42. Airgram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- Power and Policies in Qatar
Summary
The ruling Al-Thani family has been pre-eminent in Qatar since the late 19th century. Their predominance has never appeared to be [Page 198] stronger than under the present Ruler, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani, who took power from his cousin Ahmed in February 1972 in a bloodless palace coup. Khalifa, a forceful and energetic man, runs a highly centralized, moderately efficient government, in which the only restraints on his power are traditional tribal and religious customs and his own moderation and common sense.
Government policies both domestic and foreign largely reflect Khalifa’s views. Domestically, Qatar is a benevolent dictatorship or quasi-absolute monarchy run along traditional conservative tribal and religious lines. In foreign affairs many Qatari attitudes are similar to those usually attributed to King Faisal and the Saudi government: deep-seated distrust of Communism leading to a generally tolerant attitude toward the West, in the case of Qatar oriented particularly toward Great Britain; in oil matters a tendency toward conservation of natural resources combined with flexibility about supplying the United States, Western Europe, and Japan; in Gulf matters Khalifa has always taken publicly a line of cooperative relations with other Gulf States; in private he can be rather scathing about most of his Gulf colleagues.
Future relations with the United States will probably range from guardedly warm if we maintain a balanced posture in the Arab-Israeli conflict or are instrumental in de-fusing it, to tolerantly chilly if we appear to be favoring Israel.
End of Summary
[Omitted here is material unrelated to bilateral relations.]
Policies of the Government—Domestic
Qatar has had modest oil revenues for two decades, and substantial revenues for one. Sheikh Ahmed, who was ruler for the decade before Khalifa took power in 1972 distributed much of the State’s income to the various Sheikhs of the Al-Thani family in accordance with a traditional formula, which reportedly allocated at least half the national income to the ruling family. Although the energetic and cautiously progressive present Ruler Khalifa was his Prime Minister, economic development was rather half-hazard and sporadic until the end of the 1960’s. Khalifa’s policy, both as Prime Minister under Ahmed and as Ruler, has been to cut back on hand-outs to the Ruling family, to put substantial sums into carefully chosen economic development projects, and to put aside a tidy proportion of national income each year in conservatively managed European bank portfolios. The funds expended on development have been large enough to have trickled down pretty effectively, and the result is a quietly booming economy, and a slowly but surely modernizing capital.
Political institutions and social conventions, however, have not kept pace even with a moderate economic explosion. The Advisory [Page 199] Council to the Ruler, a group of non-Al-Thani Sheikhs and leading merchants, appointed by the Ruler, which is the nearest approach here to an embryo legistature, thus far has the power only attend official functions and occasionally to form the audience for a semi-public speech by Khalifa. There is no local regularly published press. Radio and television broadcasts are edited to the point of being, with respect to local events, little more than a chronicle of the daily comings and goings of the Ruler and leading Ministers without substantive content or comment. Public security is maintained by a large and constantly visible police force, which maintains an apparently largely benevolent but very tight lid on crime and all other forms of public exuberance.
The traditional desert abbah is still de rigeur for Qatari men. Qatari women are rarely seen on the street; if so they wear leather face masks under heavy black veils, an arrangement that seems to favor the ugly unduly. Men do the family shopping. The opening of a modern new hotel here in February 1973 touched off a struggle regarding the serving of liquor, which is normally prohibited, and mixed public bathing, which is still unresolved. These conservative Wahabbi customs, however, are softened by a remarkable degree of tolerance toward the dress and behavior of non-Qataris. In private, drinking by men, and pant-suits for women are becoming increasingly fashionable among the Qatari avant-guard.
Foreign Policies
The linch-pin of Khalifa’s foreign policy is close brotherly friendship with his much larger and richer next-door neighbor Saudi Arabia. It is evident that he has deep and genuine admiration for King Faisal as a man and model Monarch. In the past relations have been so close that as much as 20% of the Qatari army and security forces was made up of Saudi troops. This arrangement ended in early 1973 when the Saudi contingent went on strike for higher pay. It was returned forthwith to Saudi Arabia. This incident, however, had no visible cooling effect Saudi-Qatari relations. This strong friendship with its largest neighbor allows Qatar to feel secure with token armed forces; an army of perhaps 3,000, a handful of obsolete tanks, 4 hawker hunters, and a patrol boat or two.
