take-off by 1970 would help to free him from the Soviets. He now realizes, however, that neither is likely for some time to come. At the same time, the Cuban labor force appears tired after more than a decade of economic struggle, and the sugar harvest for 1971 was only 5.9 million tons.

Politically, Castro has equally serious development problems. His reluctance to delegate authority has led him in recent years to rely increasingly on trusted military comrades. His current emphasis, however, appears to be “democratization”—most notably seen in the election of workers’ councils throughout the island—possibly in reaction to criticisms of growing militarization in Cuba. But Castro remains distrustful of bureaucrats and has not expanded the leadership at the top. Perhaps precisely because, on various economic issues, he has had to give in to his own top-level civilian managers and the Soviets, Castro may now be trying to balance off their rising influence by cultivating the Cuban “masses”.

Castro fighting a revolutionary slowdown? Although Castro seems aware of a need for greater revolutionary realism, it is difficult for him to give up his militancy of the past. Even on the economic front, he continues to insist that the old “banners” of revolutionary dedication must be held high. “Democratization”, in turn, while to some extent pragmatically justifiable, could well prove another utopian dream. This is, perhaps, another way of saying that the Cuban revolution remains uniquely Castro’s revolution—reflecting the tensions between the militant and pragmatic sides of Castro himself.

Under present conditions, the stakes in a significant further shift away from militancy could well be perceived by Castro as inordinately high. Such a shift, for example, might imply a more collective leadership and a further increase in Soviet influence in Cuba. Hence, for the near future at least, Castro will probably continue to fight, as he seems to be fighting today against a slowdown of the revolution in Cuba.

Latin America: similar problems. Castro is confronted by troublesome problems internationally as well as domestically. Although he has some grounds for new hope in Latin America, again he has been forced—especially by events in Peru and Chile—to modify the simplistic formulae for revolution that had characterized his policies in the past, and he seems torn between the militant and pragmatic sides of his personality. In fact, he may be worried about his credentials with the violent revolutionary groups he has long championed in Latin America. Cuban material support for such groups has apparently reached its lowest point in years, and Castro’s admission that there may be many paths to revolution has compromised his earlier position as the mentor of those who insist upon the violent way. He probably realizes that the prospect, at least potentially, for renewed ties with non-revolutionary Latin American states would require him to moderate further his policy on the export of revolution. In this case, however, he may perceive the stakes in a shift toward moderation as less high than on the domestic scene. Tangible political or economic benefits to be gained from such ties might outweigh his reluctance to move toward full relations wit non-revolutionary states.

The USSR: Has the trend toward warming relations passed its peak? Cuban-Soviet relations have warmed considerably since the fall of 1968. Castro’s recent shifts on economic issues and the export of revolution bring him closer to the Soviet line. Although Soviet pressure may have been involved, there may also be a certain genuine convergence of Cuban and Soviet views—and, after years of interaction, a greater tolerance of each other’s idiosyncrasies. Most importantly, while Castro surely does not like his dependency on the USSR, he may be more willing to accept it now that he knows how difficult development can be.

But precisely because Cuba and the Soviet Union have drawn so close, Castro’s frustrations over his dependency on the Soviets could well be on the rise. His seeming efforts to balance off increasing Soviet influence domestically (see p. ii above), and the continuing militancy, if more qualified, of his recent remarks on revolution in the hemisphere, are at least signs that the trend toward increasing warmth in Cuban-Soviet relations may have passed its peak. Also of interest in this regard is the recent thaw in Cuban-Chinese (PRC) relations, though this also reflects the end of the Cultural Revolution in China.

The Soviet naval buildup at the port of Cienfuegos last fall presents special problems for any analysis of Cuban-Soviet relations. On the surface, the buildup suggests how close relations have become. But, despite some reasons for Cuban satisfaction, the incident over Cienfuegos may have served to heighten Castro’s frustrations over his dependency on the USSR. As in 1962, for example, the crucial negotiations were between the US and the USSR directly, and Castro is most probably unsure exactly what the US-Soviet “understanding” entails.

