44. Telegram From the Embassy in Bahrain to the Department of State1
519. Subject: Retaining Middle East Force in Bahrain. Ref: Manama 0514.
1. July 17 I had first opportunity to discuss in greater detail with Iranian Ambassador his July 16 meeting with Amir on Middle East Force. Amir had appeared uncertain what Iranian position might be and hence seemed especially relieved and appreciative that Shah supporting his own desire to see Navy remain. From Amir’s remarks it clear to Iranian that Saudi message of support is getting through.
2. According to Iranian, Amir specifically mentioned Foreign Minister Sheikh Muhammad Bin Mubarak as among those GOB Ministers still opposing Navy’s continued presence, and, as reported reftel, Amir said he tired of Cabinet’s debating this issue and ready to make decision himself. (Comment: Constitutional government is new here, and Amir [Page 204] sometimes displays nostalgia for a simpler, less vexing way of making decisions. I would guess odds his actually ordering Cabinet to decide to let Navy stay are only fifty/fifty.)
3. With Iranian (protect), Amir made much of fact that Kuwait continuing to urge GOB to stick by October 73 decision to terminate agreement. According Iranian, Amir said Kuwaitis now talk of paying Bahrain “five times” what U.S. Navy would have, as compensation for Navy’s going. (Comment: Figure seems to grow everytime Amir tells this story). From Amir’s remarks Iranian got impression that while Amir and Prime Minister unimpressed and irritated by this Kuwaiti advice, other Ministers, notably Foreign Minister, might be taking note of it. (Amir said he would be sending Prime Minister to Kuwait in near future to discuss broad range of Kuwaiti/Bahraini relations, about which he less than happy at moment.)
4. I would be very surprised if anyone, including USG, could get GOK to support actively Bahraini decision to permit Mid East Force to remain here. Wonder, however, if we should not consider pros and cons of approaching GOK on this subject, with maximum expectation of inducing them to stay out of it. I suspect GOK would be flattered by such approach and that it might therefore rebound to our benefit in overall relations with Kuwait. Whether on other hand it might intensify rather than muffle Kuwaiti interference in Middle East Force issue is question addressees in far better position to judge than I.
5. I have appointment for courtesy call on Amir Friday morning, July 19, the day before his reported departure for London.
6. Dept may wish to pass to Jidda and Tehran for info.
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Summary: Twinam reported that Iran had supported Bahrain’s retention of MIDEASTFOR in conversations with the Amir, noting Kuwait’s continued opposition to the flotilla’s presence in Bahrain.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 632, Country Files, Middle East, Trucial States. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Kuwait City. Telegram 514 from Manama, July 16, is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740190–0536. See Document 45.
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