Perhaps more than any other Gulf Ruler Khalifa tends to follow Saudi-Arabia’s lead in attitudes and dealings with the outside world. This starts with a deep distrust and fear of Communism in all its manifestations. Despite recurrent rumors, there are to date no Communist Block representatives here, no communist-manufactured products, and no technical assistance. Partly as the other side of the anti-communist coin, and partly as a result of years of close collaboration with the West, particularly Great Britain, Qatar has a strong bias toward the [Page 200] West. The influence of the British Ambassador, who was formerly British Political Agent here, still probably rivals that of all but two or three of the Ruler’s most intimate advisors. Fortunately the Ambassador is a very moderate and sensible man; unfortunately for the United States, he uses his influence very skillfully to promote British commercial, financial, and industrial interests, thus far largely to the exclusion others particularly in the development and financial fields.
With respect to the United States, the government is basically well disposed, but seems to regard us with some reservation, much as one would a large animal who seems friendly, but who could cause a lot of damage. At the same time of the Arab-Israeli war last fall the attitudes of many Qataris stiffened perceptibly toward us, either by instinct, or because we made several announcements concerning aid to Israel. The Ruler was reliably reported to have been upset by what he regarded as our favoring of Israel, but more in wonderment that we would risk the displeasure of the entire Arab world for the sake of Israel than in anger. He and senior Qatari officials maintained an attitude of correct politeness toward the Embassy during this difficult period.
Qatar, both geographically, and in its interests is somewhat removed from the Arab-Israeli arena. Nevertheless the emotional ties of Arab brotherhood are very real here, possibly because of the country’s smallness and isolation. Qatar is believed to have contributed very substantial sums to the combattants in the war. During the war the Ruler called an extraordinary session of the Advisory Council before which he delivered a tub-thumping and emotional speech.
With respect to the other gulf states Khalifa has always maintained a posture of cooperation and the desire for close fraternal ties. At the time the United Arab Emirates was established, he let it be known that he favored joining the union provided Bahrain did likewise. (He was Deputy-Ruler and Prime Minister at that time) However there is generally thought to be a degree of rivalry between Khalifa and Sheikh Issa of Bahrain. Qatar’s relations with Dubai remain strained because former ruler Ahmad continues to live there under the protection of Sheikh Rashid. This strain extends to a degree to relations with Sheikh Zayyid of Abu-Dhabi, though to a lesser extent. In private Khalifa does not have many kind words to say about any of his fellow-rulers in the Gulf, although in fairness to him, one of his major complaints is that they are too narrowly oriented, and fail to think in Gulf-wide terms.
Future Outlook—Domestic Stability
Despite the fact that about one half its population is a polyglot mixture which comes and goes constantly, there appears to be a remarkable lack of ferment in Qatar. Qataris seem to be by nature conservative and tradition-oriented. Most outsiders here are laborers and artisans [Page 201] from Iran, India, and Pakistan, many of them desperately poor, and disinterested in anything but trying to scrape together enough money to remit to their families at home and perhaps to build a small nest egg before returning themselves.
The security forces seem able to keep an effective watch on the few thousand outside Arabs including Palestinians, who live here more or less permanently. There appears to be no effective organization or leadership from this group in the direction of extremism or any movement of potential danger to the regime. The first generation of Qataris to have formal schooling is still in its teens. At least until this generation is able to make its weight felt, it seems a good guess that the Al-Thani dynasty will be able to maintain its present highly conservative and traditional form of rule.
Relations With the United States
Sheikh Khalifa and his top advisors do not seem to have the admiration for things American that one often finds in newly developing countries. Qatar has had a long and close relationship with Western Europe, particularly Great Britain, and seems to find European products, technical help, and advice satisfactory, comfortable, and safe. Qatar, of course, has enough oil wealth for perhaps another generation, so that it can afford to buy advice and help where it chooses without consideration of who will pay the bill.
In attitudes toward the United States, one feels a slight sense of reservation among high Qatari officials. This may be compounded of unfamiliarity, a vague uneasiness about our size and strength, and some doubts about our position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. These reservations do not seem to apply as much in the business community, which is more narrowly concerned with what will sell at a profit, although banking is still largely in British and Arab hands.
Despite these slight and vague reservations, Qataris are basically well disposed toward the U.S., and will probably become more so with increased contact, particularly if we can become instrumental in obtaining an Arab-Israeli settlement or semi-permanent cease fire. Although they are geographically and in national interest rather remote from the front lines, emotional ties with brother Arabs are genuine, and Qataris will be watching to see whether we maintain what they consider to be a balanced policy on the Arab-Israeli question.
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Summary: Ambassador Stoltzfus provided for the Department a current summary of Qatari governance and politics in preparation for the posting of a new resident Ambassador to Doha.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Doha Embassy Files: Lot 79F187, POL 1–3, Qatar. Confidential. Drafted by DCM John Wheelock; cleared by Stoltzfus; approved by DCM Walter McClelland.
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