Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

191. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Riyadh, October 21, 1976, 6:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Saudi Minister of Defense and Aviation

Saudi Arabian Participants

• MODA, Prince Sultan Ibn Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud
• Chief of Staff, General Othman Humaid
• Director of Security Assistance, LTG Ali Qabbani
• Chief of the Saudi Air Force, LTG Assad Zuhair
• Chief of the Saudi Army, LTG Muhammad Al-Shaikh
• Director of Air Force Operations, LTC Fahd Abdullah

United States Participants

• Deputy Secretary of Defense, William P. Clements, Jr.
• Chargé d’Affaires, Hume A. Horan
• Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA, Eugene V. McAuliffe
• CG, US Army Matériel Development and Readiness Command, General John R. Deane, USA
• Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, LTG Howard M. Fish, USAF
• Army General Counsel, Charles D. Ablard
• Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/PA, Tod R. Hullin
• Coordinator, Army Security Assistance, MG Louis Rachmeler, USA
• Military Assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements, RADM Kenneth M. Carr, USN
• Executive Officer, OASD/ISA, Colonel James C. Pfautz, USAF
• Chief, Africa/Persian Gulf Branch, J–5, JCS, Colonel Gene D. Rawlings, USAF
• Country Director for Saudi Arabia, OASD/ISA, Colonel William A. Fifer, USA
• Chief, US Military Training Mission, BG James Ahmann, USAF
• Embassy Political Officer, Mr. Nicholas Murphy
• USMTM Interpreter, Mr. Azzum

(C) After an exchange of pleasantries, Prince Sultan spoke of the long friendship between our two countries since the days of President Roosevelt. As an aside, he added a little dig that no matter what obstacles our friendship faces, such as recent opposition to arms purchases in Congress, that the friendship will remain. Mr. Clements stated that we would overcome any obstacles.

(C) The conversation then turned to the recent Riyadh Conference. Prince Sultan noted that many had felt the Arabs could not solve the Lebanese problem themselves; however, it had been done, and with good will, anything could be accomplished. Mr. Clements noted that it was a great step forward and asked how many troops would be involved. Sultan replied 30,000. Mr. Clements asked how many Syrians—would there be 25,000? Prince Sultan replied no, much less, but the details had not been decided. They would be decided in the Arab League and it would depend on the abilities of each of the countries who would participate in the force. He noted that Syria had less than 20,000 men in Lebanon now, and they had not asked for any specific portion of the force. Mr. Clements asked if the Saudi Army would participate. Prince Sultan replied that they had about 1,000 troops in Lebanon and they had no intention to increase the numbers, but they would support the other Arab troops. He pointed out that with the mechanization of the Saudi forces and the training involved, they had had to call back their units from Syria and Jordan, but they would not be pulling back the 1,000 man force in Lebanon.

(C) Prince Sultan said that Libya, Syria, the Sudan, and Saudi Arabia each have 1,000 troops in Lebanon now under the auspices of the Arab League. It would be this force that would be expanded, depending on the decisions in the Arab League, and they would be under the Lebanese President’s command. Mr. Clements asked if there would be any PLO forces in this new Arab Security Force. Prince Sultan replied that if the Lebanese President asked for Palestinian forces to be involved in some areas such as security within camps, he was sure that it would not be objected to. However, the key is that the solution is an Arab solution, using Arab forces, and while the great powers might have a role to play in the area, and U.S. Government help in general is welcome, that in this situation the key is to have an Arab solution and that the Arab world must care for itself. Mr. Clements agreed and expressed Secretary Kissinger’s appreciation for the role that the SAG has played in working toward peace and settlement in the area. Saudi Arabia has been a good friend.

