46. Telegram From the Embassy in Bahrain to the Department of State1
538. Kuwait pass Doha, Muscat. Subject: Retention MIDEASTFOR in Bahrain.
1. Foreign Minister, when I called on him today, informed me “officially” that GOB has determined it will rescind notice of termination stationing agreement and that Middle East Force may continue to remain stationed in Bahrain. He emphasized this had been difficult decision in which all Cabinet took part and was taken not within narrow context of stationing agreement and U.S. Navy presence but in wider view of Bahrain’s desire for best possible relations with U.S. and hope for evolving U.S. role in Bahrain and Gulf generally over next generation.
2. FonMin stressed this must remain “confidential” understanding until certain problems worked out: 1) Modalities—exchange of confidential notes in which we acknowledge termination notice and express interest in GOB reconsideration in view changed circumstances in Middle East, and GOB reply indicating it has reconsidered and in effect withdraws notice, subject to resolution certain related problems, 2) “legal questions”—“most important” issue of legal jurisdiction plus GOB desire to see termination provision of agreement shortened from one year to six months, 3) “economic questions”—benefits, focused largely on technical assistance, as evidence stronger future U.S.-Bahrain relationship in which decision to permit Navy to remain is but an aspect. This could include rental fees directly related to Navy presence but more important a U.S. “technical assistance” role which must not be ostensibly tied to Navy presence. Also question of MIDEASTFORCE use of pier space at Mina Sulman.
3. FonMin emphasized again and again that at present stage GOB decision must be handled in closest confidentiality. He said “legal [Page 207] questions” must be worked out first, with great urgency, and then we must sort out “economic questions”. He is looking toward having this business all tied up by end of August, leaving September for GOB effort to lobby to convince own people and neighboring states that its decision is in best long term interests of Bahrain, Gulf, and Arab world generally.
4. Septels, limited to addees with direct interest in details, will expand on what GOB wants and how it sees negotiations developing.
5. Comment: From FonMin’s remarks in hour long discussion it most obvious President’s and Secretary’s recent efforts toward Middle East peace have been decisive factor in turning GOB around. Although Foreign Minister careful not to acknowledge it to me, there is no doubt that approaches by Iran and Saudi Arabia have also played most helpful role in moving GOB to this difficult decision. In view of extreme GOB sensitivity about keeping decision confidential at this stage must request that any well deserved word of appreciation to governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia stress that GOB not yet ready to have its decision known to third parties, at least not through U.S. channels.
6. Dept pass DOD/ISA, CNO WashDC, CINCUSNAVEUR.
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Summary: Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaikh Mohammad al-Khalifa informed the United States officially that MIDEASTFOR could remain in Bahrain under certain conditions, including the creation of a U.S. technical assistance mission. Twinam ascribed the Bahraini change of position to recent U.S. successes in the resolution of the 1973 October War.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 632, Country Files, Middle East, Trucial States. Secret; Niact; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Priority to Tehran, Cairo, London, Kuwait, Jidda, Abu Dhabi, and COMIDEASTFOR. In telegram 163984 to Manama, July 28, the Department authorized the Embassy to officially request Bahrain to reconsider the termination notice. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740204–1081)
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