Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

189. Memorandum From Robert B. Oakley, Catherine Desibour, and Robert B. Plowden, Jr. of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, September 22, 1976.

SUBJECT

• Sale of SIDEWINDER and MAVERICK Missiles to Saudi Arabia

As we mentioned to you last evening, the proposed LOA to sell 650 Mavericks to Saudi Arabia, and possibly a similar proposal to sell 850 Sidewinders, is in serious trouble in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. While Roy Atherton, according to all sources, did a superb job testifying in favor of the Saudi sales before the committee yesterday at what appeared a congenial session, the SFRC subsequently went into closed session at which time Senator Humphrey apparently proposed Senate disapproval of the Maverick sale (according to some he also opposed the F–16 sale to Iran) if it were not withdrawn by the Executive Branch. He stated (and the press has reported) he would either call or seek a meeting with the President to request withdrawal. Senator Case was strongly supportive of Senator Humphrey’s position. After considerable discussion, however, the committee remained deadlocked and agreed to meet again Friday, presumably in open session, to decide what to do with all the proposed resolutions of disapproval.

While it appears safe to assume that most of the LOAs will be permitted to go forward, it is difficult to judge whether Humphrey can get sufficient votes in the SFRC to report resolutions of disapproval on the Saudi, and perhaps Iranian, cases. He obviously has a greater chance in respect to the Maverick sale, but the two might be paired. It appears the SFRC Staff is exerting additional pressures on Senators to use this issue as a means of rebuking the Administration for its poor performance on the arms impact control statements and for the veto of the security assistance bill. On the House side, the International Relations Committee is waiting to see what the Senate does and would probably follow its lead in disapproving or approving LOAs.

In the event the Senate does bring a resolution of disapproval to the floor, it is clear the fate of the Maverick sale will be decided not on its merits but by politics. There will be considerable pressure by Jewish groups to reject the sale, strengthened by partisan pressure to support the Democratic Party platform and present the President with a major foreign policy defeat on his arms sale policy. (It would be the first time an arms case submitted to Congress was rejected.)

A bitter floor fight on arms sales issues will hurt the President domestically but to withdraw any of the LOAs or to have Congress disapprove them after having made a strong defense (including the President’s and Senator Dole’s speeches of last week) would also be seen as a defeat for the Administration and would hurt domestically. Moreover, any further slippage at this time due to Congressional pressure on what we can deliver to Saudi Arabia, coming on top of the commitments the Administration has given and the anti-boycott action by the Congress, will create major difficulties in our relations with this important country. It could impact negatively, inter alia, on our desire to hold down oil prices. Finally, we can expect a more generalized foreign policy fall-out among friendly countries as another instance of what they would see as United States inability to make good on long-standing commitments due to domestic pressures.

State, of course, is strongly opposed to any Presidential decision to withdraw LOAs for Saudi Arabia or to reduce further the number of missiles involved.

The best possible outcome, of course, is to have any resolution of disapproval die in committee. In our view, the best means to achieve this is for the President to try and convince Senator Case to withdraw his opposition to the Saudi sale, coupled with a major Administration effort with other SFRC members to try and persuade them not to approve a resolution of disapproval should Case press ahead. Case’s stand places Senator Javits, who negotiated and agreed to the reduced sale, in a difficult position vis-à-vis his colleagues and constituents. It also makes it difficult for Humphrey not to oppose one or more LOAs. We believe the President is the only person who might be able to prevail upon Case. Accordingly, we recommend the President telephone the Senator, if possible prior to the SFRC meeting Friday morning. (There is a slight possibility the committee will be unable to achieve a quorum Friday and will put the issue over until next week.) The President could argue his position on the basis of 1) severe adverse foreign policy implications of an additional slap in the face to the Saudis or Iranians by Congress, including the potential impact on the Saudi position vis-à-vis oil prices, and on the struggle between moderates and radicals in the Arab world; 2) the broader foreign policy implications of what will appear to be another instance of the US suddenly upsetting a long-standing relationship in the security field with a friendly country; and 3) the difficult position Case, as a Republican, is placing the President, who decided to go ahead with the sales after talking to Case and Javits.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That we oppose any further negotiations to either reduce the Maverick or Sidewinder sale further or withdraw it.

2. That you forward the recommended telephone call to Senator Case at Tab A.

3. That you approve a major effort with other SFRC members.

Max Friedersdorf concurs.

1. Summary: The NSC Staff requested that Scowcroft approve several measures to secure the approval of the Sidewinder/Maverick missile sale to Saudi Arabia.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 28, Saudi Arabia (15). Confidential. Sent for action. Max Friedersdorf concurred. Scowcroft approved Options 1 and 3, and disapproved Option 2. He wrote under the disapproval: “I want to keep the President out of it. Case is hopeless, but Humphrey is obligated to support us.” Attached, but not published, at Tab A are talking points for Option 2, a Presidential telephone call to Case. The talking points indicate that Ford, following a conversation with Javits and Case, reduced the originally proposed sale of 1,000 Sidewinders and 1,500 Mavericks to 850 and 650, respectively. Ford met with Javits and Case on August 30. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary, 8/21–31/76) Scowcroft provided Ford with talking points for that meeting. (Ibid., National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 28, Saudi Arabia (14)) Congress did not block the sale. (Congress and the Nation, vol. IV, 1973–1976, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1977, p. 877.)