Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

205. Study Prepared in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 32¹ ²

Washington, July 2, 1969

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 32—CUBA

THE ISSUE

Cuba has been a double-barreled problem for the U.S.:

• —as a base for Soviet military power, and
• —as an exporter of revolutionary doctrine and violence to Latin America.

The U.S. had little choice but to counter these threats. Under present circumstances, this U.S. effort:

• —is largely preventive and damage limiting; and
• —is essentially a function of U.S.-U.S.S.R. and U.S.-other Latin American relations.

The basic policy issue before us now is whether there are practicable policies toward Cuba that offer greater promise of promoting constructive change in Cuban attitudes and behavior so as:

• —to eliminate eventually the basis for the security and subversive threats to U.S. interests; and
• —to promote meanwhile the realization of subsidiary and lesser U.S. interests in improved relations with Cuba.

U.S. INTERESTS

Priority U.S. interests and objectives are delineated by the need to cope with the threats cited (and reflect the continuing confrontation and near-void in relations with Cuba).

We have a vital interest:

1. In preventing the introduction into Cuba of strategic weapons. (The missile confrontation in October 1962 and subsequent increases in the Soviet inventory of ICBMs, which reduce the value of a “forward” base, make further Soviet strategic plans for Cuba unlikely. In any event, U.S. surveillance guards Cuba’s strategic sanitation.)

We have major interests:

2. In inhibiting the use of Cuba as a Soviet military base. (Soviet military presence peaked in 1962 with an estimated 22,000 combat troops and advisors. Combat troops were withdrawn after the October confrontation. An estimated 2,000 to 3,000 Soviets remain as technical advisors. A potential for Soviet use of Cuban naval facilities already exists and would be greater if Guantanamo were in Cuban hands. However, any such availability of Guantanamo would be a marginal factor in Soviet base strategy.)

3. In limiting the impact of Cuban insurgency activity in Latin America. (Geography and limited air and sea lift greatly restrict Cuban capacity to sustain insurgency operations of scale. Lesser and clandestine operations, however, are of concern because of socioeconomic tensions and institutional weaknesses in Latin America. U.S. development and internal security assistance address these basic problems in the area. Cuban-supported insurgencies have failed in half a dozen countries, and continuing Cuban efforts to foment insurgency in several others have not taken hold.

We have important interests:

4. In encouraging Cuba to abandon external subversion and militancy. (Export of revolution appears to have a lower Cuban priority since the Che Guevara fiasco in Bolivia. Castro’s tactics are more restrained; Cuban propaganda is substantially toned down. Castro still provides guerrilla training and assists selected insurgent groups with funds, occasionally arms, and even cadres. But he is more careful and pragmatic, and may be inhibited by Soviet preferences for a low-profile approach and by domestic preoccupations. Nonetheless, Cuba remains a continuing and long-term subversive threat given:

• —Castro’s revolutionary commitment;
• —his notion that insurgencies elsewhere help divert and weaken U.S. capability to oppose Cuba; and by
• —his bargaining position in the Communist world as an international revolutionary spokesman.)

5. In loosening Cuban international Communist ties. (The U.S.S.R. and other communist countries furnish nearly 75%, and the Soviets finance by subsidies and credits nearly 40%, of Cuban imports. Cuban-Soviet relations, although fundamental differences persist, improved considerably following Castro’s public endorsement of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Despite some similarities in revolutionary style, relations between Cuba ad China are extremely limited.)

6. In demonstrating that Cuban radicalism and extra-hemisphere alliance do not pay. (Castro to some degree is a symbol of economic failure in Latin America, thus reducing his appeal as a model, and has to some extent served to unite the hemisphere in reaction to his radicalism.).

7. In establishing a viable psychological relationship with the Cuban people. (During a decade of confrontation, Cuba has evolved into a veritable breeding ground of anti-Americanism with popular animus fed by propaganda, exploited by adversaries and deplored by friends of the U.S. within and outside Cuba.)

8. In retaining U.S. naval base rights at Guantanamo. (U.S. presence at Guantanamo rests upon the 1903 treaty whereby Cuba leased the area to the U.S. with “complete jurisdiction and control” until modified or abrogated by agreement between the parties. The base provides fleet training, sea/air facilities for naval control and protection of shipping, support for and surveillance for ASW operations, and for defense of approaches to the Panama Canal. U.S. occupation precludes Soviet naval use, maintains a physical U.S. presence on the island, and confirms legally acquired rights.)³

9. In maintaining multilateral involvement of the Organization of American States. (U.S. policy toward Cuba has been fitted into and expressed through the OAS framework and needs to be considered in terms of OAS commitments to which the U.S. is a party.)

