109. Telegram 265 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State1 2
Subj:
- What a Difference a Year Makes
Summary: Although Bolivia still faces a myriad of serious problems, the situation has dramatically improved over the past two years. Two years ago shoot-outs and murders were common, and the Ambassador was under personal attack as a CIA official. A year ago Bolivia was in the throes of lawlessness, almost to the point of anarchy. The U.S. and our presence here were under constant attack, and our influence was rapidly decreasing as leftist forces dedicated to the destruction of U.S. interests in Bolivia were in control.
1. We have been struck during this holiday season with the important differences in mood, attitude and even events of the current day with those of one and two years ago. Bolivians of all walks of life are demonstrating a new optimism and confidence, tempered wisely with concern that control should be exercised to [Page 2] prevent a recurrence of the political situation under which the events of a year ago flourished. The improvement is particularly noteworthy in terms of our work here, our presence here, and the publicly expressed attitudes towards the United States.
2. Only two years ago this season the newly arrived Ambassador was under heavy attack, having been accused of being the “brain” of the CIA in Latin America. The police were engaged in shoot-outs with the ELN, right in the heart of the city, and even on Christmas Eve there was a pitched battle in the residential area of Sopocachi with deaths on both sides. This was the beginning of an era of tension marked by a series of brutal political murders, unsolved even today; and of increasing confrontation between President Ovando, the more extremist elements of his cabinet and the military. The first nine months of 1970 were punctuated by bombings, of unknown and different origins, almost every night: by student demonstrations, often against our Embassy; by the copious use of tear gas; by the outbreak of open guerrilla warfare in Teoponte; and, inevitably, by deaths in certain confrontations. Eventually, the situation culminated in the coup of 1970 and, although we were in no way involved, U.S. installations were heavily attacked with loss of material well in excess of $100,000—but fortunately no injuries or deaths.
3. One year ago from now Torres had been in power about three months, and the leftist forces unleashed by his rise to power were beginning to ride high, while Torres himself continuously professed his desire publicly for an orderly process of development and privately for close relations with the U.S., those around him in government and “popular” organizations out of government, such as organized labor and students, supported by a leftist press, were acting irresponsibly on domestic issues and at the same time were subjecting this Embassy, other Americans here, and the U.S. in general to a constant barrage of vicious and inflammatory anti-American propaganda. Bolivian friends of the U.S. were similarly under attack and could only speak out at risk to their position, property, and even their lives. The private sector was demoralized and frightened. Investment was at a standstill. The military institution was divided, demoralized, and seemingly headed for destruction. Labor and student leaders who did not join the attack were forced out of their [Page 3] leadership positions and some even from their jobs.
4. At this time a year ago we were futilely trying to recover the La Paz BNC and we witnessed the takeover of the Santa Cruz BNC and USIS offices. Attacks on, and seizures of, private property were a common occurrence, as also were bombings, kidnappings, and threats to lives and property. ELN killers were made heroes. The record of lawlessness was so bad that the Embassy felt compelled to itemize the instances in a cable (La Paz 6541 of December 23, 1970) entitled “Breakdown and Dissension in Bolivia”. For the same reason we prepared a follow-up message on January 9, 1971 (La Paz 114 entitled “Unrest in Bolivia”.)
5. The situation degenerated to the extreme that on the night of January 9–10 a few military officers became involved in an abortive coup attempt which Torres weathered with a dramatic, and perhaps preemptive, show of force. As a result, he became further indebted to those of the far left. As partial payment on this political debt, he nationalized IMPC on the night of January 11 and permitted the organizers of the popular assembly to go ahead full speed with their plans. Organized labor and students became even more powerful, finally culminating in obtaining their goals of the nationalization of the Matilde mine on April 30, and later the expulsion of the Peace Corps. The next target was the Milgp and the Military Assistance Programs and it appeared that they might be the next to go. The only bright spot in this grim picture was that, throughout it all, the Gulf negotiations went on positively and fruitfully.
[Page 4]6. We never believed that the vicious attacks we were subjected to accurately represented the attitudes of the great majority of Bolivians towards the United States, but of a committed, determined, and overly-influential few. Those few, by determination, threats, and intimidation, controlled the media and poured out their vitriolic attacks and distortions on a daily basis. In the double talk of those days NFGA free press was a “revolutionary” press, which meant only “revolutionary”; i.e., leftist and anti-American, rhetoric enjoyed unlimited dissemination. Those who disagreed were silenced, and there was no free expression of differing points of view.
7. Today, there is a great difference in Bolivia; memories of a year ago are like a bad dream. It may be our imagination but it appears to us that the man in the street walks with his head higher and without fear. Christmas shopping was brisk, and La Paz enjoyed a holiday spirit. Business is improving and the private sector is expressing confidence. With the help of our emergency assistance, construction projects in downtown La Paz, stalled for years, are [Page 5] under way again resulting in more jobs and the psychologically important appearance of visibly demonstrating movement and progress. The present government has put a stop to lawlessness and attacks on person and property. Those extremists who rode high a year ago are now either in exile, in prison, or lying low; some of the more opportunistic are trying to change their spots. Attacks on the U.S. and on U.S. presence in Bolivia have disappeared from the media. We enjoy good, fruitful relations with the present government. The IMPC nationalization has been resolved to the satisfaction of all parties, and negotiations have begun on settlement of the Mina Matilde properties. The BNC’s in La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba are in the hands of their rightful owners, attendance is now at record highs, and we have hopes of receiving compensation for the expropriated former seat of the La Paz BNC.
8. However, all is not right. There are still serious problems to be solved. Bolivia is in serious financial straits, and a budget crisis looms on the horizon. Although many prisoners have been released, there are still, at the Minister of Interior’s admission, as many as 250 political prisoners under detention. Nevertheless, there is no reason to be sanguine that the ELN has been totally destroyed. While there have been no acts of ELN terrorism since the revolution, there is ample evidence that ELN terrorists are still on the scene, making preparations, and biding their time. The government is expecting a serious outbreak of urban terrorism, aided and abetted from Chile, probably within the next month or two. The universities and public schools are still closed, as are the doors of some of Bolivia’s most significant labor unions. These are issues which the government will have to face up to eventually, and we believe it will do so. Prisoners are being released, and the GOB is aggressively pursuing the remnants of the ELN extremists and keeping up the pressure on those it believes are dangerous political opponents. One of its serious problems is to provide for its felt security needs without becoming unduly repressive. So far, and although it often seems overly eager to arrest, we have no evidence that its treatment of prisoners is harsh, and its real objective seems to be to exile those it considers the most dangerous. For believed or proved ELN extremists it intends to hold and try. Plans are moving forward to open the public schools in February and the universities in April. The unions, hopefully under more moderate leadership, should begin to operate before too much longer [Page 6] as elections are now being held.
9. In sum, although there are still immensely difficult problems that the GOB must address as noted above, as well as some bilateral problems, such as Mina Matilde on the tableicor resolution, on the whole the situation today as compared to a year ago is as different as night and day. Looking to the future, we are optimistic that this drastic improvement will continue at least as far as one dare look ahead in volatile Bolivia, even though we believe that the specter of urban terrorism is a real one and could break out at any time.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 BOL. Confidential. Repeated to Lima, Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Asunción, Santiago, and USCINCSO.↩
- Ambassador Siracusa concluded that compared to a year before, Bolivia was more politically stable and economically vibrant. However, budget woes and the threat of terrorism by guerrillas clouded the current situation.↩