147. Telegram 769 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State1 2
Subj:
- Brazilian Aid to Uruguay and Bolivia
Ref:
- A) State 031018
- B) Montevideo 0408
- C) State 032741
- D) La Paz 1159
- F) USDAO Brasilia 0088
It is clearly in U.S. interest that Brazil and Argentina should play as effective a role as possible in supporting maintenance of Bordaberry and Banzer governments in Uruguay and Bolivia, and it is also desirable they should if possible cooperate in such efforts (though as pointed out in reftels B) and D) this can cause problems in the countries concerned). But we do not rpt not recommend scenario in reftel A) on following Brazilian considerations:
1. GOB, and in particular presidency and military, have been seriously concerned about Uruguay, and despite Frente Amplio defeat they remain so. But this concern is focused directly on security situation, and discreet and probably continuing Brazilian intervention has been addressed directly to the Tupamaro threat. While Brazilian leaders would not doubt admit that economic failure in Uruguay helps feed supervision, [Page 2] they are skeptical that political and institutional system will allow Bordaberry to succeed where his predecessor failed. They would therefore be unlikely to invest much capital in the expectation, though some gestures (e.g., on trade field) are always possible.
2. Bolivia is a somewhat different story. The rapid and efficient Brazilian assistance to Banzer government in its early days reflected not only concern over active security threat GOB felt Torres government posed, but also genuine enthusiasm for and sense of affinity with Banzer government. Hence in this case some form of direct economic or budgetary assistance could be a real possibility, though Brazilians would probably expect U.S. to carry bulk of the load. Their enthusiasm for Argentine participation or overt Brazilian-Argentine cooperation in this effort would probably be limited.
3. Most serious problem is Brazilian-Argentine relationship itself. While fundamental relationship is better than it used to be, and relations between military and police leaders in two countries are quite good, ref B) documents fact that Lanusse personally is disliked and distrusted by Brazilian leadership, and his visit viewed as an unavoidable distasteful necessity by both presidency and [garble-military?]. Hence aside from fact that Medici-Lanusse conversation (which officially planned last only fifty minutes) would be difficult to manipulate from outside, we seriously doubt that this would be the forum to kick off genuine cooperation.
4. Our proposal would be rather that we should in a normal and discreet way approach the Brazilian and Argentine Governments separately to suggest they may wish take initiative in economic assistance to Uruguay and Bolivia (while recognizing Argentina’s own economic difficulties) and to the extent they express intention do so, suggest that the countries engaged in such efforts should work together (and with relevant international organizations) to avoid [Page 3] duplication or cross-purposes. While this approach would be less dramatic, it could achieve some concrete results, and perhaps promote a greater degree of initiative on the part of those directly concerned. To extent such an effort were successful and developed specific proposals which we would find it in our interest to support, we would have little difficulty tying our own efforts in.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 2, August 1, 1971–December 1972. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Buenos Aires, La Paz, and Montevideo.↩
- Embassy officials discussed Brazilian and Argentine cooperation in supporting the Bordaberry (Uruguay) and Banzer (Bolivia) governments. In addition, Embassy officials noted the Brazilian leadership distrusted Argentinean President Lanusse.↩