We have limited interests:

10. In maximizing, so long as such ties exist, the international Communist costs of supporting Cuba. (By 1968, Cuba had drawn economic credits from the U.S.S.R. of over $1.8 billion, from Eastern Europe $200 million, from Communist China $100 million. Communist countries had aided Cuba by sugar subsidy payments totaling $1.2 billion; Soviet military supply had totaled over $700 million.)

11. In inhibiting aerial hijacking to Cuba. (In 1968, there were 17 U.S. aircraft and 9 of Latin American registry hijacked to Cuba, in addition to several frustrated attempts. In January 1969, there were 11 hijackings. Thereafter the incidence decreased sharply.)

12. In repatriating American citizens from Cuba. (As of May 15, 1969, there were 838 American citizens in Cuba registered for repatriation plus 1,713 “fireside alien” family members. Repatriation is limited by Cuba to one flight monthly via Mexico. New claimants come forward almost as fast as others are repatriated. The overwhelming majority of Americans still in Cuba are of Cuban background. Approximately twenty U.S. citizens are imprisoned—mostly charged with political crimes and many with long terms.)

13. In settling expropriation claims of U.S. citizens against Cuba. (Claims by U.S. citizens against the Cuban Government filed with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission total $3.3 billion. Probably valid claims are estimated at $1.3 billion.)

14. In reducing the need and cost of special U.S. programs for Cuban refugees. (The Cuban Refugee Program has expended over $300,000,000 since 1961 assisting 317,000 refugees. Rapidly rising annual appropriations currently are: to HEW $67,974,000 for welfare, and to State $500,000 for a twice-daily, five-day-a-week airlift. The airlift has brought over 150,000 refugees to the United States since December 1, 1965, under terms negotiated with Cuba through the Swiss. An estimated 250,000 Cubans registered by May 1966 when the Cuban Government ceased accepting applications.

SITUATION AND PROSPECTS

Consideration of US policy approaches to Cuba is illuminated by several major judgments on the current situation and prospects.

1. How is Castro doing?

Castro is in full control. During a decade in power, he has organized the Cuban revolution into a reasonably stable domestic institution and developed relatively constant strategic goals in foreign affairs. He rules Cuba absolutely through a totalitarian personal apparatus. His regime is viable if brittle. The military and security forces, under the control of brother Raul, are well-trained, well-equipped, and effective in identifying and eliminating opposition. The officer corps—especially veterans of Castro’s 26th of July Movement is the main buttress of the regime. In addition, youth and students, peasants, and the activist members of mass organizations provide Castro with a reliable constituency despite recently growing discontent. The government’s complete control of public information media, Castro’s political skills, and his ability to charm his countrymen are important factors upholding his dictatorship. There is little chance of discontent being translated into organized political opposition.

Castro has problems: morale is eroded by decreased consumer consumption, reduced civilian bureaucracy, and predominantly military administration, plus the radical “revolutionary offensive” of 1968. Concurrently, Castro’s commitments to Spartan reforms and to social discipline have cut his popularity and produced some restiveness even among groups heretofore his most enthusiastic supporters. These trends probably will intensify as it becomes increasingly apparent that highly publicized and extravagant national goals for 1970 cannot be realized.

After Castro: Cuba will be different, yet much of what he has wrought has vitality, and much of his domestic organization and social values will likely persist. A less aggressive and charismatic successor might not wish or be able to sustain the Castro style of revolutionary violence and international belligerence. Castro’s heir apparent, brother Raul, is a capable administrator with a following in the military. He is considerably more ruthless and a more dedicated ideological Marxist than Fidel, but lacks his brother’s charisma. Under Raul and a military junta, prospects might improve more for the USSR than for the US. Whether Raul could long maintain control is problematical.

