56. Telegram From the Embassy in Bahrain to the Department of State1
737. Subject: Middle East Force Status.
1. Foreign Minister informed me June 25 GOB has decided to conclude present negotiations on Middle East Force status but to ask at same time that we place a “two year limit” on Navy presence in Bahrain. GOB wants to inform us formally that it wishes Middle East Force to depart Bahrain by June 30, 1977.
2. In conveying this decision, the Foreign Minister went to great pains to express GOB’s satisfaction with its long-standing relationship with U.S. Navy and its desire to see an increasingly closer overall relationship with USG. He continued that GOB did not want to rush U.S. Navy out of Bahrain and extremely reluctant to make the gesture of formally exercising termination clause in 1971 stationing agreement. [Page 234] At same time GOB considers the concept of a permanent U.S. Navy presence in Bahrain politically unsupportable at home and in the region. Foreign Minister described U.S. Navy presence as ranking behind security decree issue as the most difficult potential problem government is facing with National Assembly next fall. He also noted that while GOB considers the proposed Gulf security pact “years away” from being implemented, Bahrainis feel they must be in position to offer U.S. Navy’s departure as a bargaining chip in negotiations among Gulf states for closer cooperation. He specifically noted need for “pro-American” Gulf states like Bahrain to try to bring South Yemen and Iraq into more harmonious relationhips with their neighbors and a less antagonistic attitude toward U.S. GOB feels it’s taking position that U.S. Navy presence in Bahrain is of limited duration will be helpful in that endeavor.
3. Foreign Minister urged that I try to convey to USG Bahrain’s conviction that eventual departure of Middle East Force from Bahrain will serve not only overall Bahraini national interests but broader U.S. interests in stability of Gulf. He pleaded for USG understanding of GOB’s position which he described as “compromise” in meeting Bahrain’s political problems while permitting U.S. Navy to remain for almost three years longer than original October 1974 deadline for its departure.
4. Foreign Minister said GOB of course wished to conclude promptly the protracted negotiations on conditions for U.S. Navy presence, expecting that we would honor our commitment to increase rent to $4 million per year from July 1, 1974, and to implement jurisdiction arrangements as we have agreed in principle.
5. I told Foreign Minister I was certain USG would appreciate and sympathize with the spirit in which this GOB decision had been made and conveyed, that I would have to seek further instructions and would be back in touch with him soonest.
Summary: The Bahraini Government informed the Embassy that MIDEASTFOR would be allowed to remain only until June 1977, noting the domestic political, regional, and diplomatic costs of the U.S. Navy’s presence.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750220–0521. Secret; Immediate. Repeated immediate to CINCUSNAVEUR, DOD, the Secretary of Defense, CNO, and COMIDEASTFOR; repeated to Abu Dhabi, Doha, Jidda, Kuwait City, Muscat, and Tehran. According to telegram 115851 to CINCPAC, May 17, Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaikh Mohammad Al-Khalifa informed the Embassy that his government was “totally satisfied” with negotiations to extend the U.S. presence, but complained of parliamentary opposition. (Ibid., D750174–1189) The Embassy discussed the Bahraini Parliament’s opposition in telegram 528 from Manama, May 5. (Ibid., D750157–0407, D750158–0019)
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