At Tabs B, C and D are three related action items which should be dealt
with ASAP but before
our c.o.b. today if at all possible:
At Tab A is a wire for Henry explaining these and recommending a
third-person message to Faysal before he leaves to see Sadat on his way to Cairo.
If one of our current interests is to shore up our political and economic
relations with Saudi Arabia, this is a major opportunity. Moreover:
—The first two paragraphs require no new decisions and say nothing
that we have not said before privately (HAK to Yamani)
or publicly (Annual Review). They serve our interests at no cost to
us except the effort of sending them promptly.
—The third paragraph (F–4s) does represent a decision, but one which
would have a powerful effect on Faysal. I believe it is one we shall
make affirmatively anyway. Part of the payoff from the decision lies
in its promptness.
Tab A
Draft Telegram From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council
Staff and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Scowcroft) to
the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger)
SUBJECT
- Urgent Message for King Faysal
King Faysal will visit Cairo on May 12 en route to Paris. His purpose
will be to warn President Sadat not to resume hostilities and to give the
United States time to begin a diplomatic initiative to break the
Middle East impasse. Since we have a separate message from Faysal on
oil, it would be very useful in strengthening his moderate position
if we could [less than 1 line not
declassified] deliver a message to him prior to his
departure for Cairo.
Several issues need to be addressed:
First is a response to King Faysal’s message to the President
affirming Saudi friendship and the lack of any intention to use oil
to get us to change our policies. You will be aware of this from the
Daily Brief.
[Page 325]
Second is our response to the recent Saudi request for an agreement
in principle to the sale of F–4s. Their request is partly a test of
the importance we attach to our relations with Saudi Arabia. The
Saudis realize that it will be several years before the F–4 can be
integrated into their air force, but they nonetheless are asking for
an agreement in principle now. The alternative for them is to
purchase the Mirage F–1, which the French will press on them during
Faysal’s visit to Paris next week.
State and Defense both recommend a positive reply to the Saudi
request. Possible disadvantages have been weighed—Israeli and
Iranian opposition, stimulation of arms races in the area, Egyptian
access to Saudi F–4s—but on balance these appear to be offset by the
obvious advantages of strengthening our relationship with Saudi
Arabia. If Faysal were to learn of our agreement in principle before
seeing Sadat, he could argue
convincingly that the United States is not being entirely one-sided
in its approach to the Arab-Israeli question.
With these points in mind, we recommend [name not
declassified] deliver to Faysal before his departure for
Cairon on May 12 the following message:
“The President greatly appreciated receiving King Faysal’s
message concerning Saudi policy on oil production. Saudi
Arabia’s friendship for the United States is highly valued and
we look forward to a growing relationship in all areas,
including oil. Shaykh Yamani’s recent talks in Washington
provided us with an excellent opportunity to exchange views and
we fully understand the points the Minister made. We deeply
appreciate the spirit of friendship in which the Saudi concerns
were conveyed.
“Before King Faysal departs for Cairo, the President would like
to reassure him that a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict
is of highest priority for the United States. We can offer no
guarantees of a successful outcome, but we can promise to pursue
the path of diplomacy with great seriousness of purpose. A peace
settlement will take time and requires the development of
confidence among all parties. We believe the process should
begin through quiet diplomacy.
“Finally, King Faysal should know that he will soon be hearing
[less than 1 line not declassified]
of US agreement in principle to provide Saudi Arabia with F–4
aircraft. We look forward to this opportunity to work with Saudi
Arabia in the years ahead to develop its strength and
independence.”
If you approve of this message, we will arrange [less than 1 line not declassified] this message and will
clear a State Department telegram authorizing Ambassador Thacher to inform the Saudis of our
agreement in principle to their request for F–4s.
Both State and Defense urge giving a similar positive response now to
Kuwait’s request for US agreement in principle to provide F–4s as a
follow-on aircraft four or more years from now. Everyone [Page 326] recognizes that this is a
more difficult decision because Kuwait’s foreign policy is less
firmly anti-Communist and is more quixotic. However, there are
strong arguments for moving ahead. It is important to move ahead
with Saudi Arabia now if we are going to make a positive decision,
but the decision on Kuwait could await your return.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That you approve as soon as possible the dispatch of the above
messages [less than 1 line not declassified].
To reach Faisal before he
departs for Cairo, we should have your approval by mid-morning
Thursday Washington time.
__________ Approve
__________ Revise as indicated.
2. That you indicate your view on giving Kuwait a positive response
at this time.
__________ Hold until I return.
__________ Go ahead now as State/Defense recommend.