2. How is Cuba doing?

Cuba is economically depressed: total output declined in 1968 and GNP lags behind population growth. Balance of payments difficulties, coupled with recurrent problems of drought, poor planning and management, shortages of agricultural labor and low labor productivity have permitted little economic growth in the 1960’s. Sugar production, a key determinant, was below average in 1968. This year’s harvest, “an agony for the country”, according to Castro, probably will fall below five million tons, four million less than planned. With sugar providing 85% of Cuba’s exports, earnings have remained below the 1957–58 average. Meanwhile Cuba is heavily dependent upon imports, and the search for Communist and non-communist credits is intense.

Cuba’s ragged economic performance prompts Castro to levy compensatory demands upon the Cuban people for work regimentation and personal sacrifice, and to reduce material diversions and services in a society already drab and plagued by pervasive consumer shortages. Nonetheless, the reaction of many Cubans is still, if decreasingly, diverted:

• —by widespread belief that Cuba is a beleaguered nation fighting against malevolent external forces—mostly American; and
• —by the social and public welfare measures which redistribute national income, level social extremes and substantially equalize status and standards.

Cuba’s economic prospects are grey: dependence upon agriculture and Soviet aid are no recipe for prosperity, even though:

• —income from sugar exports to non-communist countries will probably increase with steadily rising prices following re-establishment of the export quota system under the International Sugar Agreement of October 1968; and
• —the USSR is unlikely to allow the Cuban economy to approach a critical condition, if only to avoid association with failure of an enterprise in which it has invested heavily.

Significant development has been achieved in the Cuban infrastructure. If Castro can get through the next harvest without too great economic damage, the Cuban economy, with luck during 1970–75, should reach a per capita annual growth rate approaching 3%, some increase in labor productivity, substantially greater sugar crops, and an improved balance of payments. This should translate into slightly improved Cuban living standards.

3. Can Cuba under Castro be influenced by the US?

—To a really satisfactory settlement, probably not.

—Toward a more constructive relationship, perhaps.

Elimination of American influence in Cuba is one of Castro’s proclaimed prize achievements, and visceral anti-Yankeeism underpins his ideological and psychological position. History indicates he never intended to fit his revolutionary goals into an accommodation with the US. Subsequent US reaction reinforced his basic hostility, but did not cause it.

Castro still seeks to resolve the dilemma of dependence upon the USSR or the US and to establish a more independent international position. One approach is his radical bid for ideological prestige and a corner on the revolutionary future. Alternatively, more moderate tactics and behavior might be adopted to relieve American pressures and court respectability and economic ties in Western Europe. Castro has played the radical approach to the hilt with meager results. Domestic economic imperatives, U.S.-Soviet diplomatic trends and Vietnam peace talks may suggest to Castro that some restraint might be more productive. Castro is unpredictable but capable of rational and pragmatic adjustment in the face of hard facts.

A few elements of such restraint already exist, e.g.:

—Guantanamo: where from the beginning Castro has physically isolated the base but carefully avoided major provocations and not formally denounced the 1903 treaty; where he has not requested the return of “fence jumpers”, although the treaty provides that fugitives be returned to Cuban authorities upon request; and where he has privately solicited US cooperation in discouraging escapees.

—U–2 reconnaissance flights: which Cuba with 24 operational SAM sites has the capability to interdict but has not done so since the 1962 missile crises despite sporadic threats.

—hijacking: which Cuba evidently has not promoted and which does entail the US seeking Castro’s cooperation.

—a marked reduction in exploitation of potential propaganda opportunities against the US.

Moreover, on occasion since January 1961, and again recently, Castro seemed to have hinted at lowering the temperature of the US-Cuban confrontation.

4. How do the non-Communist Countries View Cuba?

Cuba has significant relations with Western Europe, North Africa, Canada, Mexico and Japan. The Europeans, Canadians and Japanese profess to see Cuba as a US problem inflated out of proportion. This view is reinforced by the temptation to engage in profitable trade with Cuba, and US attempts to dissuade Europeans are viewed with growing irritation.

While countries in Latin America that have felt the effect of Castro’s subversive efforts appear most concerned, Castro’s revolutionary behavior and criticism of reform leaders reduced his appeal and helped induce Latin America toward some consensus on diplomatic and commercial isolation. Nonetheless, to many Latin Americans, Cuba remains an attractive symbol of social development and of defiant independence from the US.

