Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

87. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders and William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 3, 1973.

SUBJECT

• Saudi and Kuwaiti Requests for F–4 Phantom Aircraft

During your absence in Moscow, we will be asked by State and Defense to make a decision in principle to sell F–4 Phantoms to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. As you know from the Daily Brief, the urgency surrounding the recent Saudi requests relates to the departure of King Faisal for a visit to France on May 13. The French will probably try to convince Faisal to purchase Mirage aircraft.

The Saudis have asked for our agreement in principle to sell them F–4s, in part as a test of the importance we attach to our relations with Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Minister of Defense realizes that his air force is not now ready for the F–4, but argues that after several years of experience with the F–5, Saudi Arabia will be prepared to move to the more sophisticated aircraft. They want to know in principle that they can plan on a follow-on aircraft from the US.

The Kuwaiti interest in the F–4 is less pressing, although the Kuwaitis have already been fully briefed on both the F–5 and F–4. They have concluded that the F–4 is too sophisticated given their present capabilities, but have declined the simpler F–5 as an alternative. Reports have reached us that the Kuwaitis now intend to purchase the Mirage, and to forestall such a decision we have offered them the F–8 Crusader (a Navy interceptor available in our inventory), as well as other military equipment. One element in the Kuwaiti decision on the Mirage will be our willingness to agree to sell F–4s as a follow-on to the F–8. As in the case of Saudi Arabia, an agreement in principle is sought now but deliveries would not take place for several years.

A number of considerations should govern whatever decision is reached on these requests for F–4s:

—Advantages of Agreement. We would significantly strengthen our relationship with Saudi Arabia at a time when it is beginning to emerge as a significant international actor because of its oil wealth and because of its role as the stabilizing factor in the Arabian Peninsula. We could expect some favorable reaction in other Arab countries to US willingness to provide the symbolically important F–4 to Arabs as well as Israelis and Iranians. There is also a commercial interest in these sales of some consequence.

—Disadvantages of Agreement. The Israelis, and perhaps the Iranians, would be opposed to the supply of F–4s to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Israel would fear that the Egyptians and Syrians would be allowed to familiarize themselves with the F–4, thereby possibly weakening the effectiveness of the Israeli air force. Both Israel and Iran might also fear that at some future date Saudi or Kuwaiti F–4s might be used against them. Finally, if we agree to sell F–4s to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, we can anticipate that Jordan, and perhaps eventually Morocco, will also ask for them.

The choices that we have in responding to these requests are the following:

—Defer a decision on F–4s for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for now, pending a full review of our policy in the Arabian peninsula.

—Agree in principle to sell F–4s to Saudi Arabia, but defer a decision on the Kuwaiti request.

—Agree in principle to sell F–4s to both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

An agreement in principle now would not require that we get involved in numbers or delivery schedules at this point. Nor would the decision be irrevocable, particularly if circumstances in the Middle East were to change significantly, because deliveries would be at least three or four years off.

Sisco will recommend approving in principle for both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and Clements strongly favors that course too. Our recommendation is to approve in principle for Saudi Arabia now but to hold off in Kuwait. Saudi Arabia seems solidly a US friend. Although an avowed enemy of Israel, it has not shown any stomach for joining the fight. It is important to us to strengthen our relationship with Saudi Arabia, and some of that requires simply that we treat Saudis more like Iran and Israel. Kuwait, it seems to us, is a different issue. Its policy can be more quixotic, and it is more vulnerable to Arab pressures. While the US is enjoying a honeymoon with Kuwait following Iraq’s attack, we feel the relationship should have more time to settle before we get into the F–4s.

RECOMMENDATION: Since we are likely to receive a recommendation from State and Defense during your absence, it would be useful to know your feelings on how to respond. We would recommend agreement in principle to the sale of F–4s to Saudi Arabia, but no decision now on Kuwait.

1. Summary: The NSC asked for Kissinger’s decision on whether to provide, in principle, the F–4 Phantom jet fighter/bomber to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

   Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 647, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East (General) Volume 9, 1972–74. Secret; Sent for action. On May 17, Kissinger approved, in principle only, the sale of the F–4 to Saudi Arabia with no decision on Kuwait. At the top of the memorandum Kissinger wrote “Brent: Send forward Thursday [May 17].” He also then wrote “OK.” Prince Sultan requested approval for the sale on April 24 in meetings with CINCEUR General Andrew Goodpaster, as reported in telegram 304 from Dhahran, April 25. (Ibid., Box 630, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Volume III, September 1, 1971—April 1973) Ambassador Thacher informed Acting Minister of Defense Prince Turki of the decision on May 18. (Ibid.)