112. Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 2
SUBJECT:
- Bolivian Request for Military Aircraft
Attached at Tab B is a memo from the State Department containing recommendations on Bolivia’s request for military aircraft. You will recall that an interagency paper on the situation and outlook in Bolivia was submitted in February. This paper made recommendations on our economic policies with respect to Bolivia and indicated that recommendations on arms policy—and specifically the acquisition of modern aircraft—would be forthcoming. You responded to that paper with NSDM (Tab C) approving the general thrust of the recommended political and economic policies and calling for prompt submission of the promised recommendations on aircraft.
The GOB has requested FMS credits for six A-37B jet attack fighters and two C-130 transports. State says there are ample reasons on political grounds for meeting the Bolivian request. The requested aircraft would also make a substantial contribution to Bolivian security in the face of threatened insurgency operations by the extreme left. The paper also indicates that there are few realistic alternatives once the basic decision to acquire jets has been made. An armed version of the T-33 jet trainer was considered but judged unsuitable for Bolivia’s needs on technical grounds (mainly difficulties of high altitude operation). The A-37B is well suited to operations in Bolivia and would be reasonably easy for the Bolivians to maintain. Suitable aircraft could conceivably be obtained from other suppliers, but probably at higher cost.
The main difficulty in meeting the Bolivian request is the heavy burden modern aircraft is likely to place on the country’s already shaky finances, and ceilings placed on our own arms program by the Congress. The paper proposes a compromise solution which avoids over-burdening Bolivian finances, prevents aircraft acquisitions from soaking up virtually all of the grant MAP funds available for Bolivia, and stays within Congressional limitations. The paper recommends that we:
- —Sell Bolivia three A-37Bs in FY 1972 at a cost of $2.5 million;
- —Provide an additional three A-37Bs in FY 1973;
- —Defer action on the C-130 transports for the time being.
We understand that the Department of Defense concurs in these recommendations.
This solution would take the edge off the appetite of the Bolivian military for jet aircraft and make a substantial contribution to the Government’s security posture. While it may not meet all Bolivian aspirations, it is probably as much as they can handle at one time. As you know, C-130s are expensive to acquire and maintain. They are suitable to Bolivian terrain and flying conditions, but we are giving the Bolivians some rebuilt C-54s this year which should beef up their lift capacity and tide them over for the next several years until we can reconsider the question of C-130s. I have prepared a memo for your signature approving these recommendations (Tab A).
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memo at Tab A.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 2, 1970–1974. Confidential. Sent for action. Haig initialed the memorandum for Kissinger. Kennedy cleared in a draft. Attached but not published at Tab A is Kissinger’s signed April 20 memorandum to the Departments of State and Defense and at Tab B is an April 6 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger. Tab C is Document 111. The interagency report submitted in February is Tab B of Document 110.↩
- In order to prevent over-burdening the Government of Bolivia’s finances, and to stay within congressional ceilings, Jorden recommended selling Bolivia three A–37Bs in the current fiscal year, three more the next fiscal year, and defer action on the more expensive C–130s.↩