Mexico has normal relations with Cuba and favors, but does not push normalization for other OAS members. Chile, Trinidad & Tobago, and possibly Ecuador, tend to favor normalization but within the OAS framework. There are factions in other countries who support normalization and others who advocate strict isolation. There is widespread concern lest the US make a policy change leaving Latin America at the gate, and general agreement that significant changes in Cuba policy call for OAS consideration.

5. What about Cuba and the USSR?

From Castro’s perspective: Cuba’s ambitious goals, limited capabilities and great needs make some form of external dependence unavoidable. Castro’s hostility toward the US establishes the fundamental reality of Cuban foreign policy. Nonetheless, Castro is reluctant to submit to Soviet discipline, ideological interpretation or organizational solidarity. Defiance of the Russians is useful domestically, but also reflects Castro’s unhappiness with relatively conservative Soviet views. Accordingly, Castro seeks to maneuver for greater political and economic independence within his basic relationship to the USSR.

From the Soviet perspective: Cuba is a member of the Socialist camp and a useful example of radical rejection of US domination of the Western Hemisphere. As such the Soviets are willing to expend substantial resources to ensure its survival. It is doubtful, however, that Cuba is regarded as a Soviet vital interest and hence worth protecting at the risk of nuclear confrontation with the US. The Soviets are opposed to premature Castro-type violent revolution in Latin America, disappointed with Cuban economic performance and irritated with Cuban criticism of Soviet policies and world posture, and with Castro’s stubborn adherence to anti-Soviet positions on Latin America and the Third World. Nonetheless, they apparently have not felt constrained to resort to sustained economic pressure.

From the great power perspective: the US and the USSR made a deal of sorts to keep strategic weapons out of Cuba. Both countries, for different reasons, have an interest in moderating Castro’s revolutionary activity in Latin America. Moreover, the USSR would like to limit its outsize support costs, and the US would like to see Cuba less dependent upon the USSR. In addition, the USSR is interested in having the US and Latin America accept the socialist system in Cuba. Such factors, while tenuous, suggest that the USSR would favor a partial US-Cuban accommodation. Historically at least, periods of possible Castro receptivity to improved relations with the US have surfaced when his relations with Moscow were good (and his economy strained). The current warming of Soviet-Cuban relations, e.g., recent Castro praise of the USSR and Cuban participation as an observer in the world communist conference this June, could presage another such period (in the presence of economic strains).

However, Soviet motivation for, and capability of, restraining Castro should not be overestimated. Cuban support costs are bearable; Castro’s extremism has not prevented the rapid, recent growth of Soviet relations in Latin America; Soviet tactics are opportunistic. Accordingly, while the Soviets may favor an easing of US-Cuban confrontation, they are unlikely to wish or be able to deliver such a result over Castro’s objections.

There may be some utility in considering Cuba as a “hostage” in US-USSR competition to offset US vulnerabilities in such exposed positions as Berlin. This, however, is more a rationalization of awkward reality than an operational policy level. “Hostage” tactics are risky and the contingent prospects of so using Cuba can hardly justify not loosening the Cuban-Soviet ties where possible.

6. What about the Cuban exiles?

Nearly 500,000 Cubans have come to the US since the inception of the Castro regime. Thousands have also settled in other countries, primarily Spain, Mexico, Venezuela. With the exception of Venezuela, there is no significant political activity among Cuban exiles outside the US. There is little or no coordination among the several hundred increasingly inactive Cuban exile groups scattered throughout the US, Latin America and Europe. The potential for concerted invasion by sizeable exile forces is nearly nil. Political activity of the Cuban exiles in the US is concentrated in the Miami area. A few exile organizations still aspire to armed forays against or infiltrations into Cuba, but such activities are greatly reduced in scale compared to a few years ago. With time, the exiles are becoming increasingly oriented toward US life and less toward a return to Cuba. The Cuban exile community offers little prospect of a significant leadership role in promoting and exploiting political change in Cuba.

CURRENT POLICY

Goals and premises underlying US policy toward Cuba have been redefined, and objectives recast over a decade of Castroism. During the first three years, the US actively sought Castro’s overthrow. Since the Bay of Pigs, US policy is postulated that the Castro regime would disappear and Cuba would rejoin the hemisphere community. Meanwhile, in practice, US policy has aimed at ensuring Castro’s lack of success rather than his overthrow. This has been defined more in terms of his failures in external subversion and in economic development than in terms of internal political instability. Stated US conditions for normal relations with Cuba are: Cuba must cease intervention and must terminate military ties with the USSR.

