19. Intelligence Memorandum, OCI No. 2622/691 2
The Military and Nationalism in Latin America 3
Introduction
1. The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of nationalism on the behavior of the military in Latin America. Nothing n this paper is inconsistent with the much broader study, “The Military Establishments in Latin America,” produced under the direction of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of staff in response to NSSM #68.
2. The recent assumption of power by military forces in Bolivia, Panama, and Peru not long after “revolutions” by the armed forces in Brazil and Argentina naturally raises several questions about what seems to be a new trend in military behavior in Latin America. It appears that the military, in taking control of these governments, was strongly influenced by nationalism and reformism. To guide the reader to a better understanding of this relatively new experience, the paper will try to answer the following questions:
a. Is the phenomenon described above really a trend, or were these coups and “revolutions” coincidental?
[Page 3]b. Are these military governments actually reformist, or are they manifestations of the old style of political activism under a new guise?
c. Is nationalism a motivating force behind these governments? If so, what is the nature of this nationalism?
d. Considering the experience of the past decade, can we expect:
(1) increasingly active military forces whose major goals will be set largely by the standards now being laid down by military governments already in power?
2) the military to become increasingly nationalistic, either in actually wielding power or in acting as a force behind civilian government?
e. What are the implications of this experience for US diplomatic, commercial, and security interests, and what can we expect in the future?
[Omitted here are sections on historical facts, the nature of the military, military nationalism, and the future of military reform and nationalism.]
[Page 4]IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
36. It has been argued that the long association between Latin American officers and their US counterparts has generated a sincere bond of friendship and respect that transcends domestic political considerations. This has proved in many cases to be wrong. Latin American military officers who have been trained either in the US or in Panama, or who have had long contact with US officers at home, generally admire the US and perhaps envy its dominant position in the free world, but the use of the adjective “pro-US” can be extremely misleading. In fact, most Latin American officers quite naturally are strongly nationalistic and in all cases will put their own interests and those of their nation ahead of any possible friendship or admiration for the US.
37. Experience has shown, however that many military governments in the past decade have tended to be less extreme in their nationalism (and thus their anti-Yankeeism) than their civilian counterparts. It should be recognized that the military has been dealt what it sees as a particularly low [Page 5] blow in the cutback of US arms to Latin America. This adds to the general dislike of US trade, aid, and investment policies, which have hurt the Latins’ exports, tended to restrict some of their imports, and left them open to what they now see as “imperialist exploitation.” These factors form the rationale for attempts by military and civilian governments alike to broaden their pattern of trade, expand their markets, diversify their arms purchases, and control foreign private as well as public investment.
38. The military regimes, again like their civilian counterparts, believe that the US has dominated Latin America too long and that part of the solution to this problem is a broadening of contacts with the rest of the world, including the Communist bloc. This was once anathema to the Latins, especially to the military, who foresaw increased security problems, an influx of Communist propaganda, and the prospect that domestic Communists would be strengthened. The view in many countries has changed somewhat, although there are still a few, primarily in Central America, remain convinced that expanded contacts would open a floodgate of Communist inroads. With the slowdown of pressure from Castro and of his open support for domestic guerrillas or terrorists, military as well civilian leaders who see less danger from this direction. Thus, the avowedly anti-Communist military in Peru and Bolivia now seem prepared to expand their contacts with Cuba as well as with the bloc.
39. One area that remains open to conjecture is the effect of a military government on short- and long-run internal stability. A strongly reformist government may provoke disturbances over the short run, but may contribute to long-term stability if, in fact, serious grievances within the society are corrected. A government that promises reform but delivers little may have short-run stability (if it can enforce quiet) but may strengthen dissident elements looking for a place to explode. [text not declassified]
[Page 6]CONCLUSIONS
40. The “reformist,” nationalistic military coups that have occurred in the past decade in Latin America have set the tone for military assumptions of power, and future coups can be expected to carry the trappings if not the workings of reform. Much will depend on the level of sophistication of the society, the military, and the civilian political establishment.
41. Military nationalism tends to be somewhat less extreme than the civilian version, but both stem from genuine beliefs nurtured by national traditions, education, and contemporary thought, and encouraged by leftist extremists. Military nationalists may appear in the short run to be more effective than their civilian counterparts because the military is often better prepared through discipline and organization to administer government.
42. If military governments can actually bring substantial change to their societies, they may fulfill the promise of revolution that all have made but none has yet delivered. Success by any of them will certainly have an influence on the behavior of the others.
43. Much of the nationalist, reformist ire will be directed at the US, its representatives, and US-owned businesses, particularly when the Latins feel their interests are being subordinated to those of Washington. The US presence in Latin America is too great to avoid this. It can also be expected that “reformist” nationalists will attempt to broaden their contacts with the world outside the Western Hemisphere, whether Communist or free, at the expense of the US, and that US influence, once paramount, may tend to be reduced.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, Job 79–T00829A. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. NSSM 68 is Document 7. The JCS response to NSSM 68 has not been found.↩
- In this intelligence memorandum, the CIA analyzed the influence of nationalism on the behavior of Latin American militaries and implications for U.S. policy.↩
- Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the Clandestine Service. [Footnote is in the original.]↩