43. Telegram From the Embassy in Bahrain to the Department of State1
491. Subject: Middle East Force—Meeting with Amir. Ref: Manama 475.
1. July 10 I called on Amir to present letter from Speaker Albert congratulating him on establishment National Assembly here.
2. Obviously pleased, Amir began to talk about U.S.-Bahrain friendship and how much Bahrain welcomes Americans here, adding “including the Navy”.
3. I expressed gratification to hear this. Amir said that he had recently told John Gatch he intended for Navy to remain and wanted me to know this too. I said this news would be greeted with relief in Washington since USG was growing quite concerned about Navy’s status here, particularly since Navy wives and children are uncertain about what plans to make.
4. Amir said “you may inform your government the Navy is remaining in Bahrain and so is the Bahrain school”. He added that some Ministers are still undecided but that he was going to make the decision in this case. Amir said this must be settled quickly, thought he would call the Cabinet together July 13, and let us know what formal decision had been taken.
5. He then stressed there are two major problems concerning Navy’s continuation here: (1) Bahrain must have legal jurisdiction over offenses by Navy personnel since present arrangement is unacceptable to Bahrain’s concept of sovereignity and Bahraini opinion (he was particularly forceful on this point); (2) Bahrain must be able to show more financial benefits from Navy’s presence. He added that I should know privately that Kuwaitis had offered to give Bahrain “twice” the rent that Navy is paying if Bahrain would not keep Navy here, and that this still rankles. I told Amir I was at call of GOB to discuss whatever alterations need to be made to existing arrangements in order for Middle East Force to remain. Amir said he wanted to settle matter quickly, well before return of National Assembly in October.
[Page 203]6. I must caution addressees that Amir was alone without restraining influence of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, that no formal GOB decision has been made, and that there is serious constitutional question in minds of GOB whether government can take this decision, or rescind termination notice, or adjust terms agreement or lease without at least consulting, and possibly seeking approval of, National Assembly. I must also point out that as of this moment we are under proper formal notification that stationing agreement is to terminate in October and if we are unable to satisfy GOB on jurisdiction it is not beyond realm of possibility that after October we will have Navy here but no agreement at all.
7. Dept may wish to pass above message to Jidda, Tehran, Cairo.
Summary: The Amir assured Twinam that MIDEASTFOR would stay in Bahrain, provided Bahrain had legal jurisdiction over offenses by U.S. Navy personnel committed in Bahrain.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 632, Country Files, Middle East, Trucial States. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to COMIDEASTFOR; repeated Immediate to CINCUSNAVEUR, CNO, DOD/ISA; and repeated Priority to Kuwait City.
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