Elements

The US has fully interrupted diplomatic, commercial, and economic ties with Cuba. No imports of Cuban goods or components are permitted. Exports of US goods to Cuba are prohibited except for humanitarian shipments of food and medicines. No US ships or airplanes stop at Cuban points. Third country ships in the Cuba trade are blacklisted—they cannot carry US government-owned or financed cargoes, are denied bunkers, and US longshoremen will not handle their cargo. American petroleum companies do not bunker ships in the Cuban trade.

The Treasury Department’s Cuban Asset Control Regulations (CACR) provide a virtual embargo on economic dealings between Cuba and the US:

• —Cuban assets in the US (about $140 million) are blocked;
• —US financial facilities cannot be used by Cubans or nationals subject to Cuban jurisdiction;
• —US citizens are prohibited from dealing in any financial transactions with Cuba except under tightly controlled licensing.

Under the Foreign Assistance Act, countries whose ships or aircraft carry goods to Cuba or provide strategic items or economic assistance are ineligible for US economic or military aid. Sales of US foodstuffs on concessional terms under Food for Freedom legislation are denied to countries exporting to Cuba (except for agricultural raw materials, foodstuffs, and medical supplies).

The US restricts passport validation for travel between Cuba and the US primarily to humanitarian and exceptional professional instances.

The US attempts to prevent US subsidiaries abroad from trading with Cuba, and generally pressures countries to reduce trade, credit extensions and transportation ties with Cuba.

The export and assets control regulations are administered rather stringently. Transshipment through third countries is not large. Permitted exceptions to the CACR are limited and evasion is not large. No European or Free World country extends concessional aid or exports strategic goods to Cuba, although Great Britain and Cyprus are major shipping offenders.

OAS Aspects

The OAS in 1962 excluded the Castro Government from participation in the inter-American system because adherence to Marxism-Leninism and alignment with the Soviet bloc were deemed incompatible with the system and with hemisphere security. In 1964, the OAS decided members should not maintain diplomatic or consular relations, trade or shipping with Cuba because of Cuba’s interventionist policies, until the OAS Council decides Cuba has ceased to threaten hemisphere peace and security. (These were binding decisions under the Rio Treaty.) Subsequently:

• —OAS member trade with Cuba has practically been eliminated. Even Mexican trade is reasonably small, although Mexico has not complied with the 1964 resolutions.
• —diplomatic and consular ties have been broken by all OAS countries except Mexico and anticipatedly Jamaica (which, although admitted to the OAS, is not expected to break consular ties with Cuba).
• —only Mexico permits Cuba to maintain commercial air service or ship service or its flag ships to call at Cuban ports.
• —Latin America except for Chile, Mexico and Uruguay imposes legal or administrative restrictions on travel to Cuba, but it has been difficult to control clandestine or evasive third-country traffic.
• —Latin American countries have only unevenly restricted third-country ships in the Cuba trade.

In 1967, the OAS again condemned Cuban intervention in Latin America; called on non-member states to restrict trade, credits, shipping and support for Cuba; recommended demarches by OAS members to such states; recommended that members restrict non-member shipping in the Cuban trade; and encouraged cooperative security measures.

Effects

In the early years of the Castro regime the isolation/denial policy—particularly elimination of the Cuban sugar quota and the embargo on spare parts for US-origin machinery—severely harmed Cuba. Foreign trade was distorted into Communist channels with economic costs in availability, reliability, price, etc. Cuba was forced to adopt a variety of expedients, at considerable expense, inconvenience, and loss of efficiency, to keep US-made machinery operational.

More recently, agricultural and transportation equipment of US origin has largely been replaced from Communist countries or Western Europe. However, almost 40% of Cuba’s total stock of machinery and equipment is still US-origin. The USSR has replaced the US as Cuba’s most important trading partner, and Cuba has been able to sustain imports above exports because of substantial aid from communist countries.

Weak world sugar prices in most years have restricted Cuba’s foreign exchange earnings, and Cuba has had only limited success in increasing output of other exports. By 1968, Cuba had received non-communist short and medium-term credits totaling more than $200 million and held mostly by banks and suppliers in the UK, France, and Spain.