(C) Prince Sultan commented that he knows the Israelis are unhappy with the Riyadh agreement. They fear that the rapprochement between Egypt and Syria will work to their disadvantage, and thus he expects them to maneuver and request more arms in an attempt to work the problem to their advantage. Sultan noted, for example, the recent statement of General Brown, how under intense pressure in the end he had been forced to apologize, and the President and Secretary of Defense had disclaimed General Brown’s statement as not true. Mr. Clements replied that Prince Sultan would recall that General Brown had come to Saudi Arabia with Mr. Clements on his last trip, that although he is a good friend of Saudi Arabia, occasionally people get caught in a situation saying too much or sometimes things are taken out of context, particularly during this election “silly” season.

(C) Prince Sultan then said, yes, but what about your comments in the New York Times article in which you said Saudi Arabia does not need an advance fighter? Why did they pick on General Brown but did not pick on you? Mr. Clements replied that he was somewhat misquoted, what he had said was he suspected that the Saudis would not want to buy the F–15. He did not recommend and still doesn’t; however, if in fact they wanted to buy it, they could. Prince Sultan replied that they are studying the subject now and will inform the U.S. Government of their decision later. He appreciated the opportunity for the briefings that the Air Force had provided on all the aircraft; however, they were not at this time prepared to discuss an advanced fighter. They did have some points they would like to cover such as cost increases, the balance of the missiles that they desired for the F–5, but these points could either be discussed or he could send a memo to Mr. Clements. Mr. Clements said a memo would be fine, but perhaps they could cover any urgent points while he was here and that he had two or three things he would like to raise.

(C) Mr. Clements said the first is the discussion between the Embassy and the Foreign Ministry on the Memorandum of Understanding. He understood there were some sticky points holding it up; however, he hoped that the support case which would fund the MAAG could be decoupled from the memorandum and signed. Sultan replied he would be perfectly willing to do so. As for the memorandum, the Saudi Government and the Embassy could exchange notes. They could agree to all of the new memorandum except paragraph 8 (immunities) and leave that along the same lines as it was in the 1951 agreement, subject to further negotiation at a later date.

(C) Mr. Clements raised the issue of Yemen and the training of Yemenis in the English language. We have no objection and agree it is a good idea, but we have to work out a few details. We would do so and get in touch with his staff. Mr. Clements noted, however, that we were going to Yemen after we left Saudi Arabia and he would appreciate any comments the Prince wished to make before the visit, as he had never been there before. Prince Sultan replied that there are many elements still within the Yemeni armed forces capable of stirring up problems and who have a leaning toward the Soviets; thus, it is important to show our support and make prompt deliveries of the equipment. For example, there is a problem with 105mm howitzers, a long four-year delivery time, and the need to get this equipment in there as soon as possible. Mr. Clements stated he would look into the matter.

(C) Prince Sultan repeated he would send a detailed memo of their points of interest; however, there were several key points he would like to mention then. One was delays in shipment beyond the times that were stated in the Letters of Offer, another was the inflationary cost increases, and the third was the short time that they are given to review new Letters of Offer. They need three months as a minimum for their review, and if that is inadequate they would then like to be able to ask for extension, but that 10 or 20 days was not enough time.

(C) Prince Sultan then raised the issue of laser-guided bombs. He seemed under the impression that they had not been provided any yet. He pointed out that they had been given a Letter of Offer for 1,000, which they had accepted, and that there had been adjustment in quantity between laser-guided bombs and MAVERICKs. Mr. Clements suggested that they should accept what they have now and we would look into the matter again in the future, after the initial deliveries had been made.

(U) At this point, an emissary from Prince Abdullah arrived and the meeting broke up so the group could attend the National Guard dinner.

1. Summary: Clements met with Prince Sultan to discuss the possibility of F–15 sales to the Saudis, other arms agreements and delivery schedules, and operations in Yemen.

   Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–79–0049, Saudi Arabia 000.1–399 1976. Confidential. Drafted by Fifer; approved by Clements on November 11. The meeting took place at the Ministry of Defense. This memorandum was attached as Tab D to a November 9 covering memorandum from Col. James C. Pfautz, Executive Officer to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA, to Rear Adm. Carr. (Ibid.) Five other memoranda of conversation are included under Pfautz’s note, mainly of a technical nature, but Tab A is a transcript of a meeting with King Khalid, which is not published.