149. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1
4253. Subj: Soviet Presence in Somalia. Ref: A. Jidda 3577; B. Jidda 3197.
Summary: As Saudis move toward a policy on Somalia, they again request definition of our intentions and objectives re Soviet base facilities in Berbera, and of our willingness to replace USSR as source of military supply for Somalia. SAG is inclined to press Somalis not to allow base ever to be activated; they believe that if it were activated, Soviets would simply dig in despite pressure and criticism, and raise hue and cry about Western rights and facilities elsewhere in the region. Intensity and immediacy of Saudi pressures on Somalis, however, may slacken because of linkage established by DOD briefings between Soviet presence and US interest in expanding our facility in Diego Garcia. End summary.
1. We have received another request from the Saudis for a definition of our intentions and objectives with respect to the Soviet facilities at Berbera, Somalia.
2. Calling attention to their surprise and puzzlement over unexpected publication of aerial reconnaissance photography which they had been assured was “Top Secret,” Prince Turki al Faisal has frankly questioned whether it is in Saudi Arabia’s interest to coordinate with [Page 493] USG any further action of his own government on this situation. [less than 1 line not declassified] SAG has definitely decided to concentrate on a strategy of pressuring the Somali regime not to allow the Soviet base ever to be activated—as opposed to waiting for missiles to arrive and then hoping to force the Soviet Union to make an embarrassing and expensive withdrawal under a spotlight of publicity.
3. Prince Turki’s reasoning was concise: The Saudis estimate that the Somalis were honestly ignorant of the nature of the Soviet installation in the past, and may still be unconvinced; the Soviets undoubtedly realized from the beginning that their base would be exposed sooner or later, and must have already discounted the political liability in consideration of greater long-term military advantages; the Soviets must, therefore, be expected to “dig in” and resist all efforts to force them to abandon the Berbera facility; if there is any chance to overcome Soviet determination to remain, however, it will be before the base is fully activated and while there is yet some plausibility to the claim that the real purposes of the installation were misrepresented by “Imperialist propaganda.”
4. Prince Turki “unofficially” voiced his government’s concern that if the Berbera base were activated, Soviet reaction to protests from regional governments would take the form of an international hue and cry over U.S. military rights and facilities at Bahrain, Masirah and Diego Garcia. This would put irresistible pressure on the Saudis to support a policy of keeping the entire Indian Ocean, Red Sea and Persian Gulf areas free of all foreign bases, a policy which they would, under present circumstances, consider a net disadvantage to themselves and to the free world generally. If the Soviet reaction succeeded in posing American “withdrawal” from those “foreign bases” as a reasonable quid pro quo for the closure of the Berbera facility, the Saudis fear that the United States would be inclined to reach a stand-off accommodation with the Soviet Union in favor of preserving the unchallenged right of both great powers to dispose their strategic influence in the Indian Ocean region. “In that event,” said Turki, “Saudi Arabia would be the ultimate loser. The existence of a Soviet air/communications/missile base at Berbera is a direct and immediate threat to our security. Tolerance of its existence would also significantly undercut our efforts to keep the region free of Communist military influence, and would most particularly weaken the PDRY Government’s resistance to Soviet demands for naval base rights at Aden.”
5. The pace and energy of further Saudi efforts to pressure the Somali regime can be expected to slacken measurably as a result of the publicity given this subject by the Defense Department in the context of justifying our own proposed naval facilities in the Indian Ocean. The favorable impact of our “exclusive” and “Top Secret” briefings has [Page 494] likewise been severely dissipated, and replaced by growing suspicion in Saudi minds that they were being “used.”
6. Efforts to generate renewed Saudi activity vis-à-vis Somalia must await a response to Prince Saud’s request (reftel) that they be permitted to assure Somalia of the willingness of the USG to replace the USSR as a source of military supply should the expulsion of the Soviets from Berbera result in Moscow’s shut-off of bilateral military assistance. In this connection, Prince Turki recalled on June 11 that Secretary Kissinger promised King Faisal in February of this year, when he first revealed to His Majesty the existence of the Soviet installations in Somalia, that the United States would give Saudi Arabia “whatever help is necessary” to assure their withdrawal. The Saudis, according to Turki, consider this a “commitment” which should extend to the provision of military aid if such is required to achieve our common objective.
Summary: The Embassy reported on the Saudi request for information regarding U.S. policy toward the Soviet naval base at Berbera, Somalia.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 29, Saudi Arabia–State Department Telegrams, To SecState-Exdis (3). Secret; Exdis. Telegram 3577 from Jidda was not found. Telegram 3197 from Jidda, May 6, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750158–0374. The record of Kissinger’s February 15 meeting with Fahd is Document 127. Discussion of the Soviet base at Berbera is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Documents 140, 144, and 155. Documentation on Diego Garcia is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–8, South Asia, 1973–1976, Documents 57 and 69.
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