Assessment

In terms of US interests, seven years of economic denial, political isolation, and strategic sanitization have:

• —seen Cuba free of strategic weapons and Soviet military bases without explicit Cuban (or Soviet) commitment to remain so;
• —obstructed Castro’s export of subversion without eliminating the threat;
• —contributed to Cuba’s economic and morale difficulties without loosening Castro’s grip;
• —burdened the USSR while increasing Cuban dependence upon Soviet support;
• —reduced Castro’s ideological appeal in the hemisphere while stimulating some sympathy for his David-Goliath image;
• —led to the OAS response to Castroism, with some reluctance and without Mexico;
• —not prevented retention of Guantanamo and not promoted American repatriation and claims or limited refugee flow;
• —provided an incentive for Cuban movement toward a more constructive relationship while projecting an image of US hostility that inhibits such movement.

Notably, also:

• —absence from Cuba of Soviet strategic weapons and combat units probably reflects more Soviet than Cuban restraint and is essentially a function of U.S.-U.S.S.R. rather than of U.S.-Cuban policies;
• —failures of Cuban subversion in Latin America may be less attributable to U.S. policy toward Cuba than to Latin American and U.S. policies in the affected countries.

The relative weight that can be ascribed to U.S. interests and to the effects, positive and negative, thereupon of current policy, varies with perspective and over time. In general, however, the current policy was most effective in its early stages, with subsequent declining benefits and rising costs that suggest probably diminishing benefits and rising costs that suggest probably diminishing returns within the next few years (for reasons noted above and discussed in the Annex pp 124–135).

ALTERNATIVE POLICY APPROACHES

There are tour broad policy approaches feasible with respect to Cuba.⁴

PACKAGE 1: Seek regime’s elimination: FORCE

We would undertake a military intervention alone or in collaboration with “unleashed” Cuban exile forces, which in any event would be U.S. in all important respects, because of Cuban exile weakness and the impossibility of concealing U.S. involvement.

PRO:

—would deal directly with the central problem in U.S.-Cuban relations, i.e., with the Castro regime;

—would probably be the only means to eliminate the Castro regime, since (a) spontaneous collapse, or internal rebellion or “palace coup” are very unlikely, and effective exile invasion is virtually impossible; (b) economic pressure alone will not suffice as long as the U.S.S.R. continues essential aid; and (d) only force majeure has any present prospect of success, and anything less probably would further consolidate Castro’s domestic position and increase Soviet compensatory support.

CON:

—would invite retaliatory action against the U.S. (e.g., attacks on U–2 flights, Pueblo type units, or Guantanamo), conceivably could deteriorate into great power confrontation, and would at least raise the question of the U.S. non-invasion pledge.⁵

—would provoke political dissension in the U.S., undermine the U.S. moral position, violate the OAS and UN Charters, and reinforce precedents for the use of force;

—would, in the case of intervention, probably entail heavy losses and saddle the U.S. with large and long-term military occupation and reconstruction costs;

—would not be commensurate to the Cuban problem, which is neither vital nor unmanageable; Castro, in short, would not be worth the costs, side effects and consequences involved.

PACKAGE 2: Continue present policy: ISOLATION

There would be no modification of our suspension of diplomatic and consular relations, trade and shipping with Cuba, and of our firm adherence to established OAS policies against bilateral relations with Cuba and against Cuban participation in OAS; there would be no sugar quota concessions, and all export and asset controls under CACR would continue and be tightly administered as at present; we would continue actively by persuasion and pressure to discourage third-country trade with Cuba; we would maintain a public and propaganda adversary posture toward the Castro regime. (Within this option and OAS ground rules, we could, if desired, somewhat ease our administration of the policy and our public posture. There is little room for further tightening, however.)

PRO:

—would work to maintain conditions in Cuba which erode confidence in the regime and which might lead to a change in the regime, should economic conditions further deteriorate;

—would be a politically viable course for the U.S. and an economically effective one for another two or three years with net benefits as indicated previously;

—would keep options open until the direction and durability of Castro’s current mood is clearer and the internal effects of failure to reach the 1970 sugar goal are evident;

—would avoid the difficult task of modifying and, manipulating with sufficient precision the intricate web of U.S. and OAS legislation and regulation, practice and posture that comprises current policy, and which once tampered with could readily unravel out of control;

—would avoid raising opposition from parts of Congress and the public opposed to alternative courses.

