47. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Iran (Helms) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1
981. Please pass the following message to Secretary Kissinger from me.
1. In Abu Dhabi Embtel 1252 of September 15 Ambassador Sterner reported a conversation in London with Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi, [Page 208] President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in which Shaykh Zayid discussed his desire to strengthen the central government of the UAE and criticized three of his fellow Shaykhly rulers for dragging their feet and resisting centralization. Ambassador Sterner seemed to have accepted the remarks of Shaykh Zayid at face value and indicated that he planned to do some missionary work with those other Shaykhs to persuade them to cooperate for a stronger federation.
2. Some of my resident and near-resident Arabists who have spent many years in and around the Gulf believe Ambassador Sterner should be cautioned as to the dangers of trying to broker a stronger UAE with the other Shaykhs on behalf of Shaykh Zayid. As so often happens in the Middle East, the reaction is likely to be stronger than the action, and quite negative in several respects.
3. The use is very much Zayid’s show and Ambassador Sterner’s cable, whether he realizes it or not, makes that point loud and clear. Zayid complains about each state having its own army and intel service, but his own state has the largest of both. If he feels so strongly about this, why does he not lead the way by combining his army (12,000) with the Union Defense Force (2,600)? This gesture might get a positive response from the other states. As long as he keeps his own force and intel service, how can he expect the others to do less? The fact is he wishes to bring them all under his control.
4. [4½ lines not declassified] Unlike Abu Dhabi, Rashid has very few foreign advisors—Dubai is run by native Dubayyans.
5. If Ambassador Sterner starts to talk “union” with Rashid, or with Sultan of Sharjah, or Saqar of Ras-al-Khaymah, he is likely to get caught in the middle of a nasty game, with the USG the ultimate loser. His moves will not be lost on Iran, which has its own ideas about the UAE and has close relations with Dubai and Sharjah. I am not stating that a strong UAE is not in USG interest, it most certainly is. There are, however, more and safer options open to US than those proposed in Abu Dhabi Embtel. Ambassador Sterner’s proposals concern only our relationship with Zayid and do not take into account the broader area realities.
6. While we are all pleased by the Saudi-UAE (Abu Dhabi) border agreement, let us not forget that the agreement has not yet been implemented and there are still points to be ironed out on the ground. Also, let us wait until the first Saudi Ambassador arrives in the UAE before we conclude everything is smooth sailing. The question is, do we want to associate ourselves with Zayid’s UAE, or with the UAE as a viable entity prepared to play a role with its neighbors in insuring the security of the Gulf? Right now Zayid’s views are the UAE’s views. His views [on] Iran, and on Arabizing the Gulf, are hardly compatible with USG policy. We should work on Zayid as well as the other Shaykhs, not on the other Shaykhs for Zayid.
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Summary: Ambassador Helms alerted the White House of several possible risks inherent in Ambassador Sterner’s approach to Shaikh Zayid of the United Arab Emirates.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Backchannel Messages, Box 4, Middle East/Africa, Incoming, September 1974. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. In telegram 1252 from Abu Dhabi, September 15, Sterner accepted in principle a request from Shaikh Zayid to “do some missionary work” with the other Shaikhs of the United Arab Emirates “in a low-key fashion as the opportunities present themselves” to encourage the strengthening of U.A.E. internal structures. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740258–0335)
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