The US and Castro’s scorn. In his Bay of Pigs speech on April 19, Castro “scorned” relations with the “imperialist” US government and rejected the very idea of reconciliation with “Never, not at all”. At the same time, he went to unusual lengths to justify his anti-US stand, listing various specific grievances and making his position a matter of personal “honor”. Given his grievances, any steps toward reconciliation by Cuba would be, in his view, tantamount to “submission”. In more general terms, he reaffirmed this position on July 26 and in a more recent speech on August 27.

But Castro has not always been so categorically hostile toward the US. Perhaps he was especially hostile on April 19 because of the concurrent developments in US-Chinese relations. (The ping pong visit had just occurred, preceded by US relaxation of some of its own laws and regulations against the PRC.) Moreover, if frustrated by his own domestic problems and his dependency on the USSR, Castro could be particularly angry over US conditions which make reconciliation with “honor” impossible for him to conceive. In addition, his recent reaffirmations of his anti-US positions may be intended as a reply to urgings by some of his advisors, and the Soviets themselves, that he moderate his anti-US stance.

While Castro may have reasons to doubt the wisdom of his policies toward the US, he also seems to fear the implications of reconciliation with the US. Besides various concerns over his international image, including his image as a staunch supporter of the North Vietnamese, he knows, for example, that he could not so easily mobilize his people for continued revolutionary “struggle” at home without an enemy to the north.

In sum, a series of difficult policy problems. The various domestic and international problems outlined above are clearly interrelated. To Castro, the most important of such relationships is probably that between his domestic concerns and his dependency on the USSR. But, in every arena discussed, the situation today probably seems more complex to Castro than he had bargained on. His frustrations over the constraints on his revolutionary militancy in one area may be reinforced by similar frustrations in other areas. He may even be fighting a “revolutionary slowdown” in his own mind.

But the difficult choices which confront Castro are not merely the result of a struggle within himself. As pointed out, he may well perceive various inordinate costs in a significant further shift away from militancy domestically. While reconciliation with the US might help to reduce the political cost of greater Soviet influence in Cuba, here too moderation by Castro might have domestic implications which he cannot accept for now. Even in Latin America, the pursuit of state-to-state relations could pose problems for Fidel beyond those of his revolutionary image alone. His international militancy, for example, helps him both to maintain a semblance of independence from the USSR and to appeal to his own people for continued revolutionary “sacrifice” at home.

Implications for the US. If Castro has in some ways “become more moderate, and if he is frustrated by his dependency on the Soviets, he might be potentially receptive, within limits, to a conciliatory gesture from the US. In other words, while he fears and would probably reject full reconciliation, he may be willing to take some steps in that direction. He has made clear, however, that he will not take the first step; and, feeling himself the aggrieved party, he would expect most of the initiative to come from the US. Recent US moves toward China may be especially relevant in this regard—e.g., if the US should significantly relax its trade embargo against Cuba, which is one of the grievances Castro stresses, be might prove more willing to negotiate on such issues as hijacking. On the other hand, if the US is not conciliatory, Castro may be especially difficult to deal with, in part precisely because of his frustrations over the problems which confront him.

Of course, the implications of any potential receptivity by Castro to gestures from the US could well extend considerably beyond US-Cuban relations per se. If, for example, Castro is genuinely torn by an increasing awareness of the limitations of his militancy, gestures by the US could help to push him in a generally more moderate direction. The results might be most far-reaching in the short run in Cuba itself, where Castro might ease up on the Cuban people, and Latin America, where other hemispheric nations might not only follow but even get out in front of the US lead in easing relations with Cuba. Paradoxically, the immediate results might be least evident in terms of Cuban-Soviet relations. At some point, however, if the US should give him an alternative, Castro could turn out to be the individual most able to lead Cuba out of a dependency relationship with the USSR—which could become the most important implication of all.

[Omitted here is the body of the study.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 799, Country Files, Latin America, General, Volume VI, July 1971–1974. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. It was prepared on September 28 by INR/American Republics Analyst Donald F. Herr and approved by Summ.
2. The study analyzed problems being faced by Castro and the implications for U.S. policy toward Cuba.