CON:

—would confine U.S. to a wasting course, subject to change by drift if not by conscious choice and incapable by itself of forcing or promoting constructive Cuban change;

—would entail increasing political costs in terms of: continuing to influence non-communist countries, especially Canada and Western Europe, against trading with Cuba; attempting to apply extraterritorial controls, especially concerning Canada; and attempting to control travel of U.S. citizens in light of relevant U.S. Supreme Court decisions;

—would entail declining effectiveness of economic denial measures—with point of diminishing returns probably within three years depending upon the Cuban export posture;

—would incur increasing psychological costs as a consequence of spreading trends in the U.S. and in the hemisphere away from hostility and toward tacit acceptance of, and coexistence with, the Castro regime;

—would maintain Castro regime fixation of U.S. hostility, thereby giving substance to genuine fears and continuing to provide Castro a convenient scapegoat for failure and a useful foreign devil to spur popular support;

—would continue Cuban dependence upon the U.S.S.R. in contradiction to the most important U.S. interest in loosening such ties.

PACKAGE 3: Move toward constructive change: CARROT AND STICK

We would keep the pressure on Cuba by continuing currently effective denial and isolation measures; we would, within our OAS obligations, exhibit a measure of flexibility in application of selected restrictions and a disposition toward some relaxation in exchange for tangible, verifiable advantages; we would seek to manipulate in combination the Cuban perception of the prospect of benefits and of the realities of denial; we would endeavor in this carrot and stick fashion to influence Castro, the Cuban hierarchy, and the Cuban people to move, or generate pressure for movement, toward moderation concerning U.S. interests; we would publicly project U.S. attitudes eschewing hostility and would privately formulate U.S. requirements in terms facilitating compliance and avoiding unnecessary damage to Cuban prestige and dignity.

CARROT AND STICK has active and passive versions:

VERSION A: “Work for the Breaks”

We would take the initiative directly or through other Latin American governments to improve atmospherics with Cuba, to signal openings to probe in a series of modest moves and to develop understandings aimed over time at cumulative de facto change to include a series of parallel steps and reciprocal actions designed to maneuver Castro gradually—or induce his associates to maneuver him.

The scenario would vary with circumstances but for illustrative purposes only and with the warning that certain elements would require OAS decision, it might envisage:

U.S. Quid	Castro’s Quo
Discourage escape through Guantanamo short of surrendering escapees.	Publicly reveal that Cuba jails hijackers or puts them to hard work.
Issue temporary visas more leniently to Cuban visitors or participants in non-governmental or cultural events in U.S.	Ease departure of U.S. citizens and alien families desiring return to U.S.
Adopt a more constructive tone toward Cuba.	Adopt a more constructive tone toward U.S.
Grant licenses for Commercial shipments of medicines, drugs and foodstuffs to Cuba upon request, ease “moral suasion” and “extraterritorial” efforts vis-à-vis third country trade with Cuba.	Release substantial number of political prisoners, particularly women, aged and ill.
Encourage visits to Cuba of journalists, scholars or others with a serious purpose and encourage U.S. foundations or institutions to investigate Cuban field.	Permit nonofficial U.S. scientific and educational research projects and allow entry of U.S. experts.
Relax travel or ship bunker controls, or “general licensing” of food and medicine shipments.	Evidence substantial reduction in Cuban subversive efforts abroad or training of guerrillas from abroad in Cuba.
Move toward elimination of export controls including punitive measures toward third countries in Cuba trade.	Evidence cessation of support to insurgents in Latin America.
Etc.	Etc.

PRO:

—would add a degree of flexibility to a current policy faced with erosion;

—would moderately widen U.S. contact with and information about Cuba;

—would enhance U.S. capability to test Castro’s susceptibility to constructive change, to promote specific cooperation on such matters as hijacking, and to identify and exploit pressures within the Cuban power structure;

—would facilitate the recasting the U.S. conditions (i.e., cessation of subversion and of Soviet military ties) as de facto goals toward which the U.S. might “educate” Cuba, and given the attainment of which the U.S. could tolerate Cuban socialism and communist ties other than bases and strategic weapons;

—would help counteract the contention that U.S. inflexibility is the root cause of Cuba’s actions and attitudes.

