Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

185. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹ ²

Washington, March 24, 1971

SUBJECT:

• Appraisal of Situation Within Costa Rican Communist Party (PVP) as Result of Agreement Between PVP Secretary General and President Jose Figueres

1. [text not declassified] It is an interpretation based on previously reported information. Prepared primarily for internal Agency use, it is disseminated in the belief that it may be useful to intelligence analysts in their own assessment of the situation.

2. Costa Rican President Jose Figueres and Manuel Mora Valverde, the Secretary General of the Costa Rican Communist Party (PVP), are having difficulties in implementing a secret agreement they reached in 1968. The agreement provided for PVP support of Figueres in the 1970 Presidential campaign, and Mora expected in return the establishment of diplomatic and trade understandings with the Soviet Union, the legalization of the PVP, and the placement of PVP members and sympathizers in key government positions.

3. Figueres is trying to live up to the agreement but has met with stiff opposition in both the Legislature and his own party—the National Liberation Party (PLN). This opposition stems from the sound local parliamentary system, PLN distrust of seemingly pro-Communist policies, and the apparent recent loss of public confidence in the Figueres administration. This lack of support does not constitute a threat to Figueres’ position, but indicates that Costa Rican political institutions are viable and strong and appear willing and capable of limiting or denying Figueres and Mora the advantages they seek.

4. It is probable that the agreements with the Soviets will be restrictive in some measure. Legalization of the PVP has strong opposition in the Assembly and may never be a fact. The PVP has succeeded in placing a few sympathizers in key posts, but their ability to heavily influence even their bureaucratic domains is open to serious question.

5. What Figueres expected to gain from this agreement in addition to electoral assistance is open to conjecture. Part of it is undoubtedly material since Figueres is not above using his position to line his own pocket. His alliance with the PVP may be a prelude to an attempt to lead a Central American revolution, or to perpetuate himself in power, or to establish a one-party state. Whatever Figueres’ ultimate goals, he would not be the first politician to attempt to take advantage of a Communist Party, which although very small, is still better organized and disciplined than any other local political party with the possible exception of the PLN.

6. On his part Mora has committed himself and the PVP to working closely with Figueres to obtain the objectives of their agreement. While Mora’s position as the preeminent and unquestioned leader of the PVP is still secure, Party members ranging from high officials to the rank and file have become increasingly restive about Mora’s backing of the Figueres administration, and his power in the Party may eventually erode to a precarious degree. These PVP members know nothing of the secret agreement and are concerned with Mora’s neglect of Party organizational and financial matters and his bolstering of government policies which are contrary to the PVP’s public stance. Concern within the Party with Mora’s direction manifested itself in the postponement of the PVP Congress until May 1971 because of the leadership’s desire to take a hard-line approach to Figueres and Mora’s refusal to sanction such an approach.

7. Mora has remained convinced that an alliance with Figueres is a short cut to power and will eliminate the need for painstaking outside political activity. Mora does recognize the disenchantment within the Party with his inexplicable actions on behalf of Figueres, and he has recently pushed a military training program for young Communists in an effort to allay their fears that he is no longer a militant. In addition, Mora believes that the PVP may have to back Figueres with force if his pro-PVP policies lead to a coup attempt.

8. Another relevant political factor bearing on both Figueres and Mora is that the President cannot succeed himself and may well be followed by someone who opposes Figueres’ present policies and will attempt to undo or reverse them. This time element will place mounting pressure on Mora to produce visible and real evidence (legalization of the Party, key government posts) that his policy in support of Figueres will be beneficial to the PVP and can be accomplished before the present political balance is disrupted by another campaign and a perhaps non-sympathetic President. On the other hand, if Figueres were to accelerate his drive to live up to the secret agreement because of PVP pressures on Mora, the President might jeopardize whatever achievements on behalf of the Party he has pushed through so far and further strengthen the hand of his opposition.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ODDP Registry, Job Number 80–B01086A. Secret; No Foreign Dissemination; Controlled Dissemination; No Dissemination Abroad; Background Use Only. Copies were sent to Helms, Irwin, Johnson, and Meyer. On March 29, Nachmanoff forwarded this memorandum under a covering memorandum summarizing it to Kissinger, who initialed it. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Latin America, Costa Rica)
2. Deputy Director Karamessines sent a report, which concluded that President Figueres and Communist Party Secretary General Manuel Mora were encountering difficulties in implementing their 1968 secret agreement. Figueres had encountered stiff opposition from the legislature and his own party.