190. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
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Saudi Arabia
- Prince Saud ibn Faisal al-Saud, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Amb. Ali Abdallah Alireza, Saudi Ambassador
- Hassan Shawwaf, Office Director for Prince Saud
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United States
- Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
- Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Arthur R. Day, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
[Photographers took pictures.]
Kissinger: It was nice of you to stay over.
Saud: No problem.
[The photographers leave.]
Kissinger: It’s a pleasure to see you here. You’ve been here at a time of extreme provocation and you have behaved with great dignity. We appreciate it.
[A waiter enters.]
Something non-alcoholic please. I don’t drink anyway, because I don’t enjoy it.
Atherton: How did you enjoy the Mao-tai in China?
Kissinger: Mao-tai is the biggest competition you have; you can run airplanes with it. [Laughter]
Saud: It didn’t hurt their delegation here, because he was very forceful against Russia.
Kissinger: And a little against us.
Saud: But that’s normal.
Kissinger: Since Chou En-lai died, they’ve lost the finesse in their foreign policy. If we make agreements with the Soviet Union, they cry appeasement. If we resist the Soviets, as we’re doing in Africa, they try to organize the world against “superpower competition.” They’d like a free ride—like the Israelis. They’d like a constant confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Saud: This is one of our fears in the Middle East, that it will be polarized.
Kissinger: The Israelis like the Arab extremists. They’d like to present every concession they’re forced to make as a concession to the Russians.
This is why we appreciate your conduct—you refused to be provoked.
Saud: Thanks to your efforts, the arms sale was not blocked. It would have been hard to explain, not only on the national level, but on the regional level.
I got word from Saudi Arabia to convey His Majesty’s appreciation for the President’s and your action.
Kissinger: We also stopped the boycott legislation.
Atherton: The really bad one died.
Saud: You worked on that.
Kissinger: Roy has been heroic on that.
Saud: This is why I wanted to meet with you. Relations between our two countries are really very sound in the long run. We’ve passed [Page 629] through phases of adversity which have shown the soundness of the relationship.
An arms sale can be delayed a month or two, but it doesn’t affect. . . .
Kissinger: No, you have to be able to count on the constancy of the relationship.
I’ve said many times—too many times, perhaps—that you’ve played a moderating role. In the Syrian negotiations, I have a feeling the late King Faisal played a discreet role. He always did more than he promised. He never told us, but we’d always see a Saudi footprint somewhere.
Saud: We’re not embarrassed to be a moderate country. We believe it is in the interest of Saudi Arabia and of the region.
We want to build a larger relationship with the United States, and this is our constant desire. Not just for us, but we want to build a relationship for the United States with all the Arab countries. We think this is for the good of all the Arab countries.
We think this should be done. We’d like some reciprocation, of course. I’d like to explain this to the President.
Kissinger: We’ve always considered you a stabilizing influence in the Middle East. You’ve played your role with wisdom and skill. It would be easy for Saudi Arabia to become the focal point of tensions; you’ve deflected it with great skill.
We want to cooperate with you.
[Omitted here is discussion of British Foreign Secretary Crosland and Middle East negotiations.]
Saud: The election will be over soon.
Kissinger: Not soon enough!
Saud: Saudi Arabia won’t be an issue.
Kissinger: Well, it might. Carter will say you blackmailed us.
Saud: How can a strong nation like the U.S. be blackmailed?
Kissinger: First, you didn’t blackmail us. We cut down the numbers. It’s a matter of the good faith of the U.S. to a friend.
I don’t know what line Carter will take. He’s on the extreme liberal wing.
Saud: We made it clear, as our Ambassador told Mr. Atherton, we want to enlarge our relationship with the U.S., and put it on a sounder basis.
Kissinger: We wouldn’t accept it and it would lead to tensions between us.
We really have no complaint about Saudi behavior. We appreciate how Saudi Arabia conducted itself in Lebanon when our Ambassador [Page 630] was assassinated. We appreciate how Saudi Arabia has stabilized the situation in the Middle East.
Atherton: And in the world economy.
Kissinger: There is one problem, and that is the OPEC meeting in December. A price increase—almost any price increase—could have unfortunate repercussions in this country just when we’re trying to get the peace process going.
Saud: We’re in the forefront of those fighting for no price increase in this transitional period. We will fight. We won’t break up OPEC but we will fight.
It depends on two countries: Venezuela and Iran. If they put on a stiff fight, they can get an increase. Our Minister will be attacked. He’ll have a very strong fight.
We hope we can go through with it without any increase, but if they put up a strong fight, there may be a very slight increase.
Kissinger: We don’t have much influence with Venezuela. But we can discuss it with the Shah. It would have a severe impact here on the attitude toward Iran.
Saud: We have spoken to the Shah.
Kissinger: The Shah has fervent views on the subject. I’ve sat through many lectures.
Our former Ambassador in Saudi Arabia keeps publishing memos saying some of your people thought we wanted Iran to keep the price up. I don’t remember any.
Atherton: We’ve been trying to find them since Jack Anderson wrote that!
Saud: There were some French who wrote that the U.S. wanted a price rise.
Kissinger: To wreck the European Community.
We’ll talk to the Shah. If he does it this time, it won’t be costless.
Saud: It will have to be adjusted, but if it’s done now, it will affect world recovery.
[The group moved back to the living room.]
On the arms issue.
Kissinger: On the arms issue, I’ve frankly not gotten on top of them. I’ve let these contracts develop without my getting involved. We should prepare Congress a little better.
This is an internal problem for us.
Saud: We have a problem with our military.
Kissinger: We sold 1,000 Mavericks to Saudi Arabia in February.
Atherton: And they went through Congress.
[Page 631]Kissinger: You have to ascribe some of it to the political climate in an election year.
Saud: We ascribe all of it to that!
Kissinger: This works out, because this is the number of Mavericks you need next year. Next year we’ll request the number you need for the F–5E’s you’re getting. It doesn’t make a difference whether you store them here or store them there.
Saud: But the problem remains, because we don’t know about the status of the contracts.
Kissinger: But we’ll prepare the ground better. And the position of the executive will be stronger. For these two years, we’ve had an unelected President, and a Congress that had lost its leadership. When Senator Fulbright was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, there were responsible decisions. Senator Sparkman is a fine man but not the same.
Saud: Then it’ll be Church.
Kissinger: Not until ‘78.
Alireza: Two years.
Atherton: I’ve just heard there is a Senate staff group going out to the Peninsula. This is an opportunity to show them.
Saud: We’ll show them our military needs.
Atherton: They have influence.
Saud: We don’t want to build a strong military posture.
Kissinger: So far, none of the cuts made will affect your actual programs. This is where we can be more thoughtful, to match the LOA’s with the programs.
[Omitted here is discussion of Africa.]
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Summary: Kissinger and Prince Saud met to discuss the 1976 Presidential election and arms sales.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 209, Geopolitical File, Saudi Arabia, August 5, 1976–January 8, 1977. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s suite at the Waldorf Towers Hotel. Both men were in New York for the UN General Assembly. Brackets, except those indicating omitted text, are in the original.
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