CON:

—would be too subtle and complex to coordinate well, particularly in the OAS where there is mixed sentiment concerning change and some contusion and suspicion about U.S. policy;

—would constitute a change of course at a time when evidences of economic difficulty and signs of growing discontent in Cuba suggest that the bite of ISOLATION may be having effect;

—would entail serious problems in verification, in many respects be irreversible in event of Cuban nonperformance, and in some respects take on a momentum of its own;

—would be construed as a green light by Latin American and other countries for relaxing their restraints, thereby taking pressure off Castro without Cuban concessions;

—would stir up politically articulate groups in the U.S. and in Latin America who oppose any modification of ISOLATION.

VERSION B: “Wait for the Breaks”

We would under this passive version prepare standby proposals; we would review and respond to Cuban initiatives on their merits, letting Cuba set the pace, and we would follow rather than lead Latin American sentiment on the rate and conditions of policy modification.

PRO and CON:

—would dilute advantages and disadvantages attributed to VERSION A;

—would be conservative and low risk, marginally more responsive than ISOLATION to “breaks” from Cuba and would permit relatively easier retreat to ISOLATION or advance to VERSION A as experience indicated.

PACKAGE 4: Seek negotiated settlement: NORMALIZATION

We would by under-administration of economic denial measures and by conciliatory statements indicate publicly, and confirm privately, our receptivity to negotiations without preconditions on a wide-ranging improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations; we would look in consultation with the OAS, to the eventual dismantling of bilateral denial and isolation measures and to the re-establishment of bilateral diplomatic and commercial relations, and would interpose no objections to the movement by the OAS and other countries in this direction. All of the Pros and Cons from PACKAGE 3 apply and, in addition;

PRO:

—would as a public and dramatic affirmation to U.S. reasonableness pressure Castro to respond in kind or carry the onus within and outside Cuba tor anti-American intransigence;

—would offer the prospect of relieving the U.S. of the political and economic costs of ISOLATION without incurring new costs beyond those associated with minimal normal relations.

—would reduce U.S. utility as scapegoat for Castro’s economic mismanagement and raise questions within Cuba concerning need for heavy dependence upon the U.S.S.R. and for outsize military establishment.

CON:

—would subject our bilateral and multilateral relations in Latin America to substantial strains of substance and coordination in an already difficult period;

—would possibly strengthen Castro’s aggressive stance by relieving pressure and giving him a boost at no cost to his policy aims;

—would dishearten opponents and encourage proponents of Castro’s radicalism in Cuba and abroad, thereby raising his domestic political stock and international stature;

—would entail a formidable domestic political and international U.S. effort to explain and win support for so substantial a reversal in U.S. policy in the absence of compelling and self-evident circumstances.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–39, Meeting Files, Senior Review Group Meetings, NSSM 32–Cuba, 9/23/69. Secret. In the margin next to paragraph 1 on U.S. interests, Kissinger wrote: “Tactical nukes?” The study was prepared in response to a National Security Study Memorandum from Kissinger, March 21. (Ibid.)
2. The Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs outlined three Cuba policy approaches: (1) the Castro regime’s forceful elimination; (2) a continuation of the policy of isolating Cuba; or (3) a move toward constructive change through the use of incentives and disincentives.
3. OSD/ISA and the Joint Staff consider Guantanamo a “major interest” within the context of denying its use by hostile forces, and its strategic importance to support U.S. operations and facilitate control of Mid-Atlantic and Caribbean approaches to the Panama Canal.

4. Approaches reviewed and rejected as not feasible under present and foreseeable circumstances included:

   (a) Seek to negotiate with the U.S.S.R. limitations upon Cuban conduct: SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

   (b) Accept U.S.S.R. interest in Cuba for its utility as a Soviet vulnerability open to U.S. retaliatory action and thus restraining Soviet action against U.S. interests elsewhere: HOSTAGE

   (c) Support overt or covert harassing and spoiling operations in Cuba: PARA-MILITARY

   (d) Offer to dismantle restrictive policy and reestablish normal relations without Cuban concessions: UNILATERAL

5. Correspondence among President Kennedy, Chairman Khrushchev and UN Secretary General U Thant during the missile crisis of 1962 centered on a proposed agreement whereby the U.S. offered assurances (Kennedy letter of October 27, 1962 to Khrushchev) against invasion of Cuba in return for removal of offensive weapons from Cuba under UN verification. The U.S. view is that Castro’s refusal to permit UN verification meant the agreement did not become operative and the U.S. is not bound.