237. Special National Intelligence Estimate 85–711 2
(Supersedes NIE 85–69)
[Page 2]SUBJECT:
- SNIE 85–71: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CASTRO’S CUBA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate political and economic developments in Cuba, including prospects for Castro, and Cuban relations with the USSR and with other American states over the next two to three years.
CONCLUSIONS
A. Fidel Castro remains fully in charge in Cuba, but he and his revolution have lost some dynamism and zeal. Former revolutionary associates of Castro hold the key subordinate positions and wield whatever authority Fidel allows them. We have been unable to identify any other power elites or influential interest groups in Cuba. The prime loyalty of individuals in the political process revolving around Castro is to him, rather than to institutions. Fidel relies heavily on his [Page 3] brother Raul Castro, President Osvaldo Dorticos, and Communist Party secretariat member Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.
B. Despite the outlook for continuing discontent in the next few years, there seems little chance that this sentiment will become manifest as a popular revolt. Castro is still deeply involved in schemes to make his system work, and, though he has periods of depression, is not ready to call it quits. If he were to leave the scene by accident, assassination, or by his own choice, he would probably be succeeded by his brother Raul, who would rely more upon the military, provide more systematic planning, and work more closely with the Soviets.
C. The overall performance of the Cuban economy has been poor and is not likely to change during the next few years. The regime’s ability to manage the economy shows few signs of improvement. Sugar production, still the bulwark of the economy, is at a somewhat higher level than before the revolution, but agriculture as a whole remains depressed. Cuba depends upon the USSR for a wide range of vital imports, which it cannot fully pay for.
D. Cuban-Soviet relations have improved markedly in the past few years. There are signs that the Soviets may be gaining greater influence in economic management but the USSR will move cautiously in trying to [Page 4] direct the Cuban economy along more orthodox communist lines. If they push Castro too far, they will risk drawing a violent reaction from Havana. Cubans and Soviets emphasize different approaches on revolution in Latin America and differ on a wide range of foreign policy issues. Yet, despite the likelihood of some continuing frictions, we believe that Soviet-Cuban relations will on the whole remain close over the next few years. They are tied closely to each other: the USSR would be most reluctant to abandon Cuba as a communist outpost in the Western Hemisphere and Havana must have continuing massive economic aid from Moscow. Although the Cubans probably have some misgivings about permitting the Soviets too high a military profile in Cuba, we think that the Cubans view an increased Soviet naval presence in the area as buttressing their security.
E. Latin America is the one international arena where Castro has recently acquired significantly increased room for maneuver. He will probably take a flexible attitude towards those Latin American states which seek to resume relations. It is likely that the OAS will come under increasing pressure to relax its diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba in the next several years, if only to prevent further unilateral repudiation of the 1964 resolution. Castro’s ideological commitment to revolution will continue, but where insurgency comes into conflict with his desire to improve state-to-state relations we would expect him to shift to other means of pursuing this goal.
[Page 5]F. Castro will not be so unalterably hostile to the US as to rule out minor accommodations. But, Castro has made it clear that he will not take any steps to bring about a reconciliation with the US and at present there is little likelihood that he would respond favorably to any US overtures to bring this about.
[Omitted here is the remainder of the estimate.]