41. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Navy (Warner) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger1
Subj
- Homeporting Middle East Force (U)
Recent events in the Middle East have reinforced the validity of maintaining a flexible military presence in the Arabian Sea area. The Bahraini Government decision to expel the homeported Middle East Force flagship was a direct reflection of relatively cohesive Arab bloc pressure directed against regional U.S. interests. In order that we may move ahead expeditiously in the development of alternative support options for continued flexibility of operations in that area, I seek your support for the proposal that we proceed through our embassies in Tehran and Addis Ababa to examine feasibility and, if feasible, to seek authority to conduct surveys of most promising sites for homeporting one to two destroyer size ships.
I consider an investigation of this alternative necessary for two reasons, even if the Bahraini Government ultimately reverses its decision on the Stationing Agreement. First, acquisition of an alternative homeport location would improve the U.S. bargaining position should we be afforded the opportunity to renegotiate for access to Bahrain. Secondly, in the eventuality that the Middle East Force is increased in size, additional homeport facilities would be necessary for one to two ships to avoid overtaxing limited facilities in Bahrain.
Furthermore, in reviewing that portion of the NSSM–110 follow-on that addressed our FY 1972 Indian Ocean naval presence, the Senior Review Group agreed to qualitative and quantitative upgrading of the Middle East Force, periodic CV deployments and random maritime patrols as an adequate counter-balance to Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. This underscores the requirement for a continuing and [Page 196] effective Middle East Force presence in the region. Considerations governing this decision, e.g., the importance of U.S. interests in the region plus Soviet naval presence, have become more significant since the decision was made.
The Navy has undertaken a comprehensive examination of operational alternatives available while keeping in mind the mission of the Middle East Force. As you are aware, this mission involves support of U.S. objectives in the Middle East and Indian Ocean by maintaining a presence centered around the Persian Gulf/Red Sea area but extending into the Indian Ocean as far as Sri Lanka. The options considered included:
—Afloat presence with negotiated base and airfield use rights.
—Anchoring in an area which affords proximate air support facilities.
—Homeporting the Middle East Force elsewhere.
In the first instance, an afloat presence is not feasible for maintaining a continuous presence considering the extended deployment times required and the limited ship assets available to devote to a rotational schedule. The same problem is encountered in the second option including the added liability of limited shore support. Homeporting a portion of the Middle East Force ships continues to offer the most viable option for continuation of an effective Navy presence.
A variety of potential homeporting sites has been considered. They include Assab and Massawa in Ethiopia, various ports in Iran, Victoria/Mahe Seychelles, Port Louis Mauritius, Diego Garcia and Karachi, Pakistan. For a variety of reasons, which include political considerations, the availability of support facilities and operational time-distance factors, the majority of these ports are considered unacceptable. The principal exceptions are Massawa in Ethiopia and Bandar Abbas in Iran. Both offer the best of limited dependent support facilities available on the Red Sea-Persian Gulf littoral and are optimally situated for operations in the area of our principal regional interests. A request to investigate potential sites for homeporting U.S. Navy ships in Iran may be more favorably received by the Shah if presented in a manner that emphasizes Iranian interests involved in the continuation of a U.S. presence in the Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean area. The recent message from our Ambassador in Tehran (DTG 031505Z Dec 73, cite #8507) reports the Shah’s aversion to any U.S. Navy presence which could be perceived as establishment of a U.S. Naval base at Bandar Abbas. This concern notwithstanding, our national interests in maintaining our area presence indicate that every effort be made to persuade the Shah that modification of this position would clearly be in Iran’s best interests. There are encouraging indications that this possibility is not remote based on the Shah’s historical support for a substantial U.S. Indian [Page 197] Ocean presence, his continued friendship during the Arab/Israeli conflict and his continuing support of the HANCOCK Task Group operations. By the same token, Haile Selassie is distinctly pro-western and should be agreeable to the concept of homeporting U.S. Navy ships in Ethiopia. This appraisal recognizes that he would have to contend with opposition from the African and Arab states and that some quid-pro-quo might be expected in return, such as increased military assistance.
Our initial action should be to query the ambassadors regarding the feasibility of gaining approval to conduct detailed low visibility surveys of potential homeporting locations. This would include as a minimum Bandar Abbas, Chah Bahar and Kharg Island in Iran and Assab and Massawa in Ethiopia. These surveys are necessary before any determination can be made of best location for additional homeporting facilities and the commensurate associated costs.
To this end I am attaching a proposed letter to the Secretary of State requesting his support for such action. If you concur with this course of action designed to facilitate continuation of a U.S. Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean presence, I request that you forward the attached letter. Included for the Secretary of State’s consideration is a proposed message to the American Embassy, Tehran and Ethiopia.
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Summary: Secretary Warner advocated a search for alternative sites for MIDEASTFOR.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files: FRC 330–78–0001, Middle East 092 (July–December 1973). Secret. Attached but not published are the proposal letter to the Secretary of State and the proposed telegram, the latter of which was not transmitted. The Navy study of alternative sites viewed Iranian ports at Bandar Abbas and Kharg Island as the most desirable. (Washington National Records Center, OASD Files: FRC 330–78–0011, Indian Ocean 323.3 (April–December 1974)) NSSM 110 and minutes of the Senior Review Group meeting discussing it are in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Documents 